D. Geoffrey G. Cowper

A class action was brought against a telecommunications provider on behalf of approximately two million Ontario residents who alleged they were overcharged through an undisclosed call-rounding practice.

The class consisted of both consumers (protected from arbitration by the Consumer Protection Act, 2002) and non-consumer business customers bound by a mandatory arbitration clause in standard form contracts.

The majority held that s. 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 does not grant the court discretion to refuse to stay claims that are dealt with in an arbitration agreement, and that the first precondition under s. 7(5)(a) was not met because the sole matter in dispute — alleged overbilling — was dealt with in the arbitration agreements.

The business customer claims were therefore stayed, as only the consumers benefited from the Consumer Protection Act's override of the arbitration clause.

Four judges dissented, holding that s. 7(5) confers a discretion to allow the entire proceeding including arbitrable claims to continue in court where it would be unreasonable to separate them.

Telecommunications companies sought leave to appeal certification orders permitting class proceedings concerning cellular phone billing practices.

The proposed class actions alleged that the defendants breached contracts, engaged in deceptive practices contrary to the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, and were unjustly enriched by rounding call durations up to the nearest minute under plans described as billed “per minute.” The moving parties argued that individual contractual contexts prevented the existence of a common issue and that certification was therefore inappropriate.

The court held that the meaning of the contractual phrase “per minute billing” was a common issue capable of resolution across the class, particularly given the standardized and adhesive nature of the consumer contracts.

Leave to appeal was refused and the certification orders were left undisturbed.

The employer appealed a wrongful dismissal damages award where the employee received pension benefits during the reasonable notice period.

The majority held pension payments from a defined benefit plan are generally deferred compensation and not indemnity for wage loss, so they are not deducted as a compensating advantage.

It emphasized that collateral-benefit deductibility depends on the nature and purpose of the benefit, contributory characteristics, contractual intention, and policy considerations.

Applying those factors, the employee’s pension entitlement did not reduce damages payable in lieu of notice.

The appeal was dismissed, with dissenting reasons favouring deduction under a single-contract performance analysis.

The appellant used funds advanced by the respondent to purchase property in his own name.

The respondent claimed a beneficial interest via purchase money resulting trust.

The Supreme Court declined to abandon the purchase money resulting trust doctrine in favour of unjust enrichment, holding that the doctrine provides certainty and predictability.

The Court found the trial judge correctly concluded the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted, as the respondent's contribution matched the exact amount of tax arrears it owed to a third party, and the respondent's own fax stated the funds were advanced without conditions or requirements.

The appellant deposited a forged cheque into its account at the respondent bank.

The drawee bank cleared the cheque by mistake and the funds were credited to the appellant's account and subsequently transferred to related accounts.

Upon discovering the forgery, the drawee bank requested the return of the funds.

The respondent bank restrained the funds in the appellant's and related accounts and returned them to the drawee bank.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the drawee bank had a right to recover the money paid under a mistake of fact, as the appellant had given no consideration and had not changed its position.

The Court also held that the respondent bank was entitled to trace the funds into the related accounts at common law, as the funds remained identifiable.

A 14-year-old uninsured driver stole a car and, while being pursued by a police officer, collided with another vehicle, killing its driver.

The trial judge found the uninsured driver 90% at fault and the police officer 10% at fault.

The Attorney General of British Columbia appealed, arguing its vicarious liability under the Police Act should be limited to the 10% fault attributed to the officer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that because the officer would have been jointly and severally liable under the Negligence Act but for the statutory immunity in the Police Act, the Attorney General steps into the officer's shoes and is jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the indivisible damages.

The appellant, an amateur youth soccer association operating exclusively in Ontario, applied to be registered as a charity under the Income Tax Act.

The Canada Revenue Agency denied the application on the basis that promoting sport is not a charitable purpose at common law.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the specific statutory provisions for national amateur athletic associations do not preclude other sports organizations from charitable status, the promotion of sport itself is not recognized as a charitable purpose under the common law.

The Court concluded that expanding the definition of charity to include amateur sports is a matter for Parliament, not the courts.

Lafarge Canada Inc. proposed to build a concrete batching facility on waterfront lands owned by the Vancouver Port Authority (VPA).

The City of Vancouver and the VPA approved the project, but a ratepayers group opposed it, arguing Lafarge needed a City development permit.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the VPA lands were not 'public property' under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867, but the project fell under federal jurisdiction over 'navigation and shipping' under s. 91(10).

The Court applied the doctrine of federal paramountcy, finding an operational conflict between the federal Canada Marine Act and the municipal zoning by-law, rendering the by-law inoperative to the extent of the conflict.

The infant respondents suffer from autism and sought funding from the Province of British Columbia for applied behavioural analysis (ABA) or intensive behavioural intervention (IBI) therapy.

The Province refused to fund the therapy, arguing it was an emergent and controversial treatment and citing financial constraints.

The respondents argued this refusal violated their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislative scheme does not promise funding for all medically required treatment, but only for core services provided by medical practitioners.

Since ABA/IBI therapy is a non-core service and the Province had not designated its providers as health care practitioners, the benefit claimed was not provided by law.

The Court concluded there was no discrimination and allowed the Province's appeal.

The applicant sought leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of workers' compensation legislation that bars private compensation claims.

The applicant was involved in similar pending litigation in another province where her action was stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion to intervene, finding that involvement in a similar case can satisfy the interest requirement, particularly to remedy the unfairness of the opposing provincial Attorney General having an automatic right to intervene.

The Court also found the applicant could provide useful and different submissions by ensuring a full adversarial context.