Charles William Hourigan

The appellant insurance company appealed a summary judgment order that found the respondents (an adult son, his wife, and their daughter) were covered under the homeowner's policy of the named insured (their mother/mother-in-law) as relatives "living in the same household." The named insured owned a house that served as her primary residence until she entered a nursing home, after which the respondents used it as a cottage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that "household" in insurance law refers to a type of community requiring intimacy, unity, and permanence, not merely physical residence.

The respondents maintained separate lives in the city and did not share a common life with the named insured meeting these requirements.

The appellant appealed his sentence for large-scale, prolonged marijuana trafficking for profit.

The appellant argued that changed societal attitudes toward marijuana use warranted a reduction in the established sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the parity principle and police misconduct were reasonable, and that societal perception of marijuana use does not justify reducing sentences for serious trafficking offences.

Parliament has not significantly altered applicable penalties, and large-scale trafficking remains serious criminal misconduct regardless of legislative changes regarding personal possession and use.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice on charges involving a sexual offense.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the trial judge failed to resolve conflicts in evidence regarding the timing of a disclosure narrative, whether the trial judge erroneously conflated the absence of evidence of motive to fabricate with a proven absence of motive, and whether the trial judge subjected the appellant's evidence to a higher level of scrutiny than the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons provided adequate insight into her credibility findings, that there was no erroneous conflation regarding motive, and that there was no material misapprehension of evidence or improper credibility assessment.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent following conviction on four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault.

The trial judge stayed the sexual assault charges and imposed a total sentence of two and a half years.

The Crown argued the sentence was manifestly unfit and sought a sentence of five years.

The appellate court found that while the sentence could have been higher, it was not manifestly inadequate given the totality of circumstances, including the respondent's age and status as a first offender.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of Crown non-disclosure.

The Crown failed to disclose medical records relating to the appellant's mother's health until partway through the appellant's cross-examination.

These records were relevant to the appellant's defence that his mother, rather than the appellant, killed the victim.

The trial judge initially dismissed the mistrial application, expecting that expert evidence would neutralize any prejudice.

However, the expert changed his evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the overall fairness of the trial process and ordered a new trial.

Plaintiffs appealed a motion judge's decision striking conspiracy claims without leave to amend and defendants cross-appealed the refusal to strike false arrest claims as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that conspiracy was a substantive cause of action that should not be struck under Rule 25.11, and that the merger doctrine did not apply at the pleadings stage.

The court dismissed the defendants' cross-appeal, finding that limitation defences should not be determined before a statement of defence is delivered, absent rare circumstances.

The court granted leave to amend to quantify damages for conspiracy.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a global sentence of six years imposed for multiple offences including dangerous driving, attempted robbery, attempted theft, possession of stolen property, possession of instruments for breaking and entering, and driving while disqualified.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in failing to give adequate weight to Gladue factors relating to the appellant's Aboriginal background, intergenerational trauma, and systemic disadvantage.

The court reduced the sentence to four years, emphasizing that Gladue principles apply to serious offences and that consideration of such factors does not constitute a race-based discount but rather recognizes reduced moral blameworthiness and the disproportionate representation of Aboriginal peoples in the prison system.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement appealed two directions issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge.

The first direction prohibited the appellant from participating in three appeals and ordered him to withdraw his facta, finding him insubordinate and in defiance of the supervising courts.

The second direction rescinded the first and appointed an amicus curiae to bring a Request for Direction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside both directions, finding that the appellant was owed procedural fairness and natural justice, which were not afforded.

The court also found the second direction violated the principle of functus officio.

The court held that any future proceedings regarding the appellant's conduct must follow the mandated Request for Direction process and be conducted by a different supervising judge.

The appellants sought a declaration that a 99-year lease registered against their property in 1972 was void, alleging it violated the Planning Act's subdivision prohibition.

The lease was entered into in 1968 between the respondent and the appellants' predecessor in title.

The application judge found that an oral lease agreement existed with part performance before the relevant statutory exemption was removed on May 2, 1968, thereby validating the lease.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: procedural fairness, lack of evidentiary support for part performance, and misapplication of the part performance test.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge denied procedural fairness by raising the oral lease and part performance issues only at the conclusion of argument and then refusing to permit the appellants to file further evidence to address these issues.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 45 months for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and 12 months consecutive for breach of a firearm prohibition order.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by disregarding principles of totality and parity, engaging in double counting, ignoring mitigating factors, and misapprehending evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence was well within the range for similar offenders and similar offences, and that the sentencing judge properly considered the relevant factors.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal dismissal.

The appellant had been acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of refusal to provide a breath sample.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable based on inconsistency with the acquittal, misapprehension of expert evidence, and the trial judge's independent research.

The Court of Appeal found no error by the summary conviction appeal judge and dismissed the application for leave to appeal, holding that the proposed appeal did not meet the test for leave as it raised no legal issues of significance to the general administration of justice.

Appeal from conviction on five counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual exploitation under s. 153.

The appellant, a modeling agent, was convicted of sexual offences against three male models.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal including failure to grant severance, failure to declare a mistrial, directed verdict applications, prior consistent statements, and Crown closing address issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike a negligence claim without leave to amend.

The respondent, a lawyer acting as a notary, had notarized an affidavit containing allegations against the appellant.

The affidavit was subsequently published in a newspaper article.

The appellant's original defamation claim was statute-barred, so he amended to allege negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that no duty of care existed between the appellant and respondent.

The court held that a lawyer does not owe a duty to third parties to verify the accuracy of affidavit contents, and there was insufficient proximity between the parties to ground a duty of care.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and attempt to overcome resistance by suffocation against his wife, and his sentence of 11 years in custody.

The sole issue on appeal concerned the propriety of a sentencing order under section 743.21 of the Criminal Code that imposed an absolute prohibition on contact with his children during the custodial portion of his sentence.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the division of responsibility between criminal sentencing and family law regimes, and that the family court or Children's Aid Society should determine the nature of his relationship with his children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of robbery with a firearm, three counts of forcible confinement, and one count of breaking and entering with intent to commit robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including text messages discussing obtaining a firearm, cell phone tower evidence placing the "Flyd" phone near the robbery location, fingerprint evidence linking Miles to the scene, and Miles' prior employment at the store.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, finding that despite a hearsay error regarding the post-it note evidence linking Miles to the phone, the curative proviso applied as the evidence against Miles was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order affirming the validity of a domestic contract between the parties.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's thorough analysis and rejection of the appellant's arguments to set aside the agreement.

The appellant raised a new argument on appeal regarding waiver of spousal support rights under the Family Law Act, but this argument was not advanced at trial and was declined for consideration on appeal.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following two field strip searches conducted by police in a motel room.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the strip searches violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal found that both strip searches violated the appellant's section 8 rights because they were conducted in the field rather than at a police station, and the Crown failed to establish exigent circumstances justifying the field searches.

However, the Court of Appeal did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a mixed commercial/residential property in Port Perry.

The agreement contained a mortgage assumption condition requiring approval from the mortgagee, Alterna Savings, on terms acceptable to the buyer.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the condition precedent had not been satisfied because the buyer failed to formally accept Alterna's approval by signing and returning the approval letter before the deadline.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the condition precedent was satisfied when Alterna sent its approval letter, and that formal execution was not required.

The court ordered specific performance subject to Alterna renewing its approval on substantially similar terms.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a jury trial.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had knowledge of 100 kg of cocaine secreted in his truck at a border crossing.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he made an incriminating statement to CBSA agents; (2) that the trial judge erred in leaving willful blindness with the jury; and (3) that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof in her re-charge on possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a party at a mutual friend's home.

The appellant did not dispute that sexual intercourse occurred but claimed it was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant was too intoxicated to consent to sexual activity and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's capacity to consent, the use of a toxicology report, DNA evidence, and the consideration of his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning and dismissing all grounds of appeal.