Charles William Hourigan

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for aggravated sexual assault in 2013, appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board requiring his detention in the secure unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant challenged the order as unreasonable and argued the Board should have intervened to break a treatment impasse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the disposition, finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety based on his history of elopement, substance use, and limited understanding of sexual consent.

The court determined that detention in the secure unit was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition and that rehabilitative programming was available in that setting.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing the deceased 19 times during a fight.

The appellant had armed himself with a steak knife in anticipation of a confrontation and carried it openly as he approached the deceased.

When the deceased said "you're dead," the appellant responded "bring it . . . game on." The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the words "you're dead" did not cause the appellant to lose his power of self-control and act on the sudden, as required by the provocation defence.

The appellant's preparation for the confrontation and his state of readiness negated any element of surprise necessary for provocation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his claim that he was a tenant entitled to protections under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The respondent had changed the locks on the unit and disposed of the appellant's belongings.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's finding that the appellant was not a legal tenant and therefore not entitled to tenant protections.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $300.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and marihuana, conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, and participating in a criminal organization.

The principal issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of communications found on a Blackberry seized from a co-accused.

The trial judge had ruled the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Marakah, the Crown conceded the appellant had standing and that the seizure violated his Charter section 8 rights.

The appellate court applied the Marakah framework and determined the evidence must be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the serious breach of privacy rights and substantial impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Hampton Securities Limited appealed a trial judgment in which the trial judge found that the employee, Christina Nicole Dean, was not indebted to Hampton for trading losses, was constructively dismissed, and was entitled to six months' notice in lieu of salary.

The trial judge also awarded damages for defamation and punitive damages, along with costs on a full indemnity basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld all findings, rejecting Hampton's arguments regarding the employment contract interpretation, constructive dismissal, the enforceability of the termination clause, the qualified privilege defence to defamation, and the appropriateness of punitive damages and costs awards.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated February 21, 2018, seeking an absolute discharge or a new hearing.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant danger to public safety due to improved insight into his mental illness, medication compliance, and stable employment and housing.

However, the court found the Board's concerns about recent cocaine use were reasonable given the appellant's history of manic episodes preceded by cocaine use and associated medication non-compliance.

The court allowed the appeal on the basis of transcription errors in the Board's reasons, which confused the appellant with another hospital patient and relied on irrelevant material.

A new hearing was ordered to take place as the appellant's annual review hearing in February 2019.

Appeal of summary judgment dismissal in a negligence action arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff's estate and family sued social hosts for damages, alleging the hosts owed a duty of care when the intoxicated guest drove home and subsequently drove his children and their babysitter, resulting in a fatal collision.

The motion judge dismissed the claims, finding no duty of care existed and alternatively that any duty ended when the guest arrived home safely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding genuine issues of fact regarding foreseeability and proximity that required trial, and rejecting the proposition that a social host's duty of care automatically expires upon an intoxicated guest's safe arrival home.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking her claim under a Rule 21 motion without leave to amend.

The dispute arose from a collective agreement between unionized workers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the dispute was entirely regulated by the collective agreement and that the arbitrator possessed the necessary remedial powers to address the wrong.

The court also declined to grant leave to appeal the costs award.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

This is a costs endorsement addressing the allocation of costs for certification and summary judgment motions in the Superior Court and the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The plaintiffs appealed from orders of Justice Paul M. Perell denying certification and granting summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiffs achieved partial success: they obtained certification on some common issues but not on their negligent misrepresentation claim, and they reversed summary judgment on some claims while others remained time-barred.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the plaintiffs reflecting their overall success.

A mortgage broker appealed the dismissal of its negligence claim against the Crown arising from fraud perpetrated by an individual who filed a fraudulent notice of change with the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services, falsely identifying himself as a director and officer of a corporation.

The appellant relied on a corporation profile report obtained from the Ministry when advancing $1.8 million in loans.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that no duty of care arose at the first stage of the Anns/Cooper test.

The governing legislation did not contemplate a private law duty of care, and the payment of a fee for access to public corporate records was insufficient to establish proximity.

The appellant, an egg producer, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to belatedly comply with a 2013 judgment order requiring payment into court.

The appellant had failed to pay the judgment funds into court, failed to bring a motion to add respondents as defendants to a related action, and took no further steps to advance its counterclaim for five years.

When the appellant finally returned to court in 2018, it sought permission to proceed with the counterclaim and amend it.

The motion judge applied the test from Rule 48 (dismissal for delay), placing the onus on the appellant to establish an acceptable explanation for the delay and that respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion judge found the appellant's explanation inadequate and concluded actual prejudice existed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's legal test or factual findings.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing his claim against the respondent regarding unauthorized charges to his credit card.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that while the respondent's first affidavit contained inaccuracies regarding credit agency collections, these were corrected in a second affidavit before the motion judge.

The appellant failed to adduce evidence regarding two new charges he raised at the initial return of the motion, despite the motion judge adjourning to permit him to do so.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's cost order and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a judgment in a motor vehicle accident case where the trial judge admitted liability just before trial and the matter proceeded as a damages assessment before a jury.

The appellants contended that the trial judge failed to address transgressions by respondent's counsel, unfairly summarized evidence in jury instructions, and displayed reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's conduct was fair and balanced, that many complaints were not objected to at trial, and that the allegations of bias did not meet the high threshold required to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.

The respondents operated a fitness club business through a corporate entity and agreed to sell the business to the appellants through an Asset Purchase Agreement dated October 30, 2015.

The agreement required the purchaser to assume approximately $58,000 in equipment and leasehold improvement loans.

After taking possession and operating the business, the appellants refused to sign the required promissory note, stopped payment on a cheque, and immediately defaulted on lease obligations, triggering the respondents' personal liability.

The motion judge found the corporate purchaser liable for breach of contract and pierced the corporate veil to hold the individual appellants personally liable for fraudulent conduct.

The appellants appealed on three grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The appellants constructed a detached garage on their property pursuant to a building permit issued by the respondent municipality.

During construction, the appellants accessed an unopened road allowance (Ninth Street).

After completion, the respondent took the position that access via Ninth Street was not permitted and blocked the street with concrete barriers.

The appellants sued seeking removal of the barriers, an easement, or damages for breach of promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation, plus punitive damages.

The trial judge dismissed all claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding negligence, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, or punitive damages.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the date of separation in a family law matter.

The motion judge had ruled that the parties did not reach a final settlement agreement on the date of separation and struck references to settlement communications on the ground that they were protected by settlement privilege and would be irrelevant at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that once the motion judge determined there was no agreement, the settlement communications became privileged and could not be used at trial to establish a date of separation.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually interfering with the complainant, his spouse's daughter, over a period when the complainant was between 9 and 11 years old.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) the trial judge misapprehended his evidence regarding a January 2011 assault on the complainant's mother; and (2) the trial judge applied a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence than to the complainant's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her credibility findings.

Foreign nationals released from immigration detention on terms amounting to virtual house arrest sought habeas corpus relief when their application to modify the conditions was rejected.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that habeas corpus was unavailable because the applicants were not held in custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that habeas corpus applies to any deprivation of liberty, not merely incarceration in a custodial facility.

The court remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice to determine whether the remaining requirements for habeas corpus were satisfied.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a failed real estate transaction.

They raised two issues: first, that the motion judge erred by failing to allow credit for rent payments after the respondent failed to close; and second, that the motion judge failed to adjust the purchase price to account for wasted legal expenses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in finding no authority to make the rent adjustment, the inadequate record supported dismissing that ground.

However, the Court agreed that the motion judge had authority to adjust for wasted legal expenses and that the $10,000 figure was reasonable and established on the record.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order denying him leave to bring a motion for recalculation of section 7 expenses for his son for the years 2014 to 2017.

The appellant was subject to a prior order prohibiting him from commencing or continuing litigation without leave if in arrears of child support, access cancellation costs, or court-ordered costs.

The motion judge imposed additional conditions before the appellant could bring further proceedings, including payment of a $5,000 costs award, compliance with an insurance order, and reduction of child support arrears to less than $2,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's order reasonable and consistent with the prior order.