Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and dangerous driving.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained following a police take-down.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal on the basis that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's exceptional physical condition and the disproportionate impact of incarceration on him.

The sentence was varied to make the dangerous driving sentence concurrent rather than consecutive to the firearm sentence.

The appellant was convicted of assault, possession of a weapon (a knife), aggravated assault, and breach of probation following an incident with her then-boyfriend.

She was sentenced to two years' imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction and 30 days concurrent for breach of probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of her self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the self-defence argument on the merits based on the evidence she accepted.

The appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or inferences.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering that a person found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder remain on the secure forensic unit of a hospital.

The appellant sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Board found the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety based on his lack of insight into his mental illness, likelihood of non-compliance with medication, and psychological testing indicating high risk of psychotic relapse and violent behaviour.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's disposition as reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had set aside a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge had found that the respondent raised a doubt regarding the reliability of the breath-testing instrument based on a low calibration check.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge erred by failing to apply the proper standard of appellate review and by substituting his own view of the evidence for that of the trial judge.

The Court restored the conviction and sentence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal reviewed additional material filed by counsel at the court's request and determined that the appellant's submissions did not raise an issue on which leave to appeal the costs order should be granted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister on a charge of influence peddling contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had negotiated a contract providing commissions to his girlfriend on sales of water treatment systems to First Nations communities, with the understanding that he would use his government contacts to promote the company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that there was no "matter of business relating to the government" because First Nations communities had autonomy in purchasing decisions and INAC was not involved in approving such purchases.

The Court of Appeal was divided: the majority allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, interpreting "any matter of business relating to the government" broadly to include the respondent's exercise of influence on government officials regarding the sale of products to First Nations.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's interpretation and reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences against his step-sister, who was significantly younger.

The trial judge found the appellant had been in a position of trust and had exploited the complainant's vulnerability.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's interventions during trial, and (2) misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted after a 21-day jury trial of 32 charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The convictions arose from a pattern of domestic abuse spanning over 10 years, including facilitation of sexual assault by strangers and assaults with various weapons.

The appellant appealed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and multiple errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no merit to the claims of ineffective assistance or errors in the charge to the jury.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its unjust enrichment claim against the respondents on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant knew or ought to have known of all material facts giving rise to the claim by January 2012, when the respondent admitted under cross-examination that Silverwood had supplied flooring for the M5V Project.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's testimony that profits were less than the management fee removed the possibility of damage from the appellant's mind, and that the appellant only discovered the actual damage when the respondent later admitted in 2015 that the project had made at least $200,000 in profit.

The action commenced in September 2015 was therefore within the limitation period.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual interference with an 11-year-old child.

The respondent, then 25 years old, had befriended the victim, engaged in grooming behaviour via text and telephone, and subsequently raped her.

The trial judge sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment with 15 months credit for presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give proper effect to the principles of deterrence and denunciation, by failing to recognize that the respondent had sought out a young girl, and by failing to consider the significant impact of the offence on the victim as a separate aggravating circumstance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and increased the sentence to 33 months' imprisonment (resulting in an effective sentence of 4 years after credit for presentence custody).

A police officer was convicted of sexually assaulting a complainant by performing searches of her while transporting her to a police station.

At trial, the trial judge admitted a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to a female officer at the police station, in which the complainant stated she had already been searched three times.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the prior consistent statement.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the prior consistent statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, and that the trial judge properly used the statement to assess the complainant's credibility by considering the context, timing, and spontaneous nature of the complaint.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal of an assault conviction.

The appellant had been represented at trial by a law student from a legal aid clinic and argued on appeal that he received ineffective legal representation because his counsel failed to raise Charter issues regarding a strip search conducted after his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge's determination regarding the reasonableness of the legal representation was a case-specific determination that did not extend beyond the four corners of the case and was not clearly wrong.

The other issues raised by the appellant also failed to meet the test for leave to appeal.

Jordan McPhee pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and robbery.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation.

The court, considering McPhee's criminal record, a subsequent aggravated assault conviction, and a psychiatric risk assessment, found him to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of six years imprisonment (less pre-sentence custody) followed by a ten-year Long Term Supervision Order, with specific recommendations for conditions to the parole board.

The Crown appealed a decision by Justice Maranger dismissing an application for certiorari and mandamus relating to a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling discharging the respondent on count five of an information.

The Crown had subsequently preferred a six-count indictment with count six being identical to the discharged count five.

The respondent's counsel conceded in oral argument that the indictment was properly preferred under s. 574.1(b) and indicated no intention to challenge it at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot but commented on the merits, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider all evidence relevant to the amended count five, which alleged a continuing sexual assault over a three-year period in Ontario and Quebec.

The applicant wife and respondent husband separated after an 18-year marriage.

The applicant sought spousal support and equalization, while the respondent sought child support and equalization.

The court divided the respondent's pension at source and imputed additional income to him for post-retirement work.

The court found the applicant liable for child support arrears for the parties' adult children attending post-secondary education.

The court also found the applicant entitled to compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support.

After setting off the child support arrears against the equalization payment and spousal support arrears, the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant a net amount of $7,340.14, plus ongoing spousal support.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months plus two years' probation for sexual assault.

He argued that the sentencing judge applied the wrong sentencing range, contending that the appropriate range for intercourse with an unconscious complainant was 12 to 14 months to three years, rather than the 21 months to four years range for forced intercourse with a spouse.

The appellant submitted that a sentence of six to ten months was fit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the sentencing range and that the sentence imposed was fit in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer only had a 'suspicion' of impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court reviewed the trial judge's findings, which relied on the severe unexplained collision, the appellant's disorientation, unsteadiness, odour of alcohol, and admission of consumption.

The court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officer possessed both a subjective belief and objective grounds for impairment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge found that police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant following observation of a suspected drug transaction.

Although the trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter regarding a warrantless entry into the appellant's apartment, she held that a subsequent search warrant was validly issued and declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's analysis of reasonable grounds for arrest, reasonable expectation of privacy, the validity of the search warrant, or the s. 24(2) analysis.

The appellants, a law firm and its principals, appealed a charging order granted by the application judge in favour of the respondent law firm.

The respondent had been retained as co-counsel on a contingency fee basis to assist with two minor plaintiffs' claims but the relationship broke down and the appellants terminated the agency agreements without paying the respondent's fees and disbursements.

The respondent applied for charging orders under section 34 of the Solicitors Act to secure payment from any eventual recovery.

The Court of Appeal upheld the charging orders, finding that all elements of the test were satisfied and that the order would apply only to the contingency fee percentage and disbursements, not the entire recovery.

This is an addendum to the Court of Appeal's decision on an appeal from a Superior Court order regarding family law matters, specifically concerning support.

The appellant sought relief regarding costs awarded to the respondent on the motion below.

Although this relief was requested in the Notice of Appeal, it was not addressed in the original submissions or reasons.

Following written submissions from both parties, the Court of Appeal quashed the cost order from the motion below and remitted the costs issue back to the motion judge for discretionary determination.