Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the shaking death of his infant son.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the appellant's wife, who had initially lied to police and had the opportunity to commit the offence herself.

The appellant appealed the conviction based on several errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made multiple errors, including improperly instructing the jury on circumstantial evidence, misdirecting them on how to treat the wife's evidence, and failing to properly instruct on prior acts of misconduct.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant client appealed the dismissal of his motion for summary judgment against his former solicitor.

The appellant sought a declaration that his liability for legal fees was capped at $2,500 per month, which the solicitor disputed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conflicting positions regarding the retainer agreement raised issues of credibility and documentary interpretation that could not be resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The matter was directed to proceed before an assessment judge.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant to organize a consumer club.

The defendant delivered a notice terminating the agreement, which the plaintiff argued was ineffective based on the renewal terms.

The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and the defendant successfully moved for partial summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the termination provision ambiguous and held that extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances is always admissible to interpret a contract.

The court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial and allowed the appeal.

During a lawful strike, picketers consistently obstructed the employer's vans from entering and exiting the plant until police arrived.

The employer obtained an interlocutory injunction after police could not guarantee immediate assistance.

The union appealed, arguing the condition precedent in s. 102(3) of the Courts of Justice Act was not met because police eventually provided access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most of the appeal, finding that reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance had failed to result in an acceptable degree of control.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by striking the term limiting the number of picketers to four, holding that it unreasonably restricted the employees' right of expression.

The plaintiff's husband died after receiving emergency medical care from provincial attendants.

The plaintiff sent a letter to the Ministry of Health expressing concerns about the care, which prompted an investigation.

The Province later moved to dismiss the plaintiff's subsequent wrongful death action, arguing the letter did not constitute formal notice of a claim under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the letter provided sufficient particulars to identify the occasion and allow the Crown to investigate, thereby satisfying the statutory notice requirement.

Crown appeal from the dismissal of an appeal from acquittals on impaired driving and driving over 80 charges.

The court held that the requirement in s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable" does not require police to have a breathalyzer technician available at every detachment at all times or to organize themselves so samples are taken as soon as possible.

The proper inquiry is whether the samples were taken within a reasonably prompt time in the circumstances, including where relevant the way the police were organized and why.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in law on the impaired count by proceeding on the basis that breathalyzer readings could be used to prove degree of impairment absent expert evidence, and may have applied the wrong test for impairment.

Leave was granted, the appeal allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial directed on both counts.

Commercial lease appeal concerning whether a successor landlord could re-measure leased premises and charge rent on a larger area than that fixed in a prior lease amending agreement.

The court held that the successor in title took subject to the existing lease and was bound by the stipulated square footage in the amending agreement.

The landlord failed to demonstrate any change permitting re-measurement under the original lease.

The appeal was allowed, declaratory relief was granted, and the tenant obtained a refund of excess rent paid with interest and costs.

The appellant sought repayment of two alleged loans said to have been made to the deceased and challenged the dismissal of one loan claim and the rejection of personal liability against the executrix.

The respondents cross-appealed the judgment granted on the larger loan.

The court deferred to the trial judge's factual findings, holding that the 20,000 DM loan was not proven while the 27,618 DM loan was adequately established against the estate.

The court also rejected personal liability theories based on plene administravit, devastavit, and s. 53 of the Trustee Act, finding no prejudice from the pleading amendment, no wrongful estate dissipation, and no basis to raise a new argument for the first time on appeal.

The appellant employer challenged a wrongful dismissal award limited to quantum, arguing the trial judge erred on reasonable notice, stock option damages, and mitigation.

The majority held the trial judge effectively fixed a nine-and-one-half-month notice period, properly interpreted the stock option plan as contemplating lawful termination, and did not err by excluding mining claims staked during the notice period from the mitigation calculation.

The court found no basis to interfere with the damages assessment for lost stock option value.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the action.

The appellants challenged a summary judgment dismissing their third party claim for negligent misrepresentation, the refusal to remove the third party as the plaintiffs’ solicitor of record, and an order striking portions of their statement of defence.

The court held that the motions judge applied the proper summary judgment test and correctly found no evidence on which the negligent misrepresentation claim could succeed.

Although the court expressed concern that Rule 20 was not the proper procedural vehicle to strike part of a defence absent a motion for judgment, it upheld that order because the impugned estoppel defence was based on identical factual allegations and would amount to an abuse of process.

The appeals were dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to re-attend and complete an examination for discovery as Pontiac's representative.

The court held that Rule 31.03(2) did not apply because the appellant was not an officer, director or employee of Pontiac.

His prior voluntary attendance did not amount to a waiver of his right not to attend.

The appeal was allowed, the motion order was set aside, and the motion was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a medical malpractice action on summary judgment.

The respondents had relied on expert opinion evidence that the standard of care was met, while the plaintiffs had no expert evidence supporting negligence.

The court held that neither the alleged "high forceps" theory nor the "excessive force" theory raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.

The appellants challenged orders refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal held that both motion judges properly exercised their discretion in assessing prejudice, delay, and procedural fairness.

The court accepted that the insurer had recourse against its insured under s. 258 of the Insurance Act and found no basis to interfere with the conclusion that setting aside the judgment would cause greater prejudice to the respondents.

The appeals were dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of an unregistered handgun.

The court held that the trial judge erred in principle by combining a custodial sentence and a conditional sentence where the resulting total effectively amounted to a penitentiary sentence exceeding two years less one day.

However, the court also held that blended custodial and conditional sentences are legally permissible for multiple offences where the total sentence does not exceed two years less one day and the statutory preconditions in s. 742.1(b) are met.

In light of fresh evidence showing successful rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated, the court reduced the conditional sentence on the drug offence to sixteen months less one day and left the remaining terms intact.

The appellant solicitor appealed the dismissal of his third party claim for contribution against real estate agents in a negligence action arising from a commercial property purchase involving false zoning representations.

The court held, by majority, that issue estoppel did not apply because the prior mortgage proceeding did not determine the agents' independent liability to the purchaser.

However, the majority concluded that the third party claim was an abuse of process because it effectively attempted to relitigate the same misrepresentation issue that could have been advanced in the earlier proceeding.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the agents' duty of care had never previously been litigated.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code procedure governing seizure of documents from a lawyer's office during a criminal investigation.

The court held that solicitor-client privilege attracts the highest level of protection and that a statutory search procedure must impair that confidentiality only minimally.

Section 488.1 failed that standard because privilege could be lost automatically through lawyer inaction, because the provision required disclosure of the client's name to the state in order to claim privilege, and because it permitted Crown inspection of the impugned document on the privilege application.

The court concluded that the mandated procedure produced an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to s. 8 and, absent any s. 1 justification, declared the provision unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Crown appealed an order declaring s.488.1 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as infringing the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appeal was argued together with a companion case.

The court dismissed the appeal for the reasons given in the companion decision.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence from a youth disposition imposing a conditional discharge and probation rather than an absolute discharge.

The court held there was no error in the sentencing judge's choice of disposition and no misapprehension of the distinction between absolute and conditional discharge.

It also rejected the argument that the dispositions were inconsistent under the non-disclosure provisions of the Young Offenders Act, holding that the relevant three-year period ran from the date of the finding of guilt and disposition, both of which occurred on the same date.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

Medical negligence appeal arising from a catastrophic birth injury after an emergency Caesarean section.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings on negligence and causation, numerous evidentiary rulings concerning expert reports, foundational facts, discovery corrections, and cross-examination, and alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based largely on the trial judge's handling of extreme incivility by defence counsel during a 165-day trial.

The Court of Appeal held there was ample evidence supporting the findings that no negligence was proven and that the injury was caused by a sudden placental abruption.

It further held that virtually all evidentiary rulings were correct, any errors were inconsequential, and an informed observer would not apprehend bias.

The appeal was dismissed, but the trial judgment was varied so the dismissal was without costs.

The Crown appealed sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in his factual findings and imposed an unfit sentence for very serious sexual offences involving brutal and degrading conduct.

The Court of Appeal held it was open to the sentencing judge to find that the respondent was not a sexual psychopath and that substance abuse was the root cause of the offending behaviour.

Although the effective four-year sentence was at the very low end of the range, the court was not persuaded it was manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the appeal was dismissed.