Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant suffered severe injuries after her vehicle skidded on preferential black ice on a Highway 401 bridge.

The trial judge dismissed her action against the Ministry of Transportation, finding the Ministry lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the ice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law.

The proper test is whether the Ministry knew or ought to have known of a special and highly dangerous situation creating a risk of serious and imminent harm.

Given the weather forecasts and the known risk of preferential icing, the Ministry ought to have known of the danger and failed to take reasonable remedial steps, such as an early morning inspection.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application to vary spousal and child support obligations.

He sought to reduce his support obligations to zero, arguing a material change in circumstances due to an inability to work.

The trial judge found he was working intermittently for cash and was capable of working in a supervisory capacity in the construction industry, imputing an annual income of $40,000.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including expert reports, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for damage to the respondent's bus caused by a fire originating from a seat heater.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in stating there was a presumption of negligent manufacture, the evidence supported the conclusion that the heating pads were inappropriate components for the heavy use of the bus seat.

The appellant breached its duty to take reasonable care in manufacturing the product.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent, a licensed chiropractor, pleaded guilty to nine counts of sexual assault against his female patients over a ten-year period.

The trial judge imposed an eighteen-month conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence failed to adequately reflect the principles of general deterrence and denunciation given the gravity of the offences and the gross breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed, and the conditional sentence was replaced with a nine-month term of imprisonment.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was nominated for a British peerage.

The Prime Minister of Canada intervened and advised the Queen not to confer the honour, citing Canadian policy against titular honours.

The appellant sued the Prime Minister for abuse of power and negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the Prime Minister was exercising the Crown prerogative relating to honours, which is not justiciable and therefore beyond the review of the courts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order providing for child support in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines and costs on a solicitor and client basis.

The motions judge found a material change in circumstances since the signing of the separation agreement due to the appellant's increased income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge had jurisdiction to make a final order on the motion, the finding of a material change in circumstances was supported by the evidence, and the costs order was justified due to the appellant's failure to disclose his financial affairs.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding an eight-year-old child witness were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found profound internal inconsistencies in the child's evidence that went to the core of the alleged offence, which the trial judge failed to reconcile.

The Court held that the trial judge erred by lowering the standard of proof due to the complainant's age.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas and introduce fresh evidence of his innocence.

The Court of Appeal found that the pleas were voluntary and unequivocal, and that his request to withdraw them was a calculated scheme to manipulate the system to obtain bail over the holidays.

The fresh evidence of innocence was rejected as incredible under the Palmer test.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum to address the appellant Johnson's sentence appeal, which was inadvertently omitted from the original endorsement.

As no oral or written submissions were advanced in support of the appeal, the court found it had no merit and dismissed it.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of stolen property and other offences.

At trial, the Crown sought a 12-month sentence, but the trial judge imposed a significantly longer sentence without providing reasons.

The Court of Appeal noted the appellant's youth, early guilty plea, history of childhood abuse, and pretrial custody.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 18 months' imprisonment, accomplished by reducing the sentence for possession of stolen property to five months concurrent.

A motion was brought to determine the proper appellate jurisdiction for appeals and cross-appeals arising from judgments on construction lien and breach of trust claims under the Construction Lien Act.

The Court of Appeal held that section 71(1) of the Act applies to both lien claims and trust claims, meaning all such appeals lie to the Divisional Court.

The motion was granted and the appeals were transferred to the Divisional Court.

The plaintiff was given 14.5 months' working notice of termination due to restructuring, plus 3.4 months' statutory severance.

Shortly after receiving notice, she became disabled and was unable to work for the remainder of the notice period.

She received disability benefits to which she had indirectly contributed.

The trial judge awarded damages for the full notice period and declined to deduct the disability benefits.

The employer appealed, arguing it should receive credit for the full working notice period and that the disability benefits should be deducted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a disabled employee is entitled to damages during the notice period even if unable to mitigate, and that disability benefits are not deductible when the employee has contributed to the plan.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding the calculation of her sick leave bank was allowed in part.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six years' imprisonment after punching the deceased once outside a bar, causing the deceased to fall and suffer fatal head injuries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, provocation, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and applying the curative proviso regarding the omission of a section 37 self-defence instruction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the six-year term was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment setting aside a separation agreement and determining net family property.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the respondent lacked capacity to sign the agreement, that its terms were unconscionable, and that it was signed under duress.

The court also upheld the trial judge's valuation of net family property.

The appeal was dismissed.

On cross-appeal, the court upheld the denial of pre-judgment interest but allowed the cross-appeal regarding costs, awarding the respondent her costs at trial on a party and party basis because she recovered a judgment in excess of her offer.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action under Rule 21.

The motions judge had dismissed the action, framed in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, on the basis that it was brought after the expiry of the six-year limitation period and did not properly plead fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal granted the appellant leave to amend his statement of claim to address discoverability and properly plead breach of fiduciary duty, on the condition that he pay the respondents' costs of $3,500 within 30 days.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment, impaired driving, and other offences, and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in imposing a mandatory lifetime firearms prohibition under s. 109(3) of the Criminal Code because the Crown had not provided notice under s. 727(1) that it would seek a greater punishment based on prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that a mandatory lifetime prohibition for a subsequent offence constitutes a greater punishment requiring notice.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the lifetime prohibition for non-restricted firearms was varied to 15 years.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his friend during a fight.

At trial, the defence argued the appellant was extremely intoxicated from inhaling glue and consuming alcohol, impairing his capacity to form the intent to kill.

During deliberations, the jury asked a question about the timing of the appellant's glue inhalation relative to a threatening comment he made.

The trial judge declined to review the relevant evidence for the jury.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the verdict was not unreasonable, but the trial judge erred in failing to review the evidence in response to the jury's question.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent, a public servant, was released from his employment when his position was declared surplus under s. 22(4) of the Public Service Act.

He brought an action for wrongful dismissal in the Superior Court of Justice, alleging bad faith.

The appellant employer brought a motion to dismiss the action, arguing the Public Services Grievance Board had exclusive jurisdiction, or alternatively, that the court should defer to the Board.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the Board and the courts had concurrent jurisdiction, the courts should not defer to the Board because the statutory grievance procedure was not mandatory and did not explicitly abrogate the employee's right to access the courts for breach of contract.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the integration of his pension and his entitlement to life insurance.

The Court of Appeal questioned its jurisdiction to hear the matter under section 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, but heard the merits as both parties submitted the proceeding below sought declarations beyond the arbitrated issues.

The Court held it had no jurisdiction over the pension integration issue because the parties' agreement required arbitration for pension disputes with no recourse to the courts.

On the life insurance issue, the appellant failed to provide material demonstrating he had not received the normal retiring benefit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was tried for attempted murder.

When the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge and others misheard the foreman say 'Not guilty as charged' instead of 'Guilty as charged'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty and the jury was discharged.

Moments later, the error was discovered.

The trial judge recalled the jury, conducted an inquiry, and corrected the verdict to guilty.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to change the verdict after discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's mishearing of the verdict was an accidental slip that could be corrected, and that the inquiry did not violate the appellant's Charter rights or section 649 of the Criminal Code.