Stephen T. Goudge

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an intoxicated off-duty employee of the defendant employer.

The employee had consumed alcohol before, during, and after his shift, but the employer was unaware of his intoxication on the night in question.

The plaintiffs argued the employer owed them a duty of care because the employee was enrolled in an Employee Assistance Program for alcoholism.

The Court of Appeal held that the employer did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs, as the duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to protecting the public from an employee's off-duty conduct.

The court also held that non-protected defendants are entitled to deduct collateral benefits from damage awards under section 267(1) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting specific performance with an abatement of the purchase price for an income property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had not accepted the respondent's request for an abatement as a repudiation of the contract.

The Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the property was unique, the abatement was properly valued at $281,000, and the error in expenses, which reduced the purchase price by 10%, constituted a breach of a condition.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, using a firearm, and possession of a prohibited weapon following his fourth trial.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting an overheard utterance to his lawyer ('I had a gun, but I didn't point it') without context, and in instructing the jury that his failure to ask why he was being arrested could be used to assess his guilt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the utterance's meaning was too speculative and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court also found the trial judge impermissibly undermined the appellant's right to silence.

Given this would be the appellant's fifth trial, the court entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant sought to amend her claim against the respondent and add two new defendants.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed claims were prescribed by the limitation period and that the appellant's negligence claim was barred by res judicata due to a prior small claims proceeding.

The motion judge also granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the respondent, finding no genuine issue for trial as the appellant's contract was with a corporation, not the respondent personally.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault, forcible confinement, and uttering threats.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in excluding the hearsay statement of the parties' six-year-old child, who was present in the apartment during the alleged offences but was unable to testify due to emotional trauma.

Although the trial judge found the statement met the threshold for necessity and reliability, he excluded it under his residual discretion, concluding that its admission without the opportunity for cross-examination would be fundamentally unfair to the accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of robbery with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge failed to separate evidence between the counts and that there was insufficient evidence the weapon used was a firearm under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The court held that while mandatory minimums applied, imposing consecutive minimum sentences resulted in an unduly long total sentence.

The sentence was reduced from eight years to six years.

The appellants, two psychiatrists, appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside a Consent and Capacity Board finding.

The Board had found the respondent, who suffers from bipolar affective disorder, incapable of making his own treatment decisions regarding psychiatric medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent was capable of understanding the relevant information and appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The Court emphasized that the respondent's refusal was based on a rational evaluation of the medication's negative impact on his scientific research, and that his decision, even if against his best interests, was protected by the Health Care Consent Act and section 7 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the suggestion the appellant did not leave the scene with the intent to flee civil or criminal liability was totally destroyed by the evidence.

The Court held that regardless of whether the trial judge was correct in her treatment of the presumption, the result would necessarily have been the same.

The appellant appealed convictions for uttering a forged document, breach of recognizance, and fraud under $5,000, as well as a nine-month custodial sentence.

The court rejected the challenge to the identification evidence, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the courier manager's identification despite an initial mistaken photo lineup selection.

The Crown conceded that the full offence of uttering had not been made out because the document was not dealt with by the intended recipient as genuine.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part by substituting a conviction for attempting to utter a forged document and reducing the sentence on that count to three months concurrent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault and common assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors of law and was not required to provide detailed self-instruction in her reasons.

The court upheld the three-year sentence for sexual assault but allowed the sentence appeal in part to delete an illegal two-year probation order that followed the penitentiary sentence, substituting a concurrent six-month sentence for the common assault.

The appellant operated an escort agency, arranging dates between male clients and female escorts, and keeping one-third of the fee.

She was convicted of living on the avails of prostitution, attempting to procure, and breach of probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for living on the avails, finding her business relationship with the escorts was parasitic.

The court upheld one procuring conviction but set aside another, and quashed the breach of probation conviction.

The sentence was varied from ten months' imprisonment to a $10,000 fine.

The appellant gas company appealed a declaration that the respondent municipality's right to purchase the gas distribution system arose upon the expiry of the 20-year term of their franchise agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the franchise agreement explicitly made the municipality's right to purchase subject to section 10 of the Municipal Franchises Act.

Under section 10, the Ontario Energy Board has the power to renew or extend the franchise.

Therefore, the franchise does not terminate, and the municipality's right to purchase does not arise, if the Board orders an extension.

The plaintiff sued his former solicitor for negligence after the solicitor failed to include a due on sale clause in a vendor take back mortgage.

The plaintiff's former spouse, who co-owned the mortgage, refused to join the action and was added as a defendant.

She counterclaimed against the plaintiff for occupation rent of their former matrimonial home.

The trial judge found the solicitor negligent and awarded damages to both the plaintiff and his former spouse, while also ordering the plaintiff to pay occupation rent and extinguishing judgment debts he had purchased against her.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the negligence finding but ruled the solicitor was only liable to the plaintiff for his half of the damages, as the former spouse had not sued him.

The Court also upheld the occupation rent award but reversed the extinguishment of the assigned judgment debts, allowing the plaintiff to enforce them.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant could not enforce rights from a protocol after a collective agreement commenced, rendering his claim for a declaration for that period hypothetical.

However, the Court found that any individual contractual rights existing prior to the collective agreement were not erased.

The appeal was dismissed, but the appellant was granted leave to amend his statement of claim to confine it to the period before the collective agreement commenced.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the prepayment of a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondent was entitled to prepay the mortgage without notice or bonus as it was not in default.

However, the respondent was not relieved of the obligation to make proper tender of the principal and interest.

The appeal was allowed in part to award the appellant additional interest from the date of attempted prepayment to the date of proper tender.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment awarding custody of the child to the respondent father.

She argued that the trial judge's comments in chambers and during the trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias and prejudgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some comments were unfortunate, a reasonable person would not conclude the trial judge had prejudged the issue.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's finding that it was in the best interests of the child for the father to have custody, noting the decision was fully supported by the evidence and the factors in section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The appellant school board appealed a trial judgment finding an implied agreement to provide reasonable notice of non-renewal for a 20-year transportation contract.

The respondents cross-appealed the finding that they had received overpayments based on the contract's payment formula.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions on the implied term of notice, the calculation of overpayments, and the dismissal of other claims were well-supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his personal injury action following a jury verdict.

The jury found that the motor vehicle accident did not cause or materially contribute to any of the appellant's injuries, despite assessing damages at $25,000 for pain and suffering.

The appellant argued the verdict was perverse and that the trial judge erred in evidentiary rulings regarding expert witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was reasonable given the central issue of the appellant's credibility and the defendants' position at trial.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.

Three insurance companies disputed the funding of a $1,995,000 settlement arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The primary insurer's liability was capped at the $200,000 statutory minimum due to the insured's material misrepresentation regarding the vehicle's use as a taxi.

The two underinsured motorist insurers were ordered to contribute the balance on a pro rata basis in proportion to their policy limits.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld these findings but reversed the motion judge's decision that the primary insurer should bear all costs, ordering instead that the three insurers share the $155,000 costs component equally.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual and physical assault involving three complainants over a 10-year period.

He appealed his convictions on the sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on the dynamics of abusive relationships, by allowing similar fact evidence, and by giving improper jury instructions on credibility and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was admissible to explain delayed disclosure, the jury instructions on similar fact evidence and credibility were adequate, and the pre-Lifchus charge on reasonable doubt did not mislead the jury.