Stephen T. Goudge

The Crown appealed a forfeiture order made during sentencing for conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic.

The trial judge ordered that out of $100,000 in seized proceeds of crime, $40,000 be paid to Legal Aid Ontario and $12,000 to defence counsel, with the remaining $48,000 forfeited.

The Crown argued this bestowed a financial benefit on the respondents by reducing their indebtedness to Legal Aid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had discretion under the Criminal Code to make the order and did not misapprehend the facts or proceed on an erroneous principle.

The appellant was convicted of assault, unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault with a weapon.

He appealed on several grounds, including the defective form of the indictment and the improper conduct of Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while the indictment was improperly drafted, the Crown's particulars cured the defect for most counts, except count #10.

However, the Court held that Crown counsel's cross-examination of the appellant was highly improper, sarcastic, and abusive, and improperly attacked the appellant's character.

This misconduct, combined with an improper jury address, created a real danger of a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, a lawyer and his law firm, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review.

They challenged the jurisdiction of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to reprimand the lawyer for allegedly making misleading statements while representing a client.

The appellants argued that such conduct must be dealt with exclusively through quasi-criminal proceedings or by the Law Society.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Securities Act provides the OSC with a flexible range of remedial options, including administrative reprimands under s. 127.

The Court also affirmed that the OSC has jurisdiction to reprimand lawyers acting in their professional capacity, provided that solicitor-client privilege is respected.

The appellant sold a surplus grain terminal to a purchaser with an agreement intended to include a restrictive covenant preventing the property's use for grain handling.

The property was later sold in a tax sale to a new purchaser who intended to use it for grain handling.

The appellant sued for a declaration that the restrictive covenant ran with the land and sought rectification of the original agreement if the covenant was found defective.

The motion judge struck out the rectification claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and declared the covenant did not survive the tax sale.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that it was not plain and obvious that the rectification claim could not succeed, and set aside the declaratory orders.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and commenced an action more than two years later.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred.

The motions judge dismissed the defendants' motion and instead granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff on the limitation issue, finding it was not reasonably discoverable within the first 35 days that the plaintiff had suffered a serious impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that under Rules 20.04(2) and (4), a motions judge has jurisdiction to grant summary judgment against a moving party, and that the medical evidence supported the conclusion that the limitation defence failed.

The respondent financial advisory firm was engaged by the appellant trust company to raise debt or equity financing.

The agreement permitted the appellant to sell its assets without obligation to the respondent.

After the respondent obtained a letter of interest from a bank, the appellant terminated the engagement, paid the contractual fees, and later sold its assets to the bank.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $420,000 for unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding that the respondent failed to establish an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation, or the absence of a juristic reason, as the services were not freely accepted for an asset sale and the respondent had no reasonable expectation of compensation beyond the contract.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in handling jury selection and failing to hold a fitness hearing.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly denied the appellant's right to challenge jurors for cause regarding pre-trial publicity by instead asking a general question to the panel.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not directing a fitness hearing when the self-represented appellant exhibited clear signs of mental illness and an inability to understand the proceedings.

The convictions were set aside, and the appellant was declared unfit to stand trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the respondent.

The respondent subsequently brought a civil action for damages and successfully moved for summary judgment on liability based on the criminal conviction.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment and the dismissal of his cross-motion for production of the respondent's pre-assault medical records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the criminal conviction established prima facie proof of liability and the appellant raised no genuine issue for trial.

The Court also held that while the medical records were not privileged, the appellant had not established their relevance for production at this stage.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing the evidence did not establish their identity as the perpetrators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including the appellants' presence in the vehicle used during the robbery, matching physical descriptions, and possession of the victim's stolen property and firearms—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to testify could be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the verdict.

The sentence appeal by Black was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed her custodial sentence for cocaine trafficking.

The trial judge had rejected a conditional sentence on the basis that general deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Proulx, the Court of Appeal held that general deterrence and denunciation can be met by a conditional sentence even in cocaine trafficking cases.

Given the appellant's full rehabilitation over four years on bail, the appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to a 13-month conditional sentence.

The police obtained ex parte search warrants to seize video footage and photographs from various media organizations following a violent demonstration at Queen's Park.

The media organizations challenged the validity of the warrants, arguing they should have been given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before the warrants were issued, and that the police failed to disclose an alternative source of video footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issuing justice had the discretion to proceed ex parte and did not commit jurisdictional error.

The court also found that the failure to disclose a secondary security camera system was not fatal to the warrants' validity.

The appellant applied for a stay of an order requiring the taking of a DNA sample pending his appeal of that order.

The Court of Appeal held that it has jurisdiction to stay such an order despite section 487.056(1) of the Criminal Code.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the majority granted the stay, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the appellant's privacy interests, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant as he was already in custody.

A dissenting judge would have refused the stay due to the appellant's failure to perfect the appeal on time.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to apply to strike his guilty plea after learning of a second DNA test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that counsel had informed the appellant of the test and its significance.

The court held that counsel's decision not to seek to set aside the plea was within the bounds of competency, as the second DNA test would have had minimal impact given the strong independent evidence confirming the complainant's testimony.

The appellant was convicted of importing a narcotic after customs officers discovered marihuana hidden inside coconuts in her luggage.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury charge, which was given before the Supreme Court's decision in Lifchus, failed to clarify that more than a probability of guilt was required and improperly linked the standard to an ordinary everyday meaning.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in an uninsured vehicle.

He sought indemnity from the respondent insurer under a policy issued to a man with whom he lived in a de facto parent-child relationship.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the appellant was neither a 'person insured under the contract' under s. 265 of the Insurance Act nor a 'relative' under the OPCF 44 endorsement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'insured' in s. 224(1) applies to s. 265, and that 'relative' in the endorsement should be interpreted liberally to include a de facto parent-child relationship, provided dependency is proven at trial.

The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.

The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.

The appellant was arrested and detained in Canada pursuant to an extradition request by the Federal Republic of Germany.

He subsequently brought a civil action against Germany and Canada claiming damages for mental distress and restriction of liberty.

Germany successfully moved to dismiss the action on the basis of sovereign immunity.

On appeal, the appellant argued that Germany had submitted to the court's jurisdiction by initiating the extradition proceedings and that his claim fell within the 'personal injury' exception under the State Immunity Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that extradition proceedings are distinct from the civil suit and that the 'personal injury' exception requires physical injury.

The appellant, a senior airport customs inspector, was convicted of importing cannabis and breach of trust after escorting two individuals carrying drugs through customs.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt were defective in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Lifchus and R. v. Starr.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge, considered as a whole, did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the standard of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and respondent insurers disputed priority for statutory accident benefits following a fatal accident.

The deceased had exited his tractor trailer and was standing 30 feet away when he was struck by debris from another vehicle.

The arbitrator found the deceased was the 'driver' and thus an 'occupant' of the tractor trailer under the Insurance Act, making the respondent liable.

The appeal judge reversed this finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'driver' does not require the person to be engaged in the act of driving or inside the vehicle at the exact moment of the incident, provided they maintain a physical connection and control over the vehicle.

The appellant law firm, Davies, Ward & Beck LLP, appealed an order disqualifying it from acting for Trilogy Enterprises Ltd. in a hostile takeover bid for Chapters Inc. The law firm had previously acted for Chapters on competition law issues arising from its formation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the previous retainer was sufficiently related to the current matter, thereby raising a presumption that confidential information was imparted.

The law firm failed to discharge the heavy burden of showing that no relevant confidential information was received that could be used to the prejudice of its former client.