Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant challenged convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking arising from drugs found during an inventory search of a vehicle he was occupying.

Applying the circumstantial-evidence framework for constructive possession, the court held the trial judge erred by treating guilt as a reasonable inference rather than the only reasonable inference available on the whole of the evidence.

The evidence was equally consistent with sole possession by the co-occupant, particularly because the drugs were concealed in a backpack linked by DNA to that person and there was no evidence of the appellant handling the backpack or participating in trafficking activity.

The convictions were therefore unreasonable and were set aside, with an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing that the refusal of a trial adjournment to retain new counsel forced self-representation and that the appointment of former counsel as amicus and s. 486.3 counsel created a conflict and an appearance of unfairness.

Applying the high threshold for miscarriage of justice based on trial unfairness, the court held that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and that the case management judge properly balanced fair trial interests against the timely administration of justice.

The court found no prejudice, no disclosure of confidential information, and no appearance of unfairness arising from the former counsel’s appointment.

The conviction was also supported by strong corroborative evidence, including security footage, DNA evidence, a distinctive tattoo, and a matching backpack.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault and assault with choking on the basis that recordings secretly made by the complainant should have been excluded under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the complainant was not a state agent when she made the recordings because there had been no police contact, direction, or inducement at the time, and her purpose did not alone transform her into a state actor.

The court further held that, although the appellant had a subjective privacy interest in the intimate conversations, he did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in recordings lawfully made by a participant and voluntarily provided to police in support of criminal allegations.

In the alternative, even if there had been a s. 8 breach, the recordings would have been admitted under s. 24(2) because the law was unsettled, the police acted in good faith, and the evidence was reliable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a seven-year consecutive penitentiary sentence imposed after a guilty plea to possessing a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm without authorization or licence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by exceeding the Crown's five-year position without notice, contrary to the framework in Nahanee, and by providing erroneous reasons for doing so.

The sentencing judge misread the applicable sentencing range in Tabnor, failed to give effect to the guilty plea and youthful first-offender status, and improperly disregarded rehabilitation as a sentencing objective.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to five years' imprisonment consecutive to any sentences being served.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault, incest, and human trafficking against his biological daughter.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent based on reasonable doubt arising from material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and reliability concerns related to her hallucinations, delusions, and heavy street drug use.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes about mental illness and assessed the evidence piecemeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reliability concerns were grounded in case-specific evidence, not stereotypes, and that he properly assessed the evidence as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of criminal harassment and one count of breach of release conditions.

During a court-ordered NCR assessment, the appellant made statements to a forensic psychiatrist.

The Crown introduced those statements at trial without a voir dire on admissibility under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, without first putting the statements to the appellant in cross-examination as required by ss. 10 and 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and without disclosing its intention to use the statements for impeachment purposes.

The Court of Appeal held that the combined effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

Mr. Stephens, convicted of mischief and failing to comply with a probation order in 2009, sought to reopen his appeal to argue for a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) defence.

He had previously been found NCR for unrelated 2011 offences.

His summary conviction appeal of the 2009 convictions was dismissed in 2014, and subsequent motions to reopen were also dismissed.

He brought a new motion relying on a 2024 psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the new report lacked the cogency to establish an NCR defence or to justify reopening the appeal, especially given the applicant's own inconsistent factual account of the events.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and breach of bail, and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the s. 8 Charter issue regarding the search was not raised at trial, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for appellate review under the R. v. Reid test.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, granting an additional two months of Duncan credit in recognition of the harsh conditions served during pre-sentence custody, thereby reducing the global sentence from 51 months to 49 months.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, breach of recognizance, breach of probation, and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an altercation involving a purported cocaine sale.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery by stealing with violence contrary to s. 343(b) despite the Crown alleging robbery while armed with a firearm contrary to s. 343(d).

The appellant received a global sentence of 20 months in prison and 2 years probation, with 320 days pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1, resulting in a net sentence of 4 months.

The appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in treating robbery with violence as an included offence in a charge of armed robbery, and whether the trial judge improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant regarding self-defence.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice that dismissed her appeal from a conviction for operating a rental unit without a valid licence.

The applicant contended that she had entered an uninformed guilty plea at trial, arguing this raised a question of law essential to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's complaint was fact-based rather than a question of law, and that she had failed to meet the very high threshold for granting leave to appeal under section 131 of the POA.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and from sentence of six months imprisonment.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the sentencing judge's failure to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sexual assault conviction appeal, stayed the unlawful confinement conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and found the sentencing judge erred by proceeding without adequate Gladue and pre-sentence reports addressing community-based sentencing alternatives.

The sentence appeal was reserved pending a supplementary pre-sentence report.

The Minister of Justice sought forfeiture of recognizances totalling $510,000 entered into by two sureties, Taylor Wilson and Christopher Gould, after the accused Michael Wilson absconded to Vietnam shortly before his appeal and judicial review hearing in extradition proceedings.

The accused had fled the United States to avoid prosecution on serious fraud charges involving the diversion of approximately $8 million in investor funds.

The court allowed the application in part, ordering Taylor to forfeit $200,000 and Christopher to forfeit $3,000, considering factors including the sureties' diligence, the sophistication of the escape plan, changes in financial circumstances, and post-breach conduct.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual offences against multiple young complainants on the basis that the trial reasons were inadequate, the evidence of the child witnesses was inconsistent, and one complainant's account may have been tainted by social worker involvement before a second video statement.

Applying the appellate framework governing sufficiency of reasons and deference on credibility findings, the court held that the reasons, read in the context of the record and the trial process, adequately explained why the trial judge rejected the defence and accepted the complainants' evidence.

The court found no material misapprehension of the evidence and no reversible error in the treatment of similar fact evidence or the impugned complainant's testimony.

The child pornography convictions were not argued and were left undisturbed.

The sexual interference convictions were stayed under the Kineapple principle, the remainder of the conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was refused.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code.

Based on fresh evidence, the Crown conceded the conviction could not stand, but the appellant agreed he was guilty of the lesser included offence of unauthorized possession of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for the lesser included offence and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence remained fit.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for arson of his own property.

The Crown argued the offence should have been designated a serious personal injury offence (SPIO), making a conditional sentence illegal, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the SPIO argument as it was not raised at trial.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding the sentencing judge properly balanced the gravity of the offence with the respondent's attenuated moral blameworthiness due to mental health challenges.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and failing to provide the necessaries of life after her severely developmentally delayed sister starved to death while locked in her basement.

She was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding expert evidence, failed to properly consider the mental elements of the offences, and imposed a sentence that offended the parity principle compared to her husband's conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the mental elements properly established, and the disparity in sentences justified by the appellant's role as primary caregiver and lack of remorse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and breach of probation, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was pressured by his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, noting the appellant's familiarity with the process and the time elapsed between his decision and the actual plea.

The court also declined to admit the appellant's affidavit as fresh evidence, finding it lacked credibility under the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge had drawn an impermissible adverse inference against the accused's right to silence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal court justice misinterpreted the trial judge's reasons, which, when read in context, permissibly inferred that the accused and his wife manipulated the complainant into fabricating evidence.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence from a custodial sentence of 15 months followed by 18 months probation.

The court was not persuaded that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle and held the sentence was entirely fit.

However, on the Crown's concession, the court varied the probation term requiring residence on a specified First Nations reserve and substituted a condition requiring residence at a residence approved by the probation officer.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted to give effect to that variation, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed.