Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed both his conviction for drug trafficking and his sentence of 12 months imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence fully justified the conclusion that crack cocaine in the possession of a third party came from the appellant through an intermediary.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider that this was a one-off transaction for a minimal amount of crack cocaine with no profit motive, and by failing to adequately weigh the appellant's rehabilitation efforts and significant immigration consequences.

The sentence was reduced to 160 days, which the appellant had already served through pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Kenneth Mark.

The Crown's theory was that the killing was retaliatory in nature, motivated by the victim's breach of the code of silence by identifying the appellant in connection with a prior attempted murder.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the admissibility of evidence regarding the prior attempted murder and the victim's fear of retaliation; (2) the admissibility of rap lyrics authored by the appellant; and (3) errors in the Crown's closing address regarding the appellant's late disclosure of an alibi and the false testimony of Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and affirmed the conviction.

The appellant, a man in his early 70s, appealed both his conviction and sentence for two counts of sexual assault of young girls (ages 12 and 9).

He pleaded guilty following plea negotiations and was sentenced to two years less a day in custody plus three years' probation.

On appeal, he alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, rendering his guilty pleas involuntary and the sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal found that the guilty pleas were voluntary and informed, that trial counsel provided reasonably competent advice, and that the sentence was fit and justified by the multiple incidents of sexual assault.

The court also identified that the sentence for one count was technically illegal as it exceeded the maximum available on summary conviction, but found that consecutive sentences were available and the overall sentence remained appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The conviction arose from an incident in which the appellant's motor vehicle struck and severely injured a pedestrian in a parking lot outside a pub, following an altercation with another patron.

The appellant argued the collision was inadvertent, while the Crown alleged it was intentional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's factual findings and credibility determinations were reasonable and entitled to deference, and the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant was arrested on a charge of importing cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was detained in custody.

Following conviction by jury, the appellant filed an application for judicial interim release under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, alleging a change in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application on the tertiary ground.

The appellant then brought an application in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking declarations regarding the court's jurisdiction to review bail and challenging the absence of a review mechanism as violating her Charter rights.

The Superior Court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Parliament deliberately chose not to provide a review mechanism for trial judge orders under section 523(2)(a), and that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.

The appellant failed to appear for his appeal and provided no documentation to support his claim of illness.

Duty counsel had no contact with the appellant.

As the appellant failed to take any steps to move the appeal forward despite case management directions, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant, sought by the United States on terrorism charges related to the LTTE, appealed his committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the committal on corresponding Canadian terrorism offences.

The Court also dismissed the judicial review application, holding that the Minister's independent Cotroni assessment and surrender decision were reasonable and did not deny the appellant procedural fairness.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's section 10(b) Charter rights because the police failed to adequately facilitate contact with his counsel of choice, but admitted the breathalyzer readings under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower courts that the evidence was admissible and dismissed the appeal.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, which struck down several prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional, pending appeal.

The moving party argued that the judgment created a legislative void with profound implications for the public interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that there was a serious issue to be tried, the government would suffer irreparable harm to the public interest without a stay, and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion was granted and the judgment was stayed for a limited period to permit appellate review.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown's cross-examination was improper and that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that aspects of the cross-examination were improper but concluded they did not create a miscarriage of justice in the totality of the circumstances.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning adequate, noting that while additional points could have been included, they were not essential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking a reduction to avoid adverse immigration consequences.

The immigration authorities were treating the original sentence as a two-year sentence due to the length of pre-trial custody.

With the consent of the Crown, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 53 weeks, resulting in an effective sentence of two years less a week for immigration purposes.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for certiorari and prohibition based on alleged reasonable apprehension of bias and procedural unfairness by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's frustration with delays in a summary impaired driving proceeding and counsel's inability to cooperate was understandable and did not reflect bias.

The court remitted the matter to the Ontario Court of Justice for trial to proceed expeditiously.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for which a sentence of 12 months' probation was imposed three years prior.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, noting the question of law had no significance beyond the case, the argument on the reasonableness of the conviction was not strong, and the sentence did not engage significant liberty interests.

The self-represented applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction, challenging the inferences drawn by the trial judge regarding his state of mind.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the arguments did not raise questions of law or issues of significance beyond the specific case.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering threats.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding a threat was made and that the conviction was inconsistent with an acquittal on a related charge from the previous day.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the accepted evidence and that there was no contradiction between the verdicts because the evidence for the two days differed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences, including historical assaults and an incident on April 11.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or the inculpatory inferences drawn from the appellant's conduct when confronted.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding it was at the high end but within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari.

The trial court had adjourned the matter to two dates: a pre-trial date and a confirmation date.

The matter was not spoken to on the first date, and the appellant argued this resulted in a loss of jurisdiction over the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 803 of the Criminal Code permits remands to more than one date, and the failure to place the matter on the docket on the first date did not result in a loss of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, unlawful confinement, sexual assault, criminal harassment, threatening, and assaulting a police officer, arising from incidents involving his ex-girlfriend.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on credibility and reasonable doubt, failed to give a limiting instruction on disposition evidence, and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal for administering a noxious substance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, the disposition evidence was admissible without objection, and the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's disposition was consistent with expert medical opinion and supported by the evidence, and therefore not unreasonable.

The appellant's arguments regarding disclosure and consistency of allegations relating to the index offences were rejected.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault causing bodily harm and one count of assault against three separate intimate partners, receiving a three-year sentence.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor rather than merely a lack of a mitigating factor.

However, upon determining a fit sentence, the Court of Appeal upheld the three-year term, citing the prolonged, severe violence and use of weapons against multiple victims.