Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

D.D. appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the adult complainant.

The trial judge improperly evaluated the complainant's testimony, given when she was 18, as if she were a child, inferring truthfulness from "childlike details" rather than applying adult credibility criteria while considering the childhood context of the events.

The appellant, convicted of speeding, appealed the dismissal of his provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial justice of the peace made a palpable and overriding error by failing to consider a significant discrepancy between the officer's oral testimony regarding time and distance and the radar reading, which could have raised reasonable doubt about the radar's functioning.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating it would withdraw the charge.

Costs were not awarded, consistent with the general rule for Provincial Offences Act proceedings.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and a sentence of 26 months' imprisonment.

The trial judge found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's possession was for trafficking purposes, rejecting the appellant's testimony that the drugs were for personal use due to his addiction.

The appellant's explanation that he obtained funds from online poker winnings was found to be far-fetched and unsupported.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or sentencing principles.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of morphine and possession of morphine for the purpose of trafficking, as well as an eight-month sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key defence witness and failed to properly apply Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the defence evidence and adequately considered the appellant's Aboriginal background and personal circumstances in imposing a fit sentence.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences following a jury trial and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

The sole issue at trial was identification.

The appellant appealed from conviction and requested leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge on eyewitness identification evidence was adequate given the strength of the circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge had vetted the charge with counsel.

The court also found that photo line-up evidence had no probative value as witnesses could not identify the fleeing passenger, and that the surveillance video instruction was adequate.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge had imposed the minimum sentence for very serious offences and had not disregarded pre-sentence custody or house arrest bail.

The appellant appealed convictions for touching a person under the age of 16 years for a sexual purpose and sexual assault.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the credible evidence of two young complainants who testified about being touched inappropriately while sleeping in the appellant's trailer.

The appellant denied the allegations and argued the complainants' evidence contained discrepancies and inconsistencies suggesting collusion or fabrication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, addressed the collusion arguments, and provided adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's denial in light of the complainants' credible testimony.

The appellants were convicted of first and second degree murder following a home invasion and shooting.

On appeal, they raised several issues regarding the trial judge's instructions to the jury, including late alibi adverse inference instructions, the Crown's theory of concocted alibis, the admission of discreditable conduct evidence, the lack of a Vetrovec warning for a key witness, and the instructions on voice and eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions and dismissed the appeals.

The Crown appealed the youth's acquittals for human trafficking and living on the avails of prostitution, while the youth cross-appealed his convictions for assault and breach of an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred by applying a subjective standard to the definition of exploitation and by concluding a single act could not constitute prostitution.

The youth's cross-appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's credibility findings and verdicts were reasonable.

A new trial was ordered on the trafficking and prostitution charges.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for the aggravated assault of a woman he had been dating.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in excluding the possibility that his risk to the public could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant's risk could not be controlled in the community was amply supported by the record.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on firearms offences after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police lacked objective reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to give weight to the informer's credibility and by compartmentalizing the surveillance evidence.

The Court found that the totality of the circumstances, including the reliable tip and corroborating surveillance of a rental car and suspicious handling of a shoebox, provided reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after his common-law wife fell to her death from a cliff.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on motive (an ongoing affair), opportunity, and the appellant's statements and after-the-fact conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends about her fear of the appellant, and in instructing the jury on the use of his out-of-court statements and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the hearsay evidence under the principled approach, and concluding that the jury instructions were adequate and fair.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The offences involved the severe beating and sexual assault of his former common-law partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court upheld the finding that the appellant, a diagnosed psychopath with a history of domestic abuse, posed a substantial risk of reoffending that could not be reasonably controlled in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assault and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment consecutive to a sentence he was already serving.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her credibility assessment and that the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings, which were supported by police observations of bite marks, and concluding the cross-examination was relevant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the domestic context, the injuries, and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The Registrar appealed a Divisional Court decision that found the Board erred in law regarding a liquor licensee permitting drunkenness on its premises.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Board misinterpreted the word 'permits' in section 45(1) of the regulation, holding that it requires proof the licensee knew or ought to have known of the drunkenness.

Although the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Divisional Court's assessment that the evidence could not support a finding against the licensee, it declined to order a new hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissing his appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or material misapprehension of evidence in the lower court's reasons.

The court held there was ample evidence to support the conviction and rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a professional bus driver, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving after he drove a bus too far to the right and struck a curb.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of steering failure and that the reasons for judgment were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the steering was functional prior to impact and that the appellant's delayed reaction constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against a nine-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons for both conviction and sentence to be inadequate.

However, the conviction was upheld because the appellant's own testimony admitted to an act of fellatio, and his explanation that the child initiated it while he slept was rejected as incapable of belief.

Because the trial judge's factual findings regarding other sexual acts were unclear, the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis of a single act of fellatio.

The appeal from sentence was allowed, and the sentence was reduced from four years and seven months to 15 months, taking into account seven months of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued that the trial judge's refusal to grant adjournments to allow him to retain counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and that the trial judge failed to adequately assist him as a self-represented accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had ample opportunity to retain counsel during a four-month adjournment and that the refusal of further adjournments was justified to prevent extending the complainant's ordeal.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after it was found in her luggage at Pearson Airport.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge made errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found two errors: the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that they could only draw inferences from evidence they accepted as fact, which shifted the burden of proof, and improperly instructed them that there was no evidence the cocaine was part of someone else's project, which undermined the core of the defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a former bank employee, was convicted of fraud and theft-related offences arising from a scheme to steal from dormant accounts using inside information.

He appealed the restitution order of $40,734, arguing it was unfair to impose the full amount on him rather than apportioning it among his co-conspirators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, finding the full restitution order appropriate given the appellant's breach of trust as an employee.

However, based on a Crown concession regarding a calculation error, the restitution order was reduced to $33,733.96.