Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation involving a 9-year-old complainant.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge committed a 'Miller error' in applying the W. (D.) framework for assessing credibility by allegedly ignoring evidence that was neither accepted nor rejected.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and did not err in his credibility assessment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youth convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm stemming from a mass shooting, appealed the imposition of an adult sentence.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by misunderstanding the Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) program and by failing to consider collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, concluding that the alleged IRCS error did not impact the sentence and that immigration consequences could not reduce a sentence to a point disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of importing and possessing heroin, appealed her convictions, alleging two errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

First, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly invited propensity reasoning by summarizing the Crown's position that the appellant was a person who would break the law for money, despite an earlier caution against such reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found this instruction related to the appellant's credibility and did not constitute reversible error.

Second, the appellant challenged the trial judge's answer to a jury question clarifying "negligence/recklessness or being wilfully blind." The Court found the judge's definition of wilful blindness accurate and her explanation of negligence and recklessness adequate for the jury to distinguish the concepts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Nigel Lewis, appealed his convictions for importation and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and sought leave to appeal his three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence.

The convictions arose from a controlled delivery of cocaine hidden in a package.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's inference of the appellant's knowledge and control of the drugs to be reasonable, dismissing the conviction appeal.

Regarding the sentence, the court found the three-and-a-half-year sentence to be within the appropriate range for the amount of cocaine (132 grams), distinguishing it from cases involving guilty pleas and emphasizing that sentencing is not a mathematical calculation.

The court upheld the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marcia Chambers, appealed her conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine and marijuana.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding police opinion evidence on the appellant's demeanour and her post-detention silence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to clearly instruct the jury to disregard inadmissible opinion evidence and by not providing a clear instruction that the appellant's silence could not be used against her.

These deficiencies rendered the trial unfair, leading to the quashing of the convictions and the ordering of a new trial.

The court rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, finding sufficient evidence to support a conviction if the jury had been properly instructed.

The appellant, a bar security guard, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm after he body-slammed an unruly patron, fracturing the patron's femur.

The appellant argued the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by confusing a 'metal post' with a 'cement post' when assessing whether the patron caused his own fall by pushing off a structure.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fully comprehended the evidence, properly rejected the appellant's version of events as inconsistent with video footage, and made no palpable and overriding error in her factual or credibility findings.

This appeal concerned the sufficiency of a trial judge's reasons for finding a police officer credible in a Charter application.

The appellant was stopped for a suspended license, and a subsequent search revealed a handgun.

Disclosure later revealed the stop was partly based on confidential informant information, which the officer initially omitted.

The trial judge found the officer credible, dismissing the appellant's s. 9 Charter breach claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's reasons, while brief, were sufficient given the context where there was no conflicting evidence and the defence had abandoned issues related to late disclosure.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on sexual assault charges.

The trial judge had found both the complainant and the respondent credible but had a reasonable doubt, partly due to the complainant's inability to explain her entry into an abandoned trailer and her communication with her father after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by applying stereotypical views about sexual assault victims' behavior, specifically by inferring consent from the complainant's entry into the trailer and by judging her credibility based on her communication with her father.

The court also found an error in the exclusion of the complainant's prior consistent statement and demeanour evidence to her friend.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as these errors had a material bearing on the acquittal.

The accused, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's improper use of judicial notice, including drawing on personal experience as counsel and relying on external social science research (a magazine article and parallels to battered woman syndrome from *R. v. Lavallee*), to assess the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial notice and violated procedural fairness by relying on information not put into evidence or subject to submissions.

The errors materially infected the credibility findings, which were central to the trial.

The curative proviso was not applicable due to the procedural unfairness.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his wife and daughter.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence of the appellant's uncharged prior discreditable conduct, primarily occurring in China before the family immigrated to Canada.

The trial judge admitted the evidence to show animus and explain the lack of earlier reporting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly assess and balance the reasoning prejudice of this evidence against its probative value.

The volume and highly discreditable nature of the uncharged conduct created a real risk that the jury convicted the appellant for his prior bad acts rather than the charged offences.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a demonstrably unfit 18-month sentence for sexual assault and breach of probation, arguing it failed to adequately address denunciation and deterrence given the accused's high moral blameworthiness and prior sexual assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence disproportionate but, considering fresh evidence of the accused's rehabilitation, varied the sentence to increase the probation period from two to three years instead of imposing further incarceration.

The appellant, a photographer, appealed his conviction for multiple counts of invitation to sexual touching and sexually touching two fourteen-year-old clients.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge misapprehended the defence's position regarding the complainants' alleged motive to fabricate and collusion.

The defence suggested a motive to fabricate arose from the complainants' involvement in an organization assisting sexual abuse victims, and that there was unconscious collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had properly confronted and rejected the defence's arguments regarding motive to fabricate and collusion, and that her findings were reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and released on bail pending appeal.

He subsequently absconded, failing to reside with his surety or surrender into custody as required by his release order.

His counsel brought a motion to be removed as solicitor of record due to a breakdown in communications, which was granted.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion, dismissing the appeal as abandoned and issuing a warrant for the appellant's arrest.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to address a material inconsistency in the complainant’s evidence concerning the existence of a privacy curtain and improperly relied on alcohol abuse as affecting long-term memory without evidentiary foundation.

The appeal court held that the curtain evidence was immaterial to the core allegations and did not require express resolution as a significant inconsistency.

It further held that the trial judge was entitled to assess reliability based on the appellant’s admitted memory problems, demonstrated testimonial lapses, alcohol consumption, and internal inconsistencies.

The factual findings were reasonably supported by the record and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, Floriano Daponte and Vivian Hamilton, who were charged with drug and weapon offences.

The trial judge had found a s. 11(b) Charter right infringement based on a 30.5-month net delay, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued that a 3-month delay caused by the respondents' certiorari application should have been deemed an exceptional circumstance and deducted, bringing the delay below the ceiling.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge erred by focusing on the Crown's position on only one count of the certiorari application.

With the deduction, the delay was 27.5 months, placing the onus on the respondents to show unreasonable delay.

The Court found the respondents failed to demonstrate that the case "markedly exceeded its reasonable time requirements" despite their diligence and some Crown disclosure issues and local resource shortages.

The appeal was allowed, and the stay set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of prohibited firearms, challenging the dismissal of his Charter application to exclude evidence.

He argued the search warrant for his residence was invalid because it did not specify his unit in a multi-unit dwelling, the confidential informant's information lacked corroboration, and the police unlawfully seized his vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the warrant adequately described the location, the informant's information was sufficiently corroborated, and the vehicle seizure was authorized under the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test.

The appellant had grabbed the complainant from behind, claiming he mistakenly believed she was his girlfriend.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the second step of the W.(D.) test by not considering whether the exculpatory evidence of the appellant's girlfriend raised a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision where he struck a parked crash truck.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility based on his failure to mention an obstructing van during a 9-1-1 call and the development of his testimony, and that the finding of impairment was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 9-1-1 call was properly used as a prior inconsistent statement and that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find impairment.

The Crown appealed acquittals and sentence arising from offences involving the sale of sexual services by underage females.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by defining 'procures' and 'harbours' too narrowly when directing the jury and granting a directed verdict, which materially affected several acquittals.

New trials were ordered on multiple counts.

The court also found significant errors in principle in sentencing, including minimizing the inherent exploitation of the offences, overemphasizing bail conditions, and improperly relying on media publicity to satisfy deterrence.

While upholding declarations that certain mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court substituted a global sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment followed by probation.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 ml.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the roadside screening demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was not breached.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the six-minute delay for the roadside demand was justified, the 1 hour and 45-minute delay for the breath samples was reasonable, and the appellant had a fulsome opportunity to consult with duty counsel.