Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

She raised three grounds of appeal: (1) a Sekhon error regarding inadmissible expert evidence, (2) reversal of the onus of proof regarding personal use, and (3) an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while the Crown expert offered some inadmissible anecdotal information, the expert's ultimate opinion was well-grounded in objective facts and the trial judge did not rely on the inadmissible evidence.

The court also found no reversal of the onus of proof, as the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the amount of cocaine, its value, and its form (pressed chunk rather than powder).

The verdict was reasonable based on ample evidence supporting the inference that possession was for trafficking purposes.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter on the ground that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately explain the rejection of his denials, failed to reconcile inconsistencies in the complainant's and her mother's evidence, and failed to address allegations of fabrication and collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons clearly demonstrated his reasoning and that he was alive to the frailties in the evidence.

The trial judge's credibility findings were open to him on the record.

The appellant appealed his sentence for large-scale, prolonged marijuana trafficking for profit.

The appellant argued that changed societal attitudes toward marijuana use warranted a reduction in the established sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the parity principle and police misconduct were reasonable, and that societal perception of marijuana use does not justify reducing sentences for serious trafficking offences.

Parliament has not significantly altered applicable penalties, and large-scale trafficking remains serious criminal misconduct regardless of legislative changes regarding personal possession and use.

The Crown and Ontario Provincial Police appealed a disclosure order requiring production of a drug recognition expert's rolling log.

The rolling log documented all drug evaluations conducted by the DRE from training through certification.

The respondent was charged with drug-impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge ordered disclosure of the rolling log, and the motion judge affirmed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rolling log was "obviously relevant" material subject to first party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime, and that disclosure was permitted under the exception in section 258.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code even when anonymized.

The appellant was convicted of pointing a firearm, possession of a firearm contrary to prohibition, possession of a firearm knowingly unauthorized, and operating a motor vehicle disqualified.

He received nine months' incarceration (after credit for pre-trial custody) and three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: inadequate consideration of inconsistencies in complainant evidence, misapprehension of evidence regarding whether the meeting was accidental or pre-arranged, erroneous reliance on precedent regarding firearm possession, and unreasonableness of verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant testified she was asleep when the sexual activity occurred and had no recollection of it.

The appellant accepted that sexual activity had occurred based on DNA evidence but claimed no recollection and denied he would engage in non-consensual intercourse.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the requirement that the Crown prove the appellant knew the complainant was not consenting.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the knowledge requirement, whether the trial judge erred in instructing on circumstantial evidence, and whether the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

Appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's treatment of hearsay evidence, application of the W.D. test for assessing credibility, and delay in giving reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly acknowledged hearsay limitations, correctly applied the W.D. test by considering the totality of evidence and burden of proof, and that any delay in reasons was justified by efforts to accommodate the parties.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of fraud over $5,000, one count of uttering a forged document, and one count of personation.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a deceased witness under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and second, that the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the individual counts in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence and that the jury charge, while not ideal, was adequate in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that his conduct, while aggressive or careless, did not constitute a "marked departure" from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, and thus lacked the requisite mens rea for a criminal conviction.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the appellant's driving was dangerous and represented a marked departure, given the aggressive and sustained nature of the driving, which included cutting across lanes, driving on the highway shoulder at excessive speeds, and running a red light.

The appellant, Christopher Yong, appealed his conviction for assault following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal raised grounds including judicial notice, assessment of the investigating officer's evidence, and misapprehension of the Crown's evidence by the trial judge.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the complainant showing photographs of injuries to the police officer and the likelihood of the complainant sustaining workplace bruises.

These misapprehensions were deemed essential to the trial judge's reasoning process, leading to the conclusion that the appellant did not receive a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to bring a section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay.

The adjournment request was made on the sentencing date, approximately three months after conviction, without supporting evidence or documentation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to deny the adjournment, concluding that the proposed application appeared designed to further delay proceedings.

The trial judge's reasons demonstrated consideration of the delay issue and a finding that any delay was attributable to the appellant with no resulting prejudice.

The appellant appealed her sentence for abduction of a child in contravention of a court order.

The appellant had removed her twin children from school in violation of a court-ordered access schedule, driving aggressively to evade the complainant (the children's father).

She pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence.

On appeal, she argued the sentencing judge erred by considering her prior wrongdoing as an aggravating factor and by emphasizing general deterrence over her specific circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge was entitled to consider the appellant's course of conduct in determining whether a discharge would be contrary to the public interest, and was entitled to find that a conditional discharge was not appropriate given the aggravated manner of the offense.

The appellant appealed his convictions on one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal involved two main issues: (1) whether the police violated the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) when they arrested and searched him based on information from a confidential informant, and (2) whether certain telephone calls received on seized cellular phones were admissible as evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge rejected the Charter challenge and admitted the telephone evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Debot test for assessing confidential informant information and finding the telephone calls admissible under the principled exception to hearsay as established in Baldree.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of nine years less 48 days.

He challenged the validity of a search warrant for an apartment on the grounds that there were insufficient grounds to support it, arguing the grounds amounted only to suspicion.

The trial judge had dismissed the Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the information to obtain the warrant contained credible and reliable facts supporting reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was trafficking drugs and that evidence would be found in the apartment.

The court found no error in the trial judge's application of the legal test and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, breach of recognizance, breach of probation, and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an altercation involving a purported cocaine sale.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery by stealing with violence contrary to s. 343(b) despite the Crown alleging robbery while armed with a firearm contrary to s. 343(d).

The appellant received a global sentence of 20 months in prison and 2 years probation, with 320 days pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1, resulting in a net sentence of 4 months.

The appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in treating robbery with violence as an included offence in a charge of armed robbery, and whether the trial judge improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant regarding self-defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a 911 call into evidence and in finding his driving amounted to dangerous driving.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the 911 call was admissible as part of the res gestae and did not constitute oath helping.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's erratic operation of a transport truck on a highway was objectively dangerous and a marked departure from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault relating to events on December 25, 2014.

The appellant had been acquitted of a separate assault charge relating to events in summer 2013.

The appellant and complainant were co-parenting their child and maintained a non-intimate relationship at the time of the alleged assault.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence regarding who invited the complainant to stay overnight, and second, that the trial judge improperly relied on a police officer's opinion regarding the complainant's expectations about police involvement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on dangerous driving causing bodily harm under section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in his analysis of the mens rea component by relying on the respondent's lack of deliberate intention to create danger and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the established test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, properly considered whether the respondent had deliberate intention to cause danger, and appropriately applied the modified objective test in concluding there was no marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent person.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the concept of memory fragmentation caused by alcohol consumption without expert evidence and that counsel was not given an opportunity to address this finding.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in failing to address the complainant's refusal to provide her cellphone to police to recover deleted text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to him based on the evidence and that there was no unfairness in the proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.