Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant was convicted of child luring and making sexually explicit images available to a child following an undercover police sting.

The trial judge relied on the evidentiary presumption of belief in age under s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

Following the convictions, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morrison struck down this presumption as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying the pre-Morrison framework and relying on the presumption to establish the appellant's belief in the interlocutor's age.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for assault arising from an altercation at a shopping mall.

She argued the trial judge erred by inferring her nails caused the complainant's facial injuries, misapprehending her evidence regarding the word 'disengaged', and treating the fact that the parties were strangers as an aggravating factor on sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inference about the injuries was reasonable, the misapprehension of evidence was peripheral and did not cause a miscarriage of justice, and there was no reversible error in the sentencing analysis.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and assault arising from an incident between two teenagers who had met online.

The trial judge accepted the complainant’s testimony as credible and rejected the accused’s evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge improperly treated the complainant as a child witness, applied a different level of scrutiny due to the parties’ age difference, and incorrectly found collusion between the accused and his parents.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, holding that the trial judge merely referenced the complainant’s age at the time of the events and conducted a balanced credibility assessment.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing opium into Canada.

At trial, the Crown's expert witness testified that in his experience, it was 'one hundred percent true' that the person bringing the shipment had knowledge of the illicit substance.

The Crown conceded on appeal that this anecdotal evidence was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, running afoul of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Sekhon.

Because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, relied on stereotypical reasoning, and failed to properly apply the W.D. framework.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on generalized assumptions about human behaviour—specifically regarding how a victim would act out of guilt or whether parties would cry during consensual sexual activity—to assess credibility, rather than grounding his findings in the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for wilfully killing a dog without lawful excuse.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by placing the burden on the accused to prove lawful excuse on a balance of probabilities.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the error engaged fundamental principles of criminal law and that the case against the accused was not so overwhelming that a properly instructed jury would have inevitably convicted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving by drugs.

The trial judge had excluded the accused's urine sample, finding insufficient grounds for the demand as a 'non-Charter' issue, leading to acquittal.

The accused cross-appealed the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and drug evaluation.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred by treating the urine sample exclusion as a non-Charter issue, misapplying principles of reasonable and probable grounds, and improperly excluding the accused's statement from the Charter analysis.

The court concluded that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the demand and that, even if there was a Charter breach, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the cross-appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the initial arrest.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on multiple charges, including break and enter, which resulted from a trial judge's decision to quash a DNA warrant and exclude the resulting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found insufficient grounds to link the respondent to the crimes.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapplied the standard of review for warrants by substituting his own view rather than assessing whether the issuing judge could reasonably have found reasonable grounds.

The Court found sufficient evidence, including a fingerprint in a stolen truck linked by DNA to the crime scenes, to support the warrant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on four counts.

The appellant appealed her sentence, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the harsh conditions she endured during presentence custody.

As a transgender inmate identifying as female, she was subjected to 22-hour lockdowns, segregation, and a lack of rehabilitative programs, leading to severe mental distress and two suicide attempts.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, noting it should have been before the sentencing judge and demonstrated intense human suffering.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in force.

The appellant pled guilty to trafficking approximately 3.5 kg of cocaine over four transactions and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle and in establishing an eight-year starting range before mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application of the parity principle given the co-accused's lesser roles, nor in the determination of the appropriate sentencing range for kilogram-level cocaine trafficking.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for extradition to the United States on fraud charges.

He argued the extradition judge erred in finding he was the person sought by the requesting state and that the identification evidence was manifestly unreliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that identity was conceded at the hearing and established on a balance of probabilities.

The court also found the identification evidence from three co-conspirators was not manifestly unreliable.

The applicant, convicted of a violent sexual assault and sentenced to ten years in custody, sought to vary the terms of his bail pending appeal to allow him to work and travel without his surety.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender into custody.

However, the court found that varying the conditions was not in the public interest.

Given the seriousness of the offence and the lack of supervision by a surety during the proposed work and travel, the court dismissed the application to vary the bail conditions.

Mehdi Ranjbaran appealed three criminal convictions: one for assault cause bodily harm and two for simple assault against his wife.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge's oral reasons for the assault cause bodily harm conviction insufficient, as they failed to adequately explain the path to conviction and did not explicitly address the objective foreseeability of bodily harm, a necessary mens rea element.

This deficiency frustrated proper appellate review.

However, the written reasons for the two simple assault convictions, though brief, were deemed sufficient as they clearly articulated the rejection of the appellant's evidence and acceptance of the complainant's.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part: the conviction for assault cause bodily harm was quashed, and a new trial was ordered for that charge before a different judge.

The appeals for the two simple assault convictions were dismissed, and those convictions were upheld.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the grounds that his re-election of trial mode was invalid due to non-compliance with s. 561(7) of the Criminal Code and that the trial judge erred in concluding he was functus officio.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge was not functus officio but agreed with the trial judge's alternative finding that the appellant, through counsel, had validly waived his right to have the re-election words read to him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.P., appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a threat, unlawful confinement, choking, and sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, specifically arguing that the judge failed to address a material conflict regarding noise from the alleged assaults and the lack of significant facial bruising.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The court noted that the noise issue was only one factor in the credibility analysis and that the complainant's bruising was corroborated by a witness, supporting the trial judge's conclusions.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant's evidence unbelievable due to the complainant's lack of motive to fabricate, that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, and that the trial judge made inappropriate behavioural assumptions.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding motive to fabricate by rejecting the specific motive alleged by the defence based on the evidence, did not apply uneven scrutiny, and based credibility findings on the specific past interactions between the parties rather than generalized assumptions about behaviour.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred by allowing expert evidence regarding security video footage to go beyond permissible opinion, thereby usurping the jury's function.

The expert provided narrative testimony interpreting the video, which the appellant argued undermined his claims of self-defence and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function, limiting the expert to his area of expertise, and provided sufficient cautions to the jury, reminding them of their ultimate responsibility to interpret the video evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of possession of a restricted firearm, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence, inconsistencies, and hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge extensively considered the inconsistencies in the evidence and reasonably accepted the testimony of the witnesses who saw the appellant with the backpack containing the firearm.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual assault and sexual interference against a complainant over whom he held a position of trust.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to reconcile inconsistencies, overemphasizing his demeanour during a police interview, and assigning too much weight to the complainant's youthfulness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and findings were open to him.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale fraud obtained through the Government of Canada’s Small Business Financing Program.

The conviction appeals challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of three s. 11(b) Charter motions for unreasonable delay, arguing that the judge erred by not addressing the merits due to non-compliance with deadlines.

The sentence appeals contested the length of imprisonment and a restitution order for one appellant, and the imposition of a custodial sentence for another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's proactive case management and the fitness of the sentences.