Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant, Terrence Barrett, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three grounds: Crown's closing remarks, trial judge's instruction on prior inconsistent statements and agreed facts, and refusal to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found no miscarriage of justice regarding the Crown's remarks or the jury instructions on evidence.

However, the court determined that there was an air of reality to the defence of provocation, which the trial judge erred in not putting to the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered on the ground of failure to instruct on provocation.

The appellant, Kimani Phillips, appealed his convictions for two firearms-related charges.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's alleged failure to adequately address Constable Brunato's evidence, a misapprehension of evidence regarding the bedroom temperature, and an improper reference to a witness's knowledge of Charter s. 13 rights.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence concerning Constable Brunato or the temperature.

While the trial judge erred in using the witness's (Kia Sampson's) knowledge of s. 13 rights to buttress her credibility regarding her denial of throwing the gun, the error was deemed harmless.

The court reasoned that Kia's denial, which implicated the appellant, was credible due to her strong disposition to favour the appellant, making any evidence against him reliable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Pius Bempong, appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the jury's verdicts of not guilty for sexual assault but guilty for sexual interference, based on the same facts, were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the apparent inconsistency could be reconciled by a legal error in the trial judge's instructions regarding the definition of "force" in sexual assault versus "touching" in sexual interference, as per the framework established in R. v. R.V. The court clarified that the Crown is not required to cross-appeal an acquittal to rebut an inconsistent verdict argument raised by an appellant.

The appellant, Furqan Akhtar, appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, criminal negligence, and street racing causing death and bodily harm, following a jury trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: misdirection on the mens rea for dangerous driving and criminal negligence, inadequate jury instruction on the effect of a co-accused's abscondment, and error in instructing the jury on the use of the appellant's prior Highway Traffic Act infractions for credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the dangerous driving and criminal negligence instructions, and that the instruction on the co-accused's abscondment was sufficient.

While the instruction on prior HTA infractions was deemed an error, it was cured by the proviso as it caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant's credibility.

The appellants, Elias Akhi and Jezreel Moxam, appealed their convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

The Court of Appeal found serious errors in the trial judge's jury instructions, specifically regarding party liability (aiding and common intention) and the failure to adequately delineate between the two accused and the multiple counts.

The instructions were deemed confusing and insufficient to properly equip the jury.

Consequently, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, I.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation.

The central issue at trial was whether the sexual relationship with the complainant began before she turned 16, as she could not legally consent before that age.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's instruction regarding the complainant's outbursts, the admission of a prior consistent statement, and the correction of a Crown misstatement of facts.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the fresh evidence application, upholding the convictions.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The charge arose from the respondent's driving after she crashed into a condominium lobby window.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by conflating the actus reus and mens rea analyses and failing to conduct a proper risk assessment.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the circumstances and correctly concluded the driving was neither dangerous nor a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after nearly 2.5 kilograms of cocaine were found in a hidden compartment in his vehicle.

He appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because there was little evidence he knew about the drugs and his brother had access to the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's expressed sympathy and disagreement with the verdict, a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude guilt based on the appellant's ownership and exclusive use of the vehicle, the visibility of the compartment, and the high value of the drugs.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and released on bail pending appeal, sought a variation of his bail conditions to permit travel to Pakistan for a one-month business trip to resell automotive parts.

The Crown opposed the variation, arguing that the applicant posed a flight risk due to his dual citizenship, the absence of an extradition treaty with Pakistan, and the potential profit from the business venture relative to the existing bail amount.

The court considered the flight risk and the public interest balance, distinguishing the case from a prior refusal and a more serious precedent.

The motion judge granted the variation, allowing the travel, but increased the bail amount from $60,000 to $125,000, finding that the applicant did not pose a serious flight risk and that there were no residual public safety concerns.

The appellant, Andrew Burnett, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder on two grounds: procedural error due to email discussions about jury instructions in his absence (violating s. 650(1) Criminal Code) and a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while procedural errors occurred regarding the email discussions, they did not cause prejudice to the appellant.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no breach of the implementational component of s. 10(b) Charter right, as the appellant's desire for counsel was ambivalent and he prioritized understanding the case against him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed sentences imposed on two offenders convicted after a lengthy jury trial for leading a sophisticated criminal organization that imported approximately two tonnes of cocaine into Ontario over three years.

The sentencing judge imposed global sentences of 22 and 20 years’ imprisonment, relying heavily on the parity principle by comparing the respondents’ sentences to those of co‑accused who had resolved charges through joint submissions.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred by overemphasizing parity, using joint‑submission sentences as comparators, and failing to adequately apply the proportionality principle or account for the respondents’ leadership roles and the unprecedented scale of the importation scheme.

Given the gravity of importing roughly 2,000 kilograms of cocaine and the respondents’ status as directing minds of the criminal organization, the court substituted life sentences for the conspiracy count.

The court also set aside a fine in lieu of forfeiture imposed on one respondent in light of subsequent Supreme Court authority.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He abandoned the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the usual 1.5 to 1 credit rate for the appellant's 152 days of pretrial custody.

The sentence appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced by 76 days.

The appellants, Vito Buffone and Jeffrey Kompon, appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine and several substantive offences following a 50-day jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds: the admissibility and scope of analyst's certificate evidence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), the trial judge's instructions on conspiracy (specifically the three-step Carter analysis), the instructions regarding inferences to be drawn from a third party's actions concerning an encrypted cellphone, and the instructions on the substantive counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions.

The appellant, G.B., appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his granddaughter.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence, including his attempt to manufacture a motive for the complainant to lie (a car loan dispute).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's evidence or her finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate, though it cautioned against relying on an "apparent lack of motive" to bolster credibility.

The court applied the curative proviso, finding that any error did not overwhelm the trial judge's careful reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

He argued the trial judge erred by using his roadside statement to assess credibility and by finding no breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights when the arresting officer allegedly steered him to duty counsel instead of facilitating contact with his counsel of choice.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the roadside statement was admissible, but concluded the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in the s. 10(b) analysis, specifically in finding that a second reading of the rights at the detachment cured any defects in the initial roadside explanation.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Jamie Simpson-Fry, appealed an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence imposed following convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and threatening death.

The appeal challenged the sentencing judge's weighing of the appellant's statements to psychiatric experts, arguing it effectively penalized him for not testifying and violated his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach, which considered the statements in light of the entire evidentiary record and afforded them less weight due to the lack of cross-examination.

The applicant, I.W., sought bail pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new charges of assault and uttering threats against his domestic partner, who was his surety.

He had been convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation and sentenced to five years.

The court applied the three-part test for bail pending appeal, focusing on the public interest ground, which involves public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found the enforceability interest to be high due to the seriousness of the original sexual offences and the new charges, which raised lingering public safety concerns and undermined his record of bail compliance.

While the appeal grounds were arguable, they were not considered strong enough to outweigh the high enforceability interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after 3.7 kilograms of the drug were found concealed in spice packages in his luggage upon arrival from Jamaica.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong standard for wilful blindness, ignored after-the-fact conduct, and improperly took judicial notice of restaurant spice requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the wilful blindness standard as an alternative to her primary finding of actual knowledge, and made no reversible errors in her assessment of the evidence.

The appellants were convicted by jury of second-degree murder and aggravated assault arising from a parking lot altercation in which one victim was fatally stabbed and another was wounded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the first appellant's murder conviction was not unreasonable given multiple available routes to liability under ss. 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the second appellant's s. 11(b) application was properly dismissed under the Jordan transitional exception.

The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, after-the-fact conduct, manslaughter under s. 21(2), and the Vetrovec caution regarding a mixed witness.

The appellant, R.C., appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and assault.

The primary issues on appeal were whether the trial judge's oral reasons for conviction were sufficient, and whether subsequently released "edited reasons" could be considered.

The Court of Appeal held that the edited reasons, released nearly two years after the oral reasons and after the appeal had commenced, could not be relied upon due to their substantive changes.

The court then assessed the sufficiency of the original oral reasons, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and properly applied credibility principles, including those from R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the convictions.