Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant, Nigel Lewis, appealed his convictions for importation and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and sought leave to appeal his three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence.

The convictions arose from a controlled delivery of cocaine hidden in a package.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's inference of the appellant's knowledge and control of the drugs to be reasonable, dismissing the conviction appeal.

Regarding the sentence, the court found the three-and-a-half-year sentence to be within the appropriate range for the amount of cocaine (132 grams), distinguishing it from cases involving guilty pleas and emphasizing that sentencing is not a mathematical calculation.

The court upheld the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marcia Chambers, appealed her conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine and marijuana.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding police opinion evidence on the appellant's demeanour and her post-detention silence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to clearly instruct the jury to disregard inadmissible opinion evidence and by not providing a clear instruction that the appellant's silence could not be used against her.

These deficiencies rendered the trial unfair, leading to the quashing of the convictions and the ordering of a new trial.

The court rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, finding sufficient evidence to support a conviction if the jury had been properly instructed.

The appellant, a bar security guard, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm after he body-slammed an unruly patron, fracturing the patron's femur.

The appellant argued the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by confusing a 'metal post' with a 'cement post' when assessing whether the patron caused his own fall by pushing off a structure.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fully comprehended the evidence, properly rejected the appellant's version of events as inconsistent with video footage, and made no palpable and overriding error in her factual or credibility findings.

This appeal concerned the sufficiency of a trial judge's reasons for finding a police officer credible in a Charter application.

The appellant was stopped for a suspended license, and a subsequent search revealed a handgun.

Disclosure later revealed the stop was partly based on confidential informant information, which the officer initially omitted.

The trial judge found the officer credible, dismissing the appellant's s. 9 Charter breach claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's reasons, while brief, were sufficient given the context where there was no conflicting evidence and the defence had abandoned issues related to late disclosure.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on sexual assault charges.

The trial judge had found both the complainant and the respondent credible but had a reasonable doubt, partly due to the complainant's inability to explain her entry into an abandoned trailer and her communication with her father after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by applying stereotypical views about sexual assault victims' behavior, specifically by inferring consent from the complainant's entry into the trailer and by judging her credibility based on her communication with her father.

The court also found an error in the exclusion of the complainant's prior consistent statement and demeanour evidence to her friend.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as these errors had a material bearing on the acquittal.

The accused, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's improper use of judicial notice, including drawing on personal experience as counsel and relying on external social science research (a magazine article and parallels to battered woman syndrome from *R. v. Lavallee*), to assess the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial notice and violated procedural fairness by relying on information not put into evidence or subject to submissions.

The errors materially infected the credibility findings, which were central to the trial.

The curative proviso was not applicable due to the procedural unfairness.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his wife and daughter.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence of the appellant's uncharged prior discreditable conduct, primarily occurring in China before the family immigrated to Canada.

The trial judge admitted the evidence to show animus and explain the lack of earlier reporting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly assess and balance the reasoning prejudice of this evidence against its probative value.

The volume and highly discreditable nature of the uncharged conduct created a real risk that the jury convicted the appellant for his prior bad acts rather than the charged offences.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a demonstrably unfit 18-month sentence for sexual assault and breach of probation, arguing it failed to adequately address denunciation and deterrence given the accused's high moral blameworthiness and prior sexual assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence disproportionate but, considering fresh evidence of the accused's rehabilitation, varied the sentence to increase the probation period from two to three years instead of imposing further incarceration.

The appellant, a photographer, appealed his conviction for multiple counts of invitation to sexual touching and sexually touching two fourteen-year-old clients.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge misapprehended the defence's position regarding the complainants' alleged motive to fabricate and collusion.

The defence suggested a motive to fabricate arose from the complainants' involvement in an organization assisting sexual abuse victims, and that there was unconscious collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had properly confronted and rejected the defence's arguments regarding motive to fabricate and collusion, and that her findings were reasonable.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, Floriano Daponte and Vivian Hamilton, who were charged with drug and weapon offences.

The trial judge had found a s. 11(b) Charter right infringement based on a 30.5-month net delay, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued that a 3-month delay caused by the respondents' certiorari application should have been deemed an exceptional circumstance and deducted, bringing the delay below the ceiling.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge erred by focusing on the Crown's position on only one count of the certiorari application.

With the deduction, the delay was 27.5 months, placing the onus on the respondents to show unreasonable delay.

The Court found the respondents failed to demonstrate that the case "markedly exceeded its reasonable time requirements," despite their diligence and some Crown disclosure issues and local resource shortages.

The appeal was allowed, and the stay set aside.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving by drugs.

The trial judge had excluded the accused's urine sample, finding insufficient grounds for the demand as a 'non-Charter' issue, leading to acquittal.

The accused cross-appealed the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and drug evaluation.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred by treating the urine sample exclusion as a non-Charter issue, misapplying principles of reasonable and probable grounds, and improperly excluding the accused's statement from the Charter analysis.

The court concluded that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the demand and that, even if there was a Charter breach, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the cross-appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the initial arrest.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

Mehdi Ranjbaran appealed three criminal convictions: one for assault cause bodily harm and two for simple assault against his wife.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge's oral reasons for the assault cause bodily harm conviction insufficient, as they failed to adequately explain the path to conviction and did not explicitly address the objective foreseeability of bodily harm, a necessary mens rea element.

This deficiency frustrated proper appellate review.

However, the written reasons for the two simple assault convictions, though brief, were deemed sufficient as they clearly articulated the rejection of the appellant's evidence and acceptance of the complainant's.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part: the conviction for assault cause bodily harm was quashed, and a new trial was ordered for that charge before a different judge.

The appeals for the two simple assault convictions were dismissed, and those convictions were upheld.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the grounds that his re-election of trial mode was invalid due to non-compliance with s. 561(7) of the Criminal Code and that the trial judge erred in concluding he was functus officio.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge was not functus officio but agreed with the trial judge's alternative finding that the appellant, through counsel, had validly waived his right to have the re-election words read to him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.P., appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a threat, unlawful confinement, choking, and sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, specifically arguing that the judge failed to address a material conflict regarding noise from the alleged assaults and the lack of significant facial bruising.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The court noted that the noise issue was only one factor in the credibility analysis and that the complainant's bruising was corroborated by a witness, supporting the trial judge's conclusions.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant's evidence unbelievable due to the complainant's lack of motive to fabricate, that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, and that the trial judge made inappropriate behavioural assumptions.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding motive to fabricate by rejecting the specific motive alleged by the defence based on the evidence, did not apply uneven scrutiny, and based credibility findings on the specific past interactions between the parties rather than generalized assumptions about behaviour.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred by allowing expert evidence regarding security video footage to go beyond permissible opinion, thereby usurping the jury's function.

The expert provided narrative testimony interpreting the video, which the appellant argued undermined his claims of self-defence and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function, limiting the expert to his area of expertise, and provided sufficient cautions to the jury, reminding them of their ultimate responsibility to interpret the video evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale fraud obtained through the Government of Canada’s Small Business Financing Program.

The conviction appeals challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of three s. 11(b) Charter motions for unreasonable delay, arguing that the judge erred by not addressing the merits due to non-compliance with deadlines.

The sentence appeals contested the length of imprisonment and a restitution order for one appellant, and the imposition of a custodial sentence for another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's proactive case management and the fitness of the sentences.

R.D. appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual assault, and uttering threats, citing deficiencies in the jury charge and an unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in not applying an aggravating factor related to a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both R.D.'s conviction appeal, finding the jury charge adequate and the delay not unreasonable, and the Crown's sentence appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that a position of trust was not established in the particular circumstances.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession and distribution of child pornography, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 10(b) were infringed regarding statements made to police.

The trial judge had found the statements admissible, concluding no detention occurred.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was psychologically detained when questioned at his home without being informed of his right to counsel, constituting a serious Charter breach.

The subsequent statement at the police station was also tainted.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the Court determined that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the willful disregard of Charter rights and the significant impact on the accused, despite the evidence's reliability.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

On June 21, 2019, Parliament enacted Bill C-75, which substantially limited the availability of preliminary inquiries in Canada.

Prior to the amendments, any accused who elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice could request and obtain a preliminary inquiry.

After September 19, 2019, preliminary inquiries became available only for indictable offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The central issue on appeal was whether these amendments applied retrospectively to charges that were before the Ontario Court of Justice when the amendments came into force, specifically to accused who had elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice and requested preliminary inquiries before September 19, 2019.

The appellants were charged with sexual assault, which is not punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The Superior Court of Justice had prohibited the Ontario Court of Justice from holding preliminary inquiries in their cases.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the amendments do not apply to accused who had elected and requested preliminary inquiries before the amendments came into force.