Malcolm Rowe

The accused appealed his perjury conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons given by the majority in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial for substantially the reasons of the dissent below.

The conviction was upheld.

In this criminal appeal, the accused challenged a perjury conviction arising from testimony given at an inquest following a conducted-energy-weapon incident at an airport.

The accused argued unreasonable verdict, misapprehension of evidence, issue estoppel, and abuse of process, including the Crown’s pursuit of an alleged collusion theory.

The Court held that no reviewable factual error or misapprehension was established and upheld the conviction substantially for the provincial appellate reasons.

A dissenting justice would have ordered a new trial on the basis that the collusion finding was unreasonable and tainted other findings.

A Teva employee fraudulently requisitioned and deposited 63 cheques into accounts under names matching or resembling real customers.

The majority held the collecting banks were liable in conversion because the payees were neither fictitious nor non-existing under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The Court restored the motions judge’s decision and rejected the banks’ false-payee defence.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed a ministerial referral for an admissibility hearing under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

It held that a conditional sentence is not a 'term of imprisonment' for the serious criminality threshold based on an imposed sentence.

It also held that the 'maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years' must be assessed based on the law at the time the offence was committed, not at the time of the admissibility determination.

The matter was remitted to a different delegate for redetermination on a correct legal interpretation.

The accused appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

A majority of the provincial court of appeal upheld the conviction, with one dissenting judge finding appellate intervention warranted.

The Supreme Court held there was no illogical or irrational reasoning process by the trial judge and no basis to characterize the verdict as unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction remained in force.

This appeal concerned whether records generated under the Independent Assessment Process in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement were subject to federal access, privacy, and archiving legislation, and whether they could be ordered destroyed.

The Court held the supervising judge had authority under the settlement framework to direct disposition of the records and found no palpable and overriding error in concluding the agreement contemplated confidentiality, limited retention, claimant choice, and eventual destruction.

The Court also upheld the modified order requiring a 15-year retention period with a notice program so claimants could elect archival preservation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the Independent Counsel.

The Court considered whether section 27 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act removes Crown immunity from discovery when the Crown is not a party.

It held that immunity can be displaced only by clear statutory language, and section 27 applies only to proceedings against the Crown.

Because neither the Crown nor the chief investigator was a party, the investigator could refuse discovery.

The appeal was allowed and the respondents’ discovery motion was dismissed with costs throughout.

This appeal addressed whether informer privilege can protect an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip made to obstruct a police investigation.

The Court held privilege does not apply where, on a balance of probabilities, the caller intended to further criminal activity or interfere with the administration of justice.

It confirmed judges should presume privilege exists and determine applicability through in camera proceedings, often ex parte, with fairness safeguards for the defence.

The Court also confirmed judges may review the tip record and may require a preliminary exclusion or probity showing before full litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal addressed judicial review of surrender orders in extradition proceedings and the reasonableness standard under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court held it was reasonable for the Minister to rely on diplomatic assurances and consular access commitments in concluding there was no substantial risk of torture or mistreatment contrary to s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court emphasized a contextual assessment of assurance reliability and rejected a requirement to eliminate all possible risk.

It further held the surrender decisions were not otherwise unjust or oppressive in light of the full circumstances, including treaty obligations and offence gravity.

The appeal was allowed and the surrender orders restored.

The Court dismissed an appeal about renewal and term clauses in a Quebec affiliation contract between a banner company and member pharmacists.

The majority held the renewal clause granted unilateral renewal control to the member pharmacists and could lawfully produce potentially perpetual effects.

The Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s interpretation and held the contract was not indeterminate on the majority’s analysis.

Dissenting judges would have characterized the contract as indeterminate and allowed termination on reasonable notice.

This appeal considered judicial review of an arbitration award under Quebec's specialized health insurance collective bargaining scheme.

The majority held the arbitrator reasonably concluded the dispute was not arbitrable under the Framework Agreement and that only the federation had standing to submit this type of dispute.

Concurring reasons agreed in the result while treating jurisdiction and standing analysis differently on standard of review.

Dissenting reasons would have found jurisdiction and standing errors and would have dismissed the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the arbitration award was restored.

This appeal considered whether the Crown’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples can be fulfilled through the National Energy Board process for a pipeline modification.

The Court held that the Board’s approval decision was Crown conduct that engaged the duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process where statutory powers and process are sufficient.

On the facts, the Court found meaningful participation, assessment of potential impacts, and accommodation conditions imposed on the proponent.

The consultation obligation was met and the appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging a personal oppression order against a corporate director under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

It reaffirmed a two-pronged framework requiring that oppressive conduct be attributable to the director and that personal liability be fit in all the circumstances.

The Court identified fairness, narrow tailoring to rectify oppression, vindication of reasonable stakeholder expectations, and consistency with the broader corporate law context as guiding principles.

On the facts, the director’s lead role in the non-conversion decision and personal benefit through increased corporate control supported personal liability, and the pleadings were sufficient to ground that remedy.

This criminal appeal addressed whether the Crown must prove a lawful breath demand before relying on the Criminal Code evidentiary shortcuts for proving blood-alcohol concentration in an ‘over 80’ prosecution.

The majority held that lawful demand is not a precondition to ss. 258(1)(c) and (g), emphasizing the shortcuts’ purpose of efficiency and their focus on reliability conditions tied to breath sampling and analysis.

The dissent would have overruled prior authority and required compliance with s. 254(3) reasonable grounds as a precondition.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The Court allowed AstraZeneca’s appeal and held the patent ‘promise doctrine’ is not the correct approach to utility under s. 2 of the Patent Act.

It found the doctrine improperly imports disclosure obligations into the utility requirement and wrongly invalidates patents when one of multiple promised uses is unproven.

The correct test asks whether the claimed subject-matter has at least one practical use related to that subject-matter, demonstrated or soundly predicted at filing.

Applying that test, the ‘653 patent had sufficient utility and was not invalid.

The Court dismissed Google’s appeal and upheld a worldwide interlocutory injunction requiring de-indexing of websites used to sell products in breach of court orders.

The majority held courts may grant global injunctive relief against a non-party where necessary to prevent ongoing irreparable harm and where balance of convenience favours relief.

The dissent agreed jurisdiction existed but would have refused the order as effectively final, insufficiently proven effective, and available alternatives remained.

The Court considered the scope of appellate review of a commercial arbitration award under British Columbia's Arbitration Act in a forestry compensation dispute.

A majority held that courts had jurisdiction only over the legal component of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation or statutory application issues characterized as mixed questions, and that reasonableness was the applicable standard.

Applying that framework, the majority found the arbitrator's chosen valuation approach reasonable and restored key parts of the arbitral award.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs throughout.

The Court dismissed an appeal from Alberta human rights proceedings concerning termination under a safety policy requiring pre-incident disclosure of drug dependence or addiction issues.

A majority held the tribunal reasonably found the employee was terminated for breaching the policy rather than because of addiction, so prima facie discrimination was not established.

Concurring judges would have found prima facie discrimination but still upheld the outcome on accommodation to undue hardship.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding both prima facie discrimination and inadequate accommodation.