Lois B. Roberts

The appellant, Gaurav Tewari, appealed the decision of the motion judge who permanently stayed his action as a duplicative pleading and an abuse of process.

The motion judge also struck the claim under rules 21.01(3)(c), 21.01(3)(d), and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it contained no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Leave to amend was refused.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge’s decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant, Shiu Yiu Kong, appealed the dismissal of his application for an oppression remedy under the OBCA and CBCA.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge’s consideration of the statutory provisions, legal principles, or factual findings.

The court held that the appellant’s criticisms of the companies’ books and records did not amount to oppressive conduct, especially as the supporting evidence was inadmissible opinion evidence.

The real dispute was over the price and method of share purchase, which did not warrant court intervention.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, Milad Babadi, appealed his convictions for uttering threats and criminal harassment, as well as the sentence imposed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not informed or voluntary.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel’s representation was competent, that the appellant’s mental health issues were properly considered, and that the pleas were voluntary.

The court also denied a request for a sealing order and publication ban on medical information, emphasizing the open court principle.

The appellant, L.B., was convicted of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and physically assaulting his adopted son over a lengthy period while they were children in his care.

He received a global 10-year sentence, less 6 months for pre-trial custody and harsh detention conditions.

On appeal, L.B. challenged the consecutive nature of the sexual exploitation sentence and the overall length of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s analysis or conclusions, and held that the sentence was fit and proportionate given the aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for eleven charges arising from an armed robbery of a cryptocurrency exchange business.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing circumstantial evidence and failed to consider reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Villaroman principles and reasonably concluded that the appellant's participation in the robbery was the only plausible inference based on the totality of the evidence, including DNA on clothing used in the robbery.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, arguing the trial judge erred by not excluding the firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach from a facially invalid search warrant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework, noting the breach was deemed the product of sloppiness rather than bad faith.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court deferring to the trial judge's balancing of the factors.

The Crown appealed an application judge's order staying drug trafficking proceedings against the respondents due to a breach of their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the Crown argued the delay was justified by the complexity of the multi-accused project investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown failed to meet its burden to show the case was sufficiently complex to justify the delay, particularly since the respondents were not participating in a lengthy pre-trial application that complicated other related prosecutions.

The appellant purchased a commercial condominium unit under power of sale proceedings.

The respondents, who operated a Hindu temple in the unit, sought to enforce an unregistered option to purchase contained in their lease with the previous mortgagee in possession.

The motion judge granted specific performance, allowing the respondents to purchase the unit for $350,000.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under the Land Titles Act.

The matter was remitted for a trial on this issue.

The moving party brought a motion for directions regarding the responding party's failure to comply with previous court orders requiring the production of documents and attendance at an examination in aid of execution.

The court found that the contemnor, the sole director of the responding corporate debtor, had not purged his civil contempt as he failed to produce several important categories of documents.

As a sanction, the court ordered the contemnor to pay the full judgment amount of $424,769.22 into court, make a charitable donation, and pay full indemnity costs, failing which he would be deemed to have discontinued a related action against the moving party.

The appellant, a coalition of landlords, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal residential rental licensing by-law enacted as a pilot project.

The appellant argued the by-law was arbitrary, enacted in bad faith, and ultra vires due to alleged violations of the Charter, the Residential Tenancies Act, and privacy legislation.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review to municipal decisions and found the by-law was passed in good faith for valid health and safety purposes.

The court dismissed all constitutional and statutory challenges, concluding the by-law did not restrict marketing, permit unlawful entry, interfere with subletting, encroach on criminal law powers, or require disclosure of protected personal information.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages related to a failed real estate transaction involving a Hindu Temple.

The trial judge had dismissed the claims of fraud and unjust enrichment, partly because the appellant's corporations were not named as parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the fraud claims but found the trial judge erred in her treatment of the unjust enrichment claim and in limiting the piercing of the corporate veil to cases of fraud.

The Court allowed the appeal, awarded the appellant $7,500 for mortgage payments made on behalf of the respondents, and ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claim regarding the remaining advances.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment setting aside her mother's 2016 will and a related property transfer on the grounds of diminished capacity and undue influence.

The trial judge had found that the appellant exerted undue influence over her mother and failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence regarding the property transfer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the legal principles or her application of those principles to the factual findings, which were fully supported by the record.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The moving party sought to have an unpaid Superior Court costs order of $9,000 paid out of monies the responding party had previously paid into court as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the moving party's original intent in seeking security for costs included the costs of the underlying application, and awarded $2,000 in costs for the motion.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order and a trial decision upholding a separation agreement.

The motion judge had found the agreement was signed but directed a trial on whether an escrow condition requiring corporate counsel's approval was met.

The trial judge found the appellant waived the condition by her conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was out of time to appeal the motion judge's order and that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding waiver by conduct.

The appellant, a condominium unit owner, sued the lawyers who represented the condominium corporation in prior litigation, alleging fraud, perjury, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made by solicitors in the course of litigation are protected by absolute privilege, there is no civil cause of action for perjury, and solicitors owe no duty of care to opposing parties.

Sentence appeal from convictions for child luring and invitation to sexual touching involving online sexual exploitation of a child, including direction to create explicit images and videos.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a sentence above the Crown's position without notice, by failing to give proper mitigating effect to the historical nature of the offences, and by relying on an improper victim impact statement comment.

The Court of Appeal held that, although notice should have been given before exceeding the Crown's position, no impactful error in principle occurred because the sentence was grounded in the authorities and individualized reasons.

The court also held that the sentencing judge made no error in treating rehabilitation and specific deterrence as important despite the passage of time and did not rely on the impugned victim impact statement.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants contracted with the respondent to repair fire damage to their property.

The project was overseen by a third party who fraudulently requested and retained personal payments from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants liable to the respondent for the outstanding contract amount, concluding the third party lacked actual or ostensible authority to receive personal payments on the respondent's behalf.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the governing principles of ostensible authority.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking a person under 18, procuring, advertising sexual services, and publishing child pornography, but acquitted of administering a noxious substance.

She appealed the convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day, arguing it was demonstrably unfit for sexual offences against a child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence supported the verdicts despite the jury rejecting the complainant's drugging allegations.

The Court also dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the Friesen framework and that the offender's significant mental disabilities and history of exploitation constituted exceptional circumstances justifying a conditional sentence.

The procuring conviction was stayed on consent under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant, convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault against his nieces and great-nieces, appealed his convictions.

The primary grounds of appeal were that the trial judge erred by admitting similar fact evidence without properly considering collusion among complainants and by applying a different standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of collusion, credibility, or the application of similar fact principles.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to uphold her detention order.

The ORB found she remained a significant threat to public safety due to diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and substance use disorders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the ORB's application of the "significant threat" test from Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), which requires a real risk of serious physical or psychological harm to the public resulting from criminal conduct.