Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their fraud action based on a release, while the respondents' counterclaim on two promissory notes was sent to trial after a mini-trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to assess the advisability of a staged summary judgment process in the context of the litigation as a whole.

Because the release and the promissory notes were part of the same series of transactions, and credibility was a central issue, both the claim and counterclaim were required to proceed to trial to avoid inconsistent findings and substantive injustice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting specific performance of an easement agreement in favour of the respondent.

The parties had signed an 'Easement Summary' to provide road access to the respondent's water-access-only property, but the appellant later refused to finalize the formal easement, demanding additional consideration including a severed lot.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the Easement Summary was a binding preliminary agreement containing all essential terms, that there was no genuine issue for trial, and that specific performance was the appropriate remedy.

The appeal and the motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal barroom altercation.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding self-defence under sections 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to assess the lawfulness of the victim's assault from the accused's perspective rather than the victim's, and by failing to leave section 35 with the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Following the dismissal of appeals and motions for leave to appeal regarding the appointment of a trustee for an inter vivos trust, the successful parties sought their costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the normal loser-pays regime applied to the appeals, rather than costs being paid out of the estate, as the uncertainty regarding the trust's administration had been resolved by the application judge.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful beneficiaries and full indemnity costs to the trustee, payable jointly and severally by the appellants.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assaulting a peace officer and intimidating a justice system participant.

He raised a preliminary jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the Crown had elected to proceed summarily on all charges, meaning the appeal should be heard by a summary conviction appeal court rather than the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and concluded that the Crown's ambiguous statement that it was proceeding 'summarily' applied only to the hybrid offences, while the indictable offence proceeded by indictment.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal retained jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the preliminary challenge was dismissed.

The appellants purchased a commercial property that was later discovered to be contaminated.

They sued the vendor for failing to disclose the contamination and their real estate lawyer for negligence.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, finding that the purchaser actually knew about the contamination before waiving the environmental condition and closing the transaction, and had instructed the lawyer not to order further reports.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and findings of fact.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring him to repay $195,538.98 to a joint line of credit and $10,000 to a corporate respondent, arising from funds withdrawn during matrimonial proceedings.

The appellant argued the repayment obligations had not matured and were tied to other outstanding financial issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the repayment obligations had matured based on the clear terms of the signed documents and the availability of funds, and that no triable issue was established.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three sexual offences against a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on two independent bases: he had sexual relations with a minor without taking reasonable steps to ascertain her age, and he had sexual relations without her consent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions or her use of similar fact evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that found a cohabitation agreement invalid but upheld the validity of subsequent Minutes of Settlement regarding spousal support.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Minutes were negotiated with independent legal advice and were not unconscionable.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also refused, as the trial judge properly exercised her discretion considering divided success and the parties' financial circumstances.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claims against former directors, officers, and consultants of a corporation in which he invested.

The motion judge found the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the appellant knew the material facts more than two years before asserting the claims and that the proposed amendments advanced new causes of action unconnected to the original pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 9-year sentence for serious offences.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by granting 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody instead of 1.5:1 under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in finding loss of earned remission insufficient to trigger enhanced credit, the appellant's extensive criminal record of over 70 convictions would have justified detention under s. 515(9.1), thereby excluding him from enhanced credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his two murder convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from his cellphone and workplace computer obtained in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

He also challenged the Crown's closing address, alleged factual errors in the jury charge, and complained about a summary chart of victim statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) Grant analysis, which correctly assessed the privacy impact of the computer search as minimal.

The court also rejected the appellant's other grounds, finding no prejudice from the Crown's address, the minor jury charge error, or the evidentiary chart.

The respondent invested $57,000 in a fraudulent investment scheme through the appellant and a third party.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for the loss based on a breach of constructive trust as a trustee de son tort.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by deciding liability on a theory that was not pleaded.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidentiary basis for a breach of trust, as the appellant did not guarantee the investment or participate in any wrongdoing.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent bank approximately $6 million and declaring the judgment survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The appellant argued the record was insufficient due to inadequate documentary production by the bank, which he claimed was necessary to determine his intent regarding a cheque-kiting scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test and noting the appellant had over six years to bring a production motion but failed to do so until two days before the peremptory hearing.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of arson.

The accused, while highly intoxicated, left a pan of oil on a stove, causing a fire that destroyed his ex-girlfriend's house.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that arson was a specific intent offence in these circumstances and that the accused's intoxication raised a reasonable doubt about his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The majority held that arson under s. 434 is an offence requiring subjective intent or recklessness, making it akin to a specific intent offence where evidence of intoxication is relevant.

Although the trial judge erred in treating the classification of the offence as a question of fact, the error did not affect the outcome.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order for the pre-trial sale of the matrimonial home under the Partition Act.

The respondent challenged the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction, arguing that section 7 of the Partition Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The panel agreed it lacked jurisdiction as the Court of Appeal but, given the imminent trial date, was designated as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear the matter.

On the merits, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the sale order, noting the motions judge failed to explicitly address whether the sale would prejudice the appellant's rights under the Family Law Act and that a pre-trial sale was practically unnecessary.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for first degree murder.

At his first Ontario Review Board hearing, the board accepted a joint submission for detention in a medium security unit with escorted hospital grounds privileges, but added a condition permitting escorted or accompanied access to the community at the hospital's discretion.

The Crown appealed, arguing the community access condition was unreasonable and that the board breached procedural fairness by adding it without allowing prior submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the condition was supported by expert psychiatric evidence and that the board did not owe the Crown a common law duty of procedural fairness in these circumstances.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order finding him in contempt of court for using his mother as a caregiver for his children instead of the designated daycare provider, and a subsequent order imposing sanctions.

The respondent mother moved to quash the appeal as out of time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, extending the time for service.

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt and sanction orders, finding that the motion judge erred by making findings of contempt that extended beyond the specific non-monetary breach alleged in the notice of motion.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's debt would be released by his discharge from bankruptcy.

The respondent had acted as a 'straw borrower' and co-signed a mortgage application, unaware that the primary borrower had made fraudulent misrepresentations.

The appellant argued the debt should survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act due to false pretences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 178(1)(e) requires a causal connection between the bankrupt's false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation and the obtaining of the property.

The trial judge correctly found the mortgage funds were advanced based on the primary borrower's misrepresentations, not the respondent's.

The applicant commenced an action against York University, which was struck by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant then brought an ex parte motion before another Superior Court judge to set aside the dismissal, which was denied.

The applicant appealed this denial, but the appeal was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the Registrar's order.

On a motion to review the single judge's decision, a panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the underlying appeal because the second Superior Court judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the first judge's order.