Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The moving party, a self-represented debtor, brought motions to review the orders of two single judges of the Court of Appeal.

At the hearing, she requested an adjournment, which was opposed by the respondent bank and refused by the court.

The court reviewed the materials and found no basis to overturn the previous orders, noting that the proper tests were applied and that the Charter of Rights does not relieve a debtor of her obligations.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellants brought two companion libel actions arising from an article in a corporate newsletter that was posted on a website.

The respondents, Shaw Satellite G.P. and Bell Expressvu Limited Partnership, successfully moved for summary judgment, and the actions against them were dismissed.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motions judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from refusals given on cross-examinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding it was open to the motions judge to decline to draw an adverse inference based on the record.

The appellant abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the appeal book, noting the abandonment and fixing the respondents' costs at $4,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application for a declaration that a section of a forced road had been assumed by the municipality as a public highway.

The application judge found that historical, sporadic maintenance by the municipality did not demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intention to assume the road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with an imitation firearm, disguise with intent, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying heavily on DNA evidence found on a balaclava and toy gun retrieved from a garbage bin near the scene of the bank robbery.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence, reversed the burden of proof regarding his testimonial silence, provided insufficient reasons, and reached unreasonable verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law regarding the accused's silence and that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the convictions.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent bank's motion to dismiss their action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the corporate appellant had already suffered damages from the alleged breach of contract by November 2008, meaning the limitation period commenced no later than January 8, 2009.

As the action was commenced after the limitation period expired, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a permanent injunction preventing him from interfering with a mutual driveway and sought leave to appeal the costs awarded.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals due to late filing.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal of the injunction order, finding it lacked merit as the appellant had installed a fixed, locked barrier on the driveway.

However, the court dismissed the motion to quash the costs appeal, granted leave to appeal costs, and reduced the motion judge's costs award by $3,000, finding the judge erred in treating a restatement of the claim as an offer to settle attracting substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for robbery and mischief, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that reaffirmed a hybrid detention order.

He argued he should be granted an absolute discharge, claiming he had initially malingered his symptoms and did not suffer from a mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant suffered from a major mental illness and remained a significant threat to public safety was well-supported by the evidence.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of her claims arising from a property transfer and alleged monies owing, arguing trial unfairness, inadequate reasons, and errors in the rejection of resulting trust and constructive trust remedies.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to restrict cross-examination on a document withheld in breach of a trial management order and that no unfairness resulted.

It further held that the trial judge gave adequate reasons and made factual findings open on the record supporting the conclusions that consideration was provided for the property transfer, no unjust enrichment was established, and the money-advanced claim failed.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed appeal costs to the respondent.

The appellant challenged the motion judge’s conclusion that his claim on a $50,000 loan was statute-barred.

He argued the loan was for a specific purpose rather than a demand loan, and that the limitation period was tolled by alleged wilful concealment, misrepresentation, and incapacity.

The court held that even accepting the appellant’s evidence, he knew by June 2005 that he had a cause of action, and in any event the first written demand in May 2006 triggered the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against a lawyer.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the evidentiary record did not establish any ongoing retainer or solicitor-client relationship between the appellants and the respondent.

A single telephone conversation with the appellants' then-lawyer was found to be merely a request for clarification about notice, not a retainer for legal advice on whether shares could be transferred without unanimous shareholder consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a jury finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and alleged prejudice arising from the treatment of his name during the criminal process.

Amicus additionally argued that the trial judge should not have explained the consequences of an NCR finding to the jury and that the judge misstated an example under s. 16.

The Court of Appeal held there was ample evidence to support the verdict, no prejudice arose from the treatment of the appellant's name, the charge on consequences was permissible in the circumstances, and the mistaken example was harmless because the other branch of s. 16 was the issue at trial.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for importing cocaine, arguing that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence from a border services officer explaining why the appellant was referred to secondary inspection and improperly instructed the jury on that evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the prior authority relied on by the appellant did not bar admission of an officer’s personal observations and permissible non-expert opinion evidence.

The officer’s use of the term 'indicator' was found to be merely descriptive in context and did not amount to profile evidence or impermissible opinion on knowledge.

The charge to the jury, read as a whole, did not invite the jury to treat the officer’s suspicions as proof of knowing importation.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that neither proposed ground had strong merit.

The unreasonable conviction argument had not been advanced before the summary conviction appeal judge and the record contained evidence from which the trial judge could infer the impugned conduct persisted longer than observed by Crown witnesses.

The W. (D.) argument also failed, as no reviewable error was identified and the leave request effectively sought an impermissible second appeal on credibility.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking in relation to sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because the trial judge acquitted on one count while convicting on others, and that the judge scrutinized his evidence more strictly than the complainant's.

The court held that the verdicts were not irreconcilable on any realistic view of the evidence and that there was an evidentiary basis for the choking conviction apart from the acquitted incident.

The court also found no unfairness in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The Crown appealed sentence in a criminal matter involving serious conduct in a domestic context.

The Court of Appeal held that substantial deference was owed to the sentencing judge and rejected submissions that denunciation and deterrence had been insufficiently emphasized or that rehabilitation had been overemphasized.

The court further held that the sentence, while perhaps at the low end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

In a personal injury action arising from a bicycle and motor vehicle collision allegedly caused in part by unlit streetlights on a boundary bridge, a municipal defendant appealed summary judgment dismissing its crossclaim and the action against a co-defendant utility contractor.

The appeal court held that the servicing agreement and the evidence about responsibility for identifying and maintaining boundary-road streetlights were ambiguous and contradictory.

The motion judge erred by treating the parties' common understanding as determinative despite live disputes over contractual allocation of responsibility.

The claims against the contractor were restored for trial.

The Crown appealed from a stay entered after a trial judge held that issue estoppel barred relitigation of possession of cocaine, based on a prior dismissal of a conditional sentence order revocation allegation.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the revocation judge had effectively decided the possession issue in the accused's favour, the revocation ruling was not a final decision capable of grounding issue estoppel in a subsequent criminal trial.

Revocation proceedings are sentencing proceedings, not trials determining guilt for a new offence, and extending issue estoppel to them would be inconsistent with the narrow criminal-law scope of the doctrine and its underlying policy objectives.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered on the possession for the purpose of trafficking count.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a civil claim alleging that religious divorce documents had been fraudulently altered to include a waiver of rights to a marriage gift.

The court upheld the trial judge’s credibility findings and rejected arguments concerning corroboration, bias, waiver, and factual error.

The proposed fresh evidence did not relate to the central authenticity issue, could have been obtained with diligence before trial, and would not have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed, with no appeal costs to one respondent and fixed costs awarded to another.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his action alleging misrepresentations in connection with the purchase of interests in two closely held businesses, and also challenged partial allowance of counterclaims by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's findings were grounded in credibility, were well supported by the record, and attracted deference.

It rejected the argument that one respondent breached the share purchase agreement by selling an interest he did not own, finding both parties understood the transaction as a sale of that respondent's interest.

It also upheld a damages award reflecting another respondent's continuing ownership interest after the appellant operated and dissolved one company without accounting to that shareholder.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.