Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The applicant brought a motion to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay.

The underlying action was a claim for damages against the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario regarding its investigation of a complaint against his former physician, which had been struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the single judge's decision, agreeing that the appeal had no merit.

The motion for review was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for unpaid construction work.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial to admit articles of revival for a dissolved corporate defendant, which the individual appellant sought to introduce after judgment was rendered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the evidence could have been discovered sooner with reasonable diligence and that the refusal to re-open the trial was a proper exercise of discretion.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order.

The order below dismissed the appellant's summary judgment motion without making any binding determinations of law under Rule 20.04(4).

The Court of Appeal held that the order was not final and quashed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The parties executed minutes of settlement requiring the respondents to pay $250,000 in instalments, with a consent judgment held in escrow.

The respondents missed the final $95,000 payment, prompting the appellant to file a writ of execution.

The respondents successfully moved for relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, and the motion judge rescinded the consent judgment, granting judgment for $95,000 instead.

The appellant appealed, arguing it should have been allowed to revert to its option to continue the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no live issue that the option could be revived after being exercised.

The Children's Lawyer and other appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to appoint an independent trustee for an inter vivos spousal trust.

The appellants alleged that the respondents, who were directors of the corporation wholly owned by the trust, committed a breach of trust by declaring dividends in excess of net income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents' actions as directors were governed by the Business Corporations Act, not the trust agreement, and did not constitute a breach of trust.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence and upheld the application judge's order that costs be paid out of the estate.

The moving party, a self-represented debtor, brought motions to review the orders of two single judges of the Court of Appeal.

At the hearing, she requested an adjournment, which was opposed by the respondent bank and refused by the court.

The court reviewed the materials and found no basis to overturn the previous orders, noting that the proper tests were applied and that the Charter of Rights does not relieve a debtor of her obligations.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellants brought two companion libel actions arising from an article in a corporate newsletter that was posted on a website.

The respondents, Shaw Satellite G.P. and Bell Expressvu Limited Partnership, successfully moved for summary judgment, and the actions against them were dismissed.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motions judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from refusals given on cross-examinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding it was open to the motions judge to decline to draw an adverse inference based on the record.

The appellant abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the appeal book, noting the abandonment and fixing the respondents' costs at $4,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application for a declaration that a section of a forced road had been assumed by the municipality as a public highway.

The application judge found that historical, sporadic maintenance by the municipality did not demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intention to assume the road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with an imitation firearm, disguise with intent, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying heavily on DNA evidence found on a balaclava and toy gun retrieved from a garbage bin near the scene of the bank robbery.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence, reversed the burden of proof regarding his testimonial silence, provided insufficient reasons, and reached unreasonable verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law regarding the accused's silence and that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the convictions.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent bank's motion to dismiss their action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the corporate appellant had already suffered damages from the alleged breach of contract by November 2008, meaning the limitation period commenced no later than January 8, 2009.

As the action was commenced after the limitation period expired, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a permanent injunction preventing him from interfering with a mutual driveway and sought leave to appeal the costs awarded.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals due to late filing.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal of the injunction order, finding it lacked merit as the appellant had installed a fixed, locked barrier on the driveway.

However, the court dismissed the motion to quash the costs appeal, granted leave to appeal costs, and reduced the motion judge's costs award by $3,000, finding the judge erred in treating a restatement of the claim as an offer to settle attracting substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for robbery and mischief, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that reaffirmed a hybrid detention order.

He argued he should be granted an absolute discharge, claiming he had initially malingered his symptoms and did not suffer from a mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant suffered from a major mental illness and remained a significant threat to public safety was well-supported by the evidence.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of her claims arising from a property transfer and alleged monies owing, arguing trial unfairness, inadequate reasons, and errors in the rejection of resulting trust and constructive trust remedies.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to restrict cross-examination on a document withheld in breach of a trial management order and that no unfairness resulted.

It further held that the trial judge gave adequate reasons and made factual findings open on the record supporting the conclusions that consideration was provided for the property transfer, no unjust enrichment was established, and the money-advanced claim failed.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed appeal costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against a lawyer.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the evidentiary record did not establish any ongoing retainer or solicitor-client relationship between the appellants and the respondent.

A single telephone conversation with the appellants' then-lawyer was found to be merely a request for clarification about notice, not a retainer for legal advice on whether shares could be transferred without unanimous shareholder consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged the motion judge’s conclusion that his claim on a $50,000 loan was statute-barred.

He argued the loan was for a specific purpose rather than a demand loan, and that the limitation period was tolled by alleged wilful concealment, misrepresentation, and incapacity.

The court held that even accepting the appellant’s evidence, he knew by June 2005 that he had a cause of action, and in any event the first written demand in May 2006 triggered the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a jury finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and alleged prejudice arising from the treatment of his name during the criminal process.

Amicus additionally argued that the trial judge should not have explained the consequences of an NCR finding to the jury and that the judge misstated an example under s. 16.

The Court of Appeal held there was ample evidence to support the verdict, no prejudice arose from the treatment of the appellant's name, the charge on consequences was permissible in the circumstances, and the mistaken example was harmless because the other branch of s. 16 was the issue at trial.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for importing cocaine, arguing that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence from a border services officer explaining why the appellant was referred to secondary inspection and improperly instructed the jury on that evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the prior authority relied on by the appellant did not bar admission of an officer’s personal observations and permissible non-expert opinion evidence.

The officer’s use of the term 'indicator' was found to be merely descriptive in context and did not amount to profile evidence or impermissible opinion on knowledge.

The charge to the jury, read as a whole, did not invite the jury to treat the officer’s suspicions as proof of knowing importation.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that neither proposed ground had strong merit.

The unreasonable conviction argument had not been advanced before the summary conviction appeal judge and the record contained evidence from which the trial judge could infer the impugned conduct persisted longer than observed by Crown witnesses.

The W. (D.) argument also failed, as no reviewable error was identified and the leave request effectively sought an impermissible second appeal on credibility.

The Crown appealed sentence in a criminal matter involving serious conduct in a domestic context.

The Court of Appeal held that substantial deference was owed to the sentencing judge and rejected submissions that denunciation and deterrence had been insufficiently emphasized or that rehabilitation had been overemphasized.

The court further held that the sentence, while perhaps at the low end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.