Ian Latimer

The applicant landlord sought a declaration that the respondent tenant breached a commercial lease and that the lease was validly terminated, seeking vacant possession.

The tenant sought a declaration that the lease was not validly terminated or, alternatively, relief from forfeiture.

The court found that the tenant committed numerous and ongoing breaches, including making significant structural alterations without prior approval or building permits, and installing heavy equipment without consent.

The court held that the landlord properly terminated the lease and that the tenant's deliberate and flagrant conduct disentitled it to the equitable remedy of relief from forfeiture.

The landlord's application was granted and the tenant's application was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to remove Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP as lawyers of record for the plaintiff, LaSalle Electrical Contractors Inc. Norton Rose also represented the third party, Jensen Building Ltd., in this action and a related construction lien action.

The defendants argued that Norton Rose was in a conflict of interest and could misuse confidential information obtained from the third party against the defendants.

The court granted the motion, finding a potential for conflict and mischief, and ordered Norton Rose removed as counsel for the plaintiff.

A cross-motion for consolidation and waiver of the implied undertaking rule was adjourned.

The plaintiff vendor sued the defendant purchaser for damages after the purchaser failed to close a real estate transaction for a newly built home.

The purchaser argued she was pressured into signing the agreement by a real estate agent she believed represented the vendor, and that the vendor failed to mitigate its damages.

The court found that the agent acted for the purchaser, not the vendor, and that no undue pressure was applied.

The court also held that the vendor took reasonable steps to mitigate its losses by reselling the property in a declining market.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $194,155.60.

The plaintiff in a construction lien action brought a motion to compel the defendant to serve an affidavit of documents and attend examinations for discovery before the plaintiff delivered responding materials to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed the request for an affidavit of documents.

The court held that under the amended Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no automatic right to an affidavit of documents without a discovery plan, and requiring one in the face of a summary judgment motion would be disproportionate and contrary to the modern approach to summary judgment.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside two prior trial management orders.

The prior orders were made by a judge who later recused himself from the trial because the respondent's counsel, who was to testify as a witness, was a deputy judge under the judge's administrative responsibility.

The appellants argued the recusal retroactively tainted the prior orders due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court held that while the motion judge erred in applying issue estoppel, the result was correct.

The court found that the judge's subsequent recusal out of an abundance of caution had no retroactive impact on his previous orders, as the conflict only arose when counsel became a witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Onyx Corporation, appealed a trial judgment finding it wrongfully terminated an oral subcontract with the respondent, S & J Gareri Trucking Ltd., for snow removal services.

The trial judge found the oral subcontract was for a five-season term, mirroring the appellant's main contract with the municipality, rather than a season-by-season term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct principles for interpreting oral contracts and made no error in assessing damages based on expected revenues less mitigation.

This costs endorsement followed summary judgment motions arising from a failed sale of a machine shop business and related limitations and pleading issues.

The successful plaintiff sought partial or substantial indemnity costs after defeating motions alleging the action was statute-barred, disclosed no cause of action, and failed to raise a genuine issue for trial on a counterclaim.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, held that fairness and reasonableness governed, and found no special circumstances justifying substantial indemnity costs.

Partial indemnity costs of $22,007.17 were awarded, with pre-judgment interest, apportioned two-thirds to one defendant and one-third to another.

The appellant challenged the motion judge’s conclusion that his claim on a $50,000 loan was statute-barred.

He argued the loan was for a specific purpose rather than a demand loan, and that the limitation period was tolled by alleged wilful concealment, misrepresentation, and incapacity.

The court held that even accepting the appellant’s evidence, he knew by June 2005 that he had a cause of action, and in any event the first written demand in May 2006 triggered the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment that resulted in dismissal of the action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The court reiterated the general principle that costs follow the event and rejected submissions that costs should not be awarded.

Although the plaintiff raised concerns regarding mental health issues and impecuniosity, the court concluded that these circumstances did not justify departing from the ordinary rule.

The defendant’s claimed costs were found to be reasonable in light of the work performed and the parties’ bills of costs.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis in the amount claimed.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action to recover three alleged loans made between 1998 and 2000.

The defendant argued the claims were statute-barred under the former Limitations Act, which imposed a six‑year limitation period.

The court found the first loan became due in 1999 and the other two loans were properly characterized as demand loans whose causes of action arose when the funds were advanced.

The plaintiff failed to produce written acknowledgements restarting the limitation period and provided insufficient medical evidence to establish incapacity suspending the limitation period.

The court held there was no trust or equitable claim capable of avoiding the limitation defence and no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a bank and its legal counsel regarding the enforcement of two mortgages on properties in default.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no basis for a claim against the bank's counsel, one appellant lacked standing, and the other appellant's claims should have been raised in the underlying enforcement proceedings.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for breach of an equipment rental contract.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in calculating the hours the respondent would have worked and in failing to credit a prior payment.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's finding of 1000 hours of work, as it was supported by evidence including time cards and witness testimony.

However, the Court agreed the trial judge erred by not crediting a $2,990 payment made for preparation work.

The judgment was varied downward to correct this and a minor arithmetical error, but the appeal was otherwise dismissed.