Karen M. Weiler

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

He had previously been convicted of drug trafficking and firearms offences, and his appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

The Crown opposed release on public interest grounds, arguing the prospect of obtaining leave was remote.

The court found that the applicant's proposed ground of appeal regarding the sufficiency of a search warrant raised a potential conflict with another appellate decision.

The court concluded that continued detention was not necessary in the public interest and granted the application for release.

The moving party sought an order permitting the late filing of a notice of appeal from a motion judge's dismissal of its summary judgment motion.

The summary judgment motion had been based on a limitation period defence.

The Court of Appeal determined that the motion judge's dismissal was an interlocutory order, not a final order, because the formal order did not reflect a binding determination on the limitation period and the matter was sent to trial.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the motion for late filing was dismissed.

The appellants, an engineering firm and its principal, appealed a trial judgment apportioning liability for damages between them and their insurers.

The trial judge found the appellants liable in negligence and breach of contract for errors and delays in engineering drawings for a construction project.

The trial judge apportioned 45% of the damages to the appellants and 55% to the insurers, based on an exclusion clause for delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that all delays were caused by the appellants' negligence in having to correct errors, which was covered under the policy.

The insurers' cross-appeal regarding the assessment of damages and the date used for foreign currency conversion was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a 'bedpan vigil' search authorized by a general warrant.

He was detained for 43 hours, handcuffed to cell bars, and experienced severe withdrawal symptoms without medical supervision.

The Court of Appeal held that while a general warrant can authorize a bedpan vigil search, the warrant was defective because it purported to authorize indefinite detention, violating the requirement to bring an arrested person before a justice without unreasonable delay.

The court also found the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, violating the appellant's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the convictions were set aside, and an acquittal was ordered.

On a civil appeal arising from historic sexual and physical abuse allegations based largely on recovered memories, the court held that the trial judge erred by using expert psychological evidence to corroborate the truth of the respondent's allegations and resolve a credibility contest.

Expert evidence could explain memory processes and damages, but could not be used to decide the ultimate issues of credibility, reliability, and liability.

The court therefore set aside the judgment, dismissed the assault claim, and held that a new trial was unnecessary because the admissible evidence was evenly balanced.

The court also allowed the appellant's defamation counterclaim in part, finding that qualified privilege did not protect defamatory communications sent to a former friend who had no reciprocal interest or duty to receive them.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting statements he made to police at the scene, claiming they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act or made while detained without access to counsel.

He also argued the breathalyzer results should have been excluded because the arresting officer forgot to make a breath demand at the scene, and the demand was instead made later by a breath technician at the station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the roadside statements were voluntary and made before detention crystallized.

The Court also held that the breath technician's demand satisfied the requirements of s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, as it was made as soon as practicable after the technician formed his own reasonable grounds.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter for shooting his brother.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and by allowing the jury to consider the lack of bruising on the deceased's wrist without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the self-defence instructions properly conveyed the requirement of a defensive purpose, and concluding there was no realistic possibility the jury improperly speculated about the bruising evidence.

The moving party, a debtor company in receivership, sought leave to appeal an order approving the sale of its assets by a court-appointed receiver.

The moving party argued that the receiver acted unfairly, that the debtor's management retained the right to negotiate a restructuring, and that the receiver failed to consult with affected Aboriginal communities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the debtor's parallel negotiations contravened the receivership order, the receiver had exclusive authority to market the assets, and the Aboriginal consultation issue was raised too late and lacked an adequate evidentiary record.

The appellant tenants appealed a decision denying them a rent abatement after their apartment building's elevator was out of service for 96 days due to a latent defect.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found that the landlord had acted diligently and reasonably in maintaining the elevator and replacing it, and thus did not breach its duty to maintain the residential complex in a good state of repair under s. 20(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The Divisional Court affirmed the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's contextual interpretation of s. 20(1), which considered the reasonableness of the landlord's actions, was reasonable and did not constitute an error of law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences, including assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement against his former girlfriend, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing defence evidence as an alibi, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and over-relying on similar fact and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in characterizing certain evidence as an alibi, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the curative proviso applied.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding the trial judge reasonably assessed the psychiatric evidence and the appellant's risk to re-offend.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in Ontario seeking $400 million in damages and served the defendants in Guatemala, a non-Hague Convention state, in accordance with Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants appealed the validation of service, arguing that Rule 17.05(2) must be interpreted in accordance with customary international law and comity, which would require service to comply with Guatemalan law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that service under Rule 17.05(2) does not violate Guatemalan sovereignty or international law, and that the rule provides a clear choice of service methods that rebuts any presumption of conformity with foreign law.

On a motion to quash, the court held that orders granting leave to amend a statement of defence and adding a party defendant for limited purposes were interlocutory, not final.

The motion judge's discussion of res judicata and the Limitations Act, 2002 did not amount to a final determination of those issues on the merits, but only a preliminary assessment that the proposed defence was tenable under rule 26.01.

The court emphasized that appeals lie from orders, not reasons, and that the nature of the underlying motion governs the characterization of the order.

Because the litigation continued and no substantive right was finally determined, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appeals were quashed and leave to appeal the costs award was refused.

The appellant, who was previously found Not Criminally Responsible for criminal harassment and mischief, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board maintaining his conditional discharge.

He argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable given the appellant's active symptoms of schizophrenia, lack of insight, and stated intention to stop taking medication if discharged.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault causing bodily harm, which was entered following a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was invalid and not unequivocal due to shifting facts presented by the Crown, the appellant's statements suggesting a lack of mens rea, and indications she pleaded guilty primarily to be released from jail where she was allegedly denied HIV medication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, and assault arising from three separate incidents that occurred over a 30-minute period.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable, challenging the trial judge's findings on self-defence, identity, and common intention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence, which established that the appellants acted together as common participants in all three incidents.

Leave to appeal sentence was also denied.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment in 2008, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention order.

He argued the Board erred in law by equating the harm of criminal harassment with a 'significant threat to the safety of the public' under s. 672.5401 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not focus solely on the index offence but considered all evidence, including the likelihood that the appellant would discontinue medication and engage in physical and aggressive behaviour.

The Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that directed his detention at a mental health facility, revoking his prior conditional discharge.

The appellant had been returned to the facility after being charged with criminal harassment, which was resolved by a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was reasonable, given his diagnosis, lack of insight, and recent negative interactions.

The Court also upheld the detention order, noting the appellant's lack of stable housing and employment prospects, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible due to schizophrenia, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that changed his status from a conditional discharge to a detention order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's refusal to grant an absolute discharge, as the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the detention order, finding the Board failed to adequately explain why a detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given the appellant's compliance with previous conditions.

The conditional discharge was reinstated.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim sought to set aside a transfer of real property to the respondent, alleging an oral promise by their parents to gift the property to the appellants' company.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge's reasons sufficient and agreed with the characterization of the claim as a promise to make a gift.

However, the Court held that the motion judge erred by failing to grant leave to amend the pleading under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their statement of claim to plead an oral agreement concerning the property.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for declaratory relief concerning her aunt's estate and the respondent's role under a power of attorney.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no evidence of fraud or lack of capacity, and awarded $8,000 in costs against the appellant due to unsubstantiated allegations and unnecessarily lengthening the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's findings or costs award and dismissed the appeal.