Sarit E. Batner

The appellant, Bank of Montreal, sought to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings in a receivership, which allowed the respondent to terminate a project agreement.

The appellant argued it had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively, sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the order lifting the stay was procedural, did not directly bring into play the value of the debtor's property, and did not directly result in a loss, meaning there was no automatic right of appeal.

The court also denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, did not raise issues of general importance, and would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action following the death of their family member from a delayed splenic rupture two weeks after a fall.

The deceased had been treated by the defendant surgeon at the hospital and subsequently cleared to return to work by the defendant family doctor.

The court found that neither doctor breached the standard of care, as objective evidence at the time did not indicate a splenic injury.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, finding it likely that an intervening trauma caused the fatal rupture.

The action was dismissed.

The appellants, Fram and Kerbel, appealed a trial judgment that declared a 2005 land sale agreement between Kerbel and Romandale at an end.

The trial judge had found that Kerbel repudiated the agreement by entering into a settlement agreement with Fram that delayed the closing of the land sale until after secondary plan approval.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that Romandale was estopped by convention from asserting that the settlement agreement breached the 2005 agreement, as all parties had shared the assumption that the sale could only close after secondary plan approval.

The Court also held that the 2005 agreement was not frustrated or void for mistake, Kerbel's claim was not limitation-barred, and Kerbel was entitled to specific performance because the lands were unique.

The defendants sought to dismiss two actions brought by the self-represented plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The actions involved allegations of improper disclosure of medical information and forged consent, which had already been conclusively dismissed in a prior summary judgment motion.

The court found that the new actions were an attempt to relitigate the same issues, constituting an improper collateral attack and res judicata.

The actions were dismissed as an abuse of process.

The defendants brought a motion for a mandatory interim injunction to enforce indemnity agreements and require the plaintiffs to advance funding for their legal expenses.

The court found that the Cytrynbaum jurisprudence did not apply because the motion sought a mandatory injunction against an individual and a corporation, rather than a final determination under the CBCA.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the defendants failed to establish a strong prima facie case due to concerns about conflicts of interest and lack of independent legal advice in the drafting of the indemnity agreements.

The court also found no irreparable harm, as any harm could be quantified in monetary terms.

Multiple actions arising from a complex land development dispute involving co-ownership agreements for two farm properties in Markham.

Fram alleged Romandale breached the co-ownership agreements by entering into a conditional agreement to sell its interest to Kerbel.

Kerbel later entered into a settlement agreement with Fram to delay the closing of its purchase from Romandale for decades.

The court found that Romandale did not breach the co-ownership agreements.

Furthermore, the court held that Kerbel repudiated its agreement with Romandale by entering into the settlement agreement with Fram, which fundamentally altered the timeline for closing.

All claims by Fram and Kerbel against Romandale were dismissed, and Romandale was granted a declaration that its agreement with Kerbel was at an end.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's refusals motion and the granting of the defendants' motion to discharge certificates of pending litigation, the court determined the costs of the proceedings.

The court awarded the plaintiff $4,095 for a successful adjournment request, and awarded the defendants $2,000 for the refusals motion.

For the main motion to discharge the CPLs, the court awarded the defendants substantial indemnity costs of $75,000 due to the plaintiff's failure to make full and fair disclosure on its initial ex parte motion and its failure to accept a reasonable Rule 49 offer to settle.

The net costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendants were fixed at $72,905.

The defendant, Romandale Farms Limited, brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of defence, add third parties, consolidate actions, and dissolve a 2007 interlocutory injunction in a complex commercial real estate dispute.

The plaintiff opposed the amendments, arguing prejudice, res judicata, and withdrawal of an admission.

The court granted leave to amend, finding no non-compensable prejudice and that the proposed defences were tenable and responsive to the plaintiff's amended claims regarding a partial settlement agreement.

The court also joined one third party for limited purposes to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and dissolved the 2007 injunction, as the plaintiff no longer claimed a proprietary interest in the land.

A former employee of a digital cinema company misappropriated proprietary 2D to 3D conversion software and confidential information while still employed and used it to establish competing businesses in China.

The court found breaches of the duty of good faith and fidelity, misuse of confidential information and trade secrets, misappropriation of a corporate opportunity, and the tort of conversion.

The defendants, most of whom were noted in default, used the stolen technology to win a theatre project and compete in the digital cinema market.

The court awarded damages reflecting the minimum cost of developing the stolen technology, disgorgement of profits from the misappropriated project, punitive damages, and substantial costs.

In an estates application concerning capacity and management of property, a respondent brought a motion to prevent the use of a transcript from an examination conducted in unrelated prior litigation.

The applicant sought to rely on the transcript to demonstrate incapacity.

The court held that the transcript was subject to the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and could not be used in collateral proceedings without leave.

The court found that the interests of justice did not outweigh the privacy and litigation integrity concerns underlying the rule.

The transcript was ordered to remain sealed and excluded from the application record.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding it liable in nuisance, trespass, and negligence for noise and odour emanating from its temporary asphalt plant.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the finding of liability in nuisance, concluding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the severity of the interference or the character of the neighbourhood.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to qualify an expert witness employed by an environmental advocacy group, finding her employment did not automatically disqualify her.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding trespass and negligence, finding that noise and odour are indirect intrusions that do not constitute trespass, and that the respondents suffered no personal injury or property damage compensable in negligence.

The damages award of $14,700 was upheld.

The defendants appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to sever the claims of two plaintiffs who alleged sexual misconduct against their deceased family physician.

The Master had dismissed the motion primarily because it was brought at a late stage in the litigation, after discoveries were completed and the action was set down for trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master made no error of law and reasonably exercised her discretion in concluding that the conduct of the trial, including rulings on the admissibility of similar fact evidence, should be left to the trial judge.