John I. Laskin

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent one-third of the proceeds of a winning lottery ticket.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's conduct during the trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge excessively interrupted the testimony of the parties, asking hundreds of questions, cross-examining the appellants, and making sarcastic and condescending remarks.

The Court held that the trial judge's interventions crossed the line, usurped the function of counsel, and destroyed the image of judicial impartiality.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for eight robberies of financial institutions committed while on parole for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's lengthy record and the circumstances of the offences.

A post-sentence report did not alter the fitness of the sentence, as much of the information was already before the trial judge.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his third conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge improperly discounted defence witnesses' testimony because they had to reconstruct events years later, holding the defence to an impossible standard.

Given that this would be the appellant's fourth trial for an incident that occurred 13 years prior, the Court concluded that proceeding further would violate the community's sense of fair play.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion, having been acquitted of related assault charges arising from the same incident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury by providing a generic instruction on extortion that included 'threats', which could have led the jury to convict based on words alone, despite the Crown's case requiring proof of physical assault.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and theft, arguing for the first time on appeal that the Crown prosecutor was in a conflict of interest for having previously represented him on an assault charge.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but found no actual conflict of interest or prejudice, as the matters were independent and no relevant confidential information was used.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the custodial sentence due to the seriousness of the frauds committed against a charitable institution.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the defence of accident and failed to adequately address conflicting expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made clear findings of an intentional assault and properly handled the conflict in expert evidence.

The court noted that the trial judge's careful analysis of the expert testimony justified rejecting the basis for the defence expert's opinion.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants, a Michigan law firm and one of its members, appealed an order finding that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over the claims against them and that Ontario was the forum conveniens.

The plaintiffs, an Ontario transportation company and its president, sued the appellants for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a Michigan action.

The Court of Appeal applied the Muscutt factors and upheld the motions judge's finding of a real and substantial connection to Ontario, emphasizing the multiplicity of parties and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The Court also upheld the finding that Michigan was not clearly the more appropriate forum, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The victim had described his assailant's build, hair, clothing, age, and state of intoxication.

The appellant was found in the area twenty minutes later matching the description, had scratches on his chest, admitted to being in a fight, and was immediately recognized by the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly dealt with minor inconsistencies and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a brief endorsement in this appeal, directing the parties to see the endorsement in companion file C37669 for the disposition.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding liability for occupation rent.

The trial judge had found the respondent's parents liable for occupation rent due to their participation in a conspiracy to acquire assets, but found the respondent daughter was not part of the conspiracy and was merely living with her parents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the parents, not the daughter, were liable for the occupation rent until the delivery of possession.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent doctor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that summary judgment is generally inappropriate when the rule of discoverability is central to a limitation issue and facts are in dispute.

Furthermore, the court held that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not related to a claim for malpractice in respect of professional services and is therefore not subject to the limitation period in the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for surrender to the United States for conspiracy to launder proceeds of crime.

The primary issue was whether identification evidence gathered in Canada by a foreign officer and included in the record of the case was admissible under section 32(2) of the Extradition Act without requiring viva voce testimony.

The Court of Appeal held that evidence lawfully gathered in Canada and substantively admissible under Canadian law does not need to take the form of viva voce testimony at the extradition hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on narcotics charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender decision.

He argued that the new Extradition Act's evidentiary provisions were unconstitutional, that time limits for the authority to proceed were breached, and that the extradition judge erred in his assessment of the conduct and evidence.

He also challenged the Minister's surrender decision on Charter grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding the legislation constitutional, the time limits functionally met, the committal justified by the evidence, and the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order granting judgment on the respondent's claim for payment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's claim and the appellants' claim for set off were so interrelated that judgment should not have been granted on the former if the latter was to proceed.

The court directed a trial for both claims and ordered the funds held in trust to remain as security pending further court order.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal varied the order to grant the moving party leave to intervene as an added party pursuant to Rule 13.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that the assumption that existing parties would protect claims of community use appeared to be in doubt.

The parties reached a settlement on the appeal from the judgments of Justice Susan E. Greer.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the $1.5 million held in trust pursuant to a prior order be transferred forthwith to Goldman Sloan in trust pending further order, and that necessary consents be filed to give effect to the Minutes of Settlement.

The respondent, a registered owner of semi-automatic firearms, sought to acquire a fully automatic Thompson submachine gun from another collector.

The Registrar of Firearms refused to issue a registration certificate, but a summary conviction appeal court judge allowed the respondent's appeal, finding he was grandfathered under s. 12(5) of the Firearms Act.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 12(2) is the exclusive grandfathering provision for fully automatic firearms, and s. 12(5) cannot be used by owners of semi-automatic weapons to acquire fully automatic ones, consistent with the Act's public safety purpose.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Costs were awarded against the appellant on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents were awarded a total of $70,000, distributed as $20,000 to the plaintiff, $30,000 to one set of defendants, and $20,000 to another set of defendants.

The appellants, the chief and band council of the Wasauksing First Nation, appealed a decision dismissing their application to rectify the corporate records of Wasausink Lands Inc. (WLI) to reflect that all band members were members of WLI and the band council were its directors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the factual basis for rectification was not established and that s. 309(1) of the Corporations Act is not intended for fundamental corporate restructuring.

The Court also declined to impose a constructive trust as it was raised for the first time on appeal, and rejected the claim for a constitutional exemption based on aboriginal rights.

The petitioning creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor on a promissory note and subsequently filed a petition for a receiving order based on this single debt.

The bankruptcy judge granted the petition, finding that the unpaid judgment automatically constituted special circumstances under s. 42(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while a judgment constitutes a continuing demand, a single judgment debt does not automatically establish an act of bankruptcy.

The court must consider all circumstances, including the size of the judgment, how long it has been outstanding, and collection efforts.

The appeal was allowed, the receiving order set aside, and the matter remitted to the bankruptcy judge.