John I. Laskin

The employers appealed a trial judgment awarding the plaintiff damages for wrongful dismissal.

The employers argued the plaintiff was dismissed for just cause because she gave herself and another employee unauthorized salary and vacation pay increases.

The trial judge found the conduct was an indiscretion rather than dishonesty and served as a pretext for a planned dismissal.

Applying the McKinley contextual analysis, the trial judge concluded the employers failed to prove just cause.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal on damages and the employers' appeal on the dismissed counterclaim were also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition, arguing that sections 32(1) and 34 of the Extradition Act are unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the constitutional issue had already been decided against the appellant's position in a previous decision.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States.

He argued that the Minister's letter ordering surrender did not give adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that while the reasons were perfunctory, they were adequate.

The Minister considered the applicant's section 6 Charter rights, health concerns, and the Cotroni factors, which overwhelmingly pointed to prosecution in the United States.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was unfit.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the sentence was at the bottom end of the range but noted the trial judge had valid reasons for it.

Even assuming the sentence was unfit, the Court held it was not in the interests of justice to re-incarcerate the respondent, citing a very positive post-sentence report, the respondent's youthfulness, and the importance of rehabilitation.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondents' acquittals for criminal negligence causing death following a fatal horseback riding accident involving a ten-year-old novice rider.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of prior incidents involving the horse and expert evidence regarding safe trail ride operations.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding one prior incident and the expert evidence, as the expert evidence met the necessity criterion.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the Crown failed to demonstrate with a reasonable degree of certainty that the verdicts would not necessarily have been the same had the errors not occurred.

The appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had declared him a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender and imposed the sentence to ensure he would receive sex offender treatment while in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the disposition and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding adjustments to a construction contract price for additional excavation and haulage costs.

The trial judge held that the adjustments were governed by a specific letter and unit prices in Schedule A, rather than the general work changes provision in Article 12 of the contract.

The Court of Appeal agreed with this interpretation, noting the parties' conduct was consistent with it.

The appellant's argument that compensation should be based on costs plus 10 percent under Article 12 was rejected, as it was not pleaded at trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $10,000 to the respondent.

The debtor filed an assignment in bankruptcy while owning a motor vehicle subject to an unperfected conditional sales contract held by the appellant.

The appellant filed a proof of claim for the balance owing, which the trustee disallowed as a secured claim but allowed as an unsecured claim.

The appellant appealed, arguing it was entitled to priority over the trustee for the first $5,000 of the vehicle's value under the motor vehicle exemption in s. 2.6 of the Execution Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the plain wording of s. 2.6 provides an exemption only for a motor vehicle not exceeding $5,000 in value, and does not exempt the first $5,000 of a vehicle worth more than that amount.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim against the municipality for a pedestrian accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that on the uncontested facts, there was no basis to extend the municipality's statutory duty to repair under s. 284 of the Municipal Act to pedestrian traffic at the specific location of the accident.

The court noted, however, that the duty to repair is not strictly limited to areas specifically designated for pedestrian traffic.

The appellant, a pub owner, challenged a municipal by-law requiring employers to adopt and implement a non-smoking policy in their workplaces.

He argued the Municipal Act did not authorize the municipality to compel him to adopt a written policy.

The application judge dismissed the challenge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the Act does not expressly authorize the requirement, the express power to prohibit smoking in workplaces carries with it the implied power to require employers to adopt, implement, and post a non-smoking policy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that while a certain letter should have been before the motion judge, the result would have been the same given the history of the matter and the appellant's failure to explain the default or comply with outstanding undertakings.

Costs of $6,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff's personal injury action was settled before trial, and the trial proceeded solely to determine liability between the two defendants following a motor vehicle accident.

During the jury trial, the trial judge repeatedly intervened during the cross-examination and re-examination of the investigating police officer, expressing strong opinions that the officer had failed to conduct a thorough investigation.

The trial judge reiterated these criticisms in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's interventions and expressions of opinion crossed the line, usurped the role of counsel, and created an appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendants in California in 1992 and commenced an action in Ontario to enforce it in 2001.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the six-year limitation period for simple contract debts under s. 45(1)(g) of the former Limitations Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding that the 20-year limitation period for domestic judgments applied, and alternatively, that a trial was needed to determine if the discoverability principle extended the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that a foreign judgment is a simple contract debt subject to a six-year limitation period, but dismissed the appeal because there was a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiff discovered the defendants had returned to Ontario.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay his former wife an equalization payment of $100,000 and lump sum spousal support of $75,000 or $1,500 per month for six years.

The Court of Appeal noted that while the trial judge ought to have done a proper net family property calculation, the result was fair given the unsatisfactory evidence of the appellant's assets and his conduct during the marriage.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

In a costs endorsement following an appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that success in the proceedings was divided.

The appellant succeeded on his appeal to the Court of Appeal, but the Divisional Court had correctly held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Considering the divided success and the disparity in income between the parties, the Court ordered no costs for the proceedings in either court.

The lower court's costs order was set aside and reserved to the judge hearing the application to vary.

The appellant requested that the Court of Appeal substitute the terms of access previously ordered.

The court declined, finding that the ordered terms were not unworkable and that the appellant's request for a substantially extended timesharing arrangement amounted to a marked deviation from the original order.

The court held that the appellant must bring a motion in the trial court to vary access.

The request was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction on the basis that highly prejudicial evidence from a confidential informant was placed before the jury without a limiting instruction.

The Court of Appeal found that while the evidence was admissible to show the officers' state of mind, it was not admissible for its truth.

Because the Crown cross-examined the appellant on this evidence and referred to it in closing, and the trial judge referred to it in the charge, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude evidence obtained from a wiretap authorization under s. 185 of the Criminal Code, which led to the respondents' acquittals on drug smuggling charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the unchallenged affidavit evidence met the requirements of s. 186(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, providing reasonable grounds and demonstrating investigative necessity.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if a s. 8 Charter breach had occurred, the evidence should have been admitted under s. 24(2) because the police reasonably relied on a facially valid judicial authorization and the evidence was non-conscriptive.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The creditor union obtained an order for damages against a corporate debtor for violating a collective agreement.

The debtor subsequently incorporated a new company to evade the debt.

The creditor served notices of garnishment on a garnishee who owed money to the debtor.

The garnishee continued to pay the debtor under its new corporate name, claiming it owed no money to the specific entities listed on the garnishment notices.

The motions judge ordered the garnishee to pay the creditor, finding the garnishee knew the new company was the same debtor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the garnishee's appeal, holding that under Rule 60.08(16), the court has broad discretion to determine the rights and liabilities of a garnishee and prevent unjust evasion of garnishment obligations.

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident by an unidentified driver and claimed the $200,000 policy limit under his unidentified driver coverage with the defendant insurer.

The plaintiff also received $102,400 in disability benefits from a private disability policy.

The defendant insurer sought to deduct the disability benefits from the $200,000 limit pursuant to s. 2(1)(b) of O. Reg. 676.

The motion judge held the deduction was not permitted due to the common law private insurance exception to the rule against double recovery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the regulation abrogated the common law exception and the insurer was entitled to deduct the disability payments.