Dennis M. O’Leary

Unifund Assurance Company brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement requiring Dieter Knoppke to pay $600,000.

Alex Krek's estate sought a continuation order and removal of an encumbrance from title.

The court granted Unifund's motion, ordering Knoppke to pay the settlement amount with 5% pre-judgment interest.

The court also granted the Krek estate's requests.

While acknowledging Knoppke's egregious conduct, the court declined to award punitive damages due to his absence and lack of instructions to counsel, opting instead to award full indemnity costs to Unifund and partial indemnity costs to the Krek estate.

The appellant, 908593 Ontario Limited (Eagle Travel), by its receiver, appealed the dismissal of its claim for coverage under a credit risk insurance policy issued by the respondent, Atradius.

Eagle Travel sought indemnity for over $4 million in outstanding accounts receivable from "Discretionary Credit Limit Buyers." The motion judge found, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, that the policy contained a clear and unambiguous aggregate liability limit of $100,000 per insurance year for such buyers.

The Court rejected arguments that the policy was a standard form contract (thus requiring a correctness standard of review) and that the appellant was unaware of the limit, emphasizing the presumption of knowledge for signed contracts and the commercial reasonableness of the policy's interpretation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant, 908593 Ontario Limited (Eagle Travel Plaza) by its receiver, brought a motion seeking coverage under a credit risk insurance policy issued by Atradius.

The core dispute was the interpretation of Article 23300 of the policy, specifically whether a $100,000 maximum liability limit for "Discretionary Credit Limit" (DCL) Buyers applied per DCL Buyer or as an aggregate limit for all DCL Buyers per insurance year.

The court found the policy language clear and unambiguous, concluding that the $100,000 limit was an aggregate for all DCL Buyers per insurance year, not per individual DCL Buyer.

The applicant's motion was dismissed.

This is a personal injury action where the parties jointly sought to adjourn a jury trial to bring a summary judgment motion on a limitation period defence.

The court denied the adjournment, emphasizing that trial dates are a precious commodity and that the summary judgment motion could have been brought years earlier.

However, the court directed that the summary judgment motion on the limitation period issue be heard by the trial judge prior to the scheduled jury sittings, setting a timetable for materials.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an unsuccessful motion brought by the plaintiffs, Milena and Stane Karafiloski, to add Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin as a defendant.

The original motion was dismissed because the claim against Viking was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

Viking, as the successful party, sought substantial indemnity costs and argued that the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF) should be jointly liable, alleging MVACF encouraged the motion.

The court found that MVACF was not the "real litigant" and its liability was not impacted by the motion's outcome, thus declining to hold MVACF liable for costs.

Considering factors such as the complexity of the issues, the importance of the matter, and the reasonableness of time spent and hourly rates, the court fixed Viking's costs at $12,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable by the plaintiffs.

The court acknowledged the plaintiff's difficult circumstances but found no justification to limit or postpone Viking's ability to collect costs.

Following a trial where the defendant was successful, the court received submissions on costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $44,390.72.

The plaintiff argued the amount was disproportionate given the amount at issue was approximately $53,000.

Balancing the principles of indemnity, proportionality, and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court fixed costs payable to the defendant at $24,000 all inclusive.

The plaintiff insurance broker sued the defendant insurer for $91,042 based on an erroneous preliminary profit share calculation provided by the defendant.

The actual accrued profit share was $2,402.

The plaintiff argued the erroneous calculation constituted a separate contract or a contract of insurance under the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the action, finding the letter was not a stand-alone contract, did not constitute insurance, and the erroneous schedule did not bind the defendant to pay the mistakenly calculated amount.