S. Alexandre Proulx

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment based on the expiry of the limitation period just two weeks before a scheduled jury trial.

The plaintiff had suffered a concussion but argued she did not discover the cause of her symptoms until months later, after ruling out a brain tumour.

The court declined to decide the motion, finding that assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's discoverability required a proper evidentiary base, including cross-examinations, which was not feasible so close to trial.

The motion was adjourned to the trial judge.

This is a personal injury action where the parties jointly sought to adjourn a jury trial to bring a summary judgment motion on a limitation period defence.

The court denied the adjournment, emphasizing that trial dates are a precious commodity and that the summary judgment motion could have been brought years earlier.

However, the court directed that the summary judgment motion on the limitation period issue be heard by the trial judge prior to the scheduled jury sittings, setting a timetable for materials.

The Third Party, Frederick Page, brought a motion for summary judgment against the Defendant, Ronald Sharman, seeking dismissal of the Third Party Claim.

The claim arose from a motor vehicle collision where Sharman rear-ended the Plaintiff, Khow Chin Hew, and sought to apportion liability to Page, alleging Page's sudden stop was negligent.

The court applied the Hryniak v. Maudlin test for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

It was determined that Page's braking and left turn were not negligent, as the vehicles immediately behind him stopped safely, and Sharman was found to be following too closely given his vehicle and road conditions.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the Third Party Claim against Page was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged an order declaring her a vexatious litigant, arguing primarily that the respondent law firm lacked standing to bring the underlying application.

The court held that s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act does not restrict who may bring such an application and rejected policy-based submissions seeking to narrow the provision.

The court further found no error in the application judge’s reasoning or procedure, including the conclusion that the evidentiary record met the threshold for a vexatious litigant declaration.

The motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed for lack of probative value, and costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.

A law firm brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had repeatedly pursued meritless motions and appeals after her underlying action had been dismissed on summary judgment, despite multiple rulings from the Court of Appeal stating the appeal lacked merit.

She also failed to pay costs orders and continued filing extensive materials and additional motions attempting to reopen dismissed matters.

Applying the established factors for vexatious proceedings, the court found the respondent had persistently pursued proceedings without reasonable grounds and engaged in abusive litigation conduct.

The court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant and ordered that she obtain leave of the Superior Court of Justice before commencing or continuing any proceeding in Ontario.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside service and stay an Ontario action arising from a trip and fall accident that occurred in a retail store in New York State.

The court considered whether Ontario had jurisdiction over the foreign defendant using the real and substantial connection test and whether Ontario should decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Applying the framework from Van Breda, the court found significant connections between the plaintiffs’ claim and Ontario, including residency, damages, and treatment occurring in the province, as well as sufficient connection between Ontario and the defendant due to its participation in an international retail organization and cross‑border advertising through its website.

The court also concluded that Ontario remained the appropriate forum because most witnesses and evidence were located in Ontario and proceeding there would not be unfair to the defendant.

The motion to stay the proceedings was dismissed.