John I. Laskin

Amertek Inc. sued the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) after losing money on a subcontract to supply fire crash trucks to the U.S. Army.

The trial judge found CCC liable for deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, awarding disgorgement of a re-procurement penalty CCC avoided.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision, finding palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusions.

The Court held that CCC's statements about the contract's profitability were not false when made, Amertek did not rely on them, the relationship was purely commercial rather than fiduciary, and there was no breach of contract or unjust enrichment.

The appeal was allowed and Amertek's action was dismissed.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for multiple sexual offences against two child complainants and appealed an eight-year penitentiary sentence.

The court rejected the unreasonable verdict argument, holding that despite material inconsistencies, the core allegations remained intact and the jury was properly instructed on credibility concerns.

The court also held that medical opinion evidence concerning vaginal penetration was relevant to one complainant but irrelevant to counts involving the other complainant; however, the evidentiary error and absence of a limiting instruction caused no substantial wrong and were cured under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

On sentence, the court found the trial judge had set the range too high by over-relying on a more aggravated comparator case and reduced the custodial sentence to six and a half years, in addition to pre-sentence custody.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences arising from a conspiracy to rob commercial establishments.

They appealed their convictions on numerous grounds, including alleged errors in the jury charge regarding the standard of proof, co-conspirator statements, and the failure to give a Vetrovec caution.

They also appealed evidentiary rulings, including the admission of a DNA warrant and the voluntariness of a police statement, as well as the refusal to sever their trials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

Leave to appeal the sentences was granted; one appellant's sentence appeal was dismissed, but the other appellant's sentence was reduced from six to four years imprisonment due to his status as a first-time offender with good rehabilitation prospects.

The appellants, automobile insurers, appealed the dismissal of their motions to dismiss class proceedings brought by the respondent insureds.

The insureds claimed that the insurers breached statutory condition 6(7) by reducing their actual cash value payments by the policy deductible when taking title to the salvage in total loss claims.

The motion judge, bound by the Court of Appeal's previous decision in McNaughton, dismissed the insurers' motions.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal held that McNaughton was wrongly decided, as statutory condition 6(7) does not quantify the insurer's payment obligation but merely gives the option to acquire salvage.

The Court overruled McNaughton, allowed the appeals, and dismissed the insureds' actions.

Following the release of its judgment regarding a sealing order on search warrant materials, the Court of Appeal was informed that the redacted names were not the subjects of the search warrants, but rather two other individuals mentioned in the materials.

The Attorney General of Canada requested a revised judgment, while the appellant media organization requested an addendum.

The Court agreed with the appellant, releasing an addendum to note the new information and varying the formal order to permit media access to the redacted names.

The appellants, a media organization and a reporter, sought access to the names of individuals whose premises were searched under warrants related to a national security investigation.

The initial judge maintained a sealing order over the names to protect the privacy of innocent persons.

The reviewing judge dismissed an application for certiorari.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found an error of law on the face of the record because the initial judge failed to consider reasonably alternative measures, specifically allowing media access to the names while imposing a publication ban.

The appeal was allowed, and an order was made granting media access to the names subject to a non-publication order.

The plaintiff was involved in multiple motor vehicle accidents between 1989 and 1997, resulting in a chronic pain disorder and total disability.

Three separate actions were tried together.

The trial judge discharged the jury due to the complexity of the medical evidence, overlapping injuries, and different statutory regimes.

The trial judge assessed damages globally and apportioned liability among the defendants, holding the defendants from the 1989 accident solely responsible for past and future income loss and future care costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to discharge the jury, the apportionment of damages, or the quantum of damages awarded.

The Crown appealed a youth court judge's decision to stay proceedings against a young person due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The young person had been in custody for three months from arrest to the scheduled trial date.

The youth court judge found that the Youth Criminal Justice Act created an enhanced duty for speedier trials compared to the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the youth court judge erred, as the YCJA merely codified existing jurisprudence and did not impose new, stricter timelines.

The Court found the three-month delay reasonable and set aside the stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside the accused's conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle.

The accused's vehicle was half in a ditch, and he had called a tow truck.

The appeal court judge had ruled that the conviction could not stand because the accused did not intend to set the car in motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge reasonably found a risk of danger that the accused might drive off or inadvertently set the car in motion once it was extricated.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder of his stepson and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 20 years.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructions regarding his false alibi statements, consciousness of guilt, and the victim's prior injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate in the context of a stark 'either/or' case where either the appellant or the child's mother committed the murder.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the 20-year parole ineligibility period upheld due to the heinous nature of the crime.

The appellant appealed his 15-month custodial sentence.

He had been denied bail on a second set of charges and refused a lifting of bail on his first charge.

The second set of charges was later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have considered the six months served on the withdrawn charges as relevant information under section 726.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court agreed with the 15-month sentence but granted 12 months of credit (at a 2:1 ratio) for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit bodily harm and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault arising from a home invasion.

He argued that the Crown failed to disclose an interview with a witness who would have testified that the appellant was not involved, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer criteria as it was available at trial and not reasonably capable of belief.

The court also held that the verdict was reasonable, as there was evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant acted as a recruiter and organizer.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an offence involving the theft of jewellery and the alleged use of an imitation gun.

He argued the trial judge failed to distinguish between credibility and reliability, ignored his statement to police, and that the Crown's cross-examination was improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that, while there were improprieties in the cross-examination, they did not destroy the appearance of a fair trial in a judge-alone proceeding.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant condominium corporation obtained a compliance order against the respondent unit owner for operating a short-term rental business.

The appellant then added its actual legal and administrative costs to the respondent's common expenses and registered a lien under s. 85(1) of the Condominium Act.

The motion judge discharged the lien, finding that 'additional actual costs' under s. 134(5) did not include legal costs beyond those awarded by the court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 134(5) permits a condominium corporation to recover its actual legal costs incurred in obtaining the order, including appeal costs, but not enforcement or unrelated administrative costs.

A reference was ordered to determine the proper amount of the lien.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on driving charges.

At arraignment, the Crown sought to amend the information to correct the make and model of the accused's vehicle.

The defence refused to consent, and the trial judge refused the amendment, citing prejudice.

The Crown offered no evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge erred in finding prejudice, she correctly refused the amendment because a court has no power under s. 601 of the Criminal Code to amend an information to conform to evidence before any evidence has been heard.

The insured's tractor-trailer was damaged in a rear-end collision.

The vehicle was covered by a collision policy from one insurer and a liability policy from another.

The collision insurer paid for the damage and brought a subrogated claim against the liability insurer.

The motion judge held the subrogated claim was barred by section 263(5) of the Insurance Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 263(5) only bars subrogated claims for payments made under a motor vehicle liability policy.

Because the collision policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy, the subrogated claim was permitted under section 278(1) of the Act.

The plaintiffs in a civil action arising from an assault sought production of police and Crown records relating to the young offenders who committed the assault.

The motion judge ordered production under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a subsequent judge ordered compliance subject to a vetting process.

The Attorney General appealed, arguing that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) provides the exclusive mechanism for accessing such records.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that section 118(1) of the YCJA clearly and unambiguously limits access to young offender records to the procedures set out in that Act, precluding the Superior Court from ordering production under Rule 30.10 or its inherent jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed and the production order set aside.

The appellant appealed her conviction for counselling to commit murder, arguing for a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

At trial, her defence of duress was rejected, and the trial judge found she had fabricated some journal entries.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from her trial counsel to show the continuity of her journal entries and the post-sentence criminal conduct of her former boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion and the appeal, concluding that the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result, as her behaviour with undercover officers was inconsistent with acting under duress.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and the sentence imposed.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because there was no evidence the complainant feared for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the complainant feared for her safety.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission for a global sentence of six months custody.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of the joint submission, noting the appellant's persistent behaviour and related criminal record made the joint submission contrary to the public interest.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of possession of child pornography based on written stories depicting sexual activity between adults and children.

The court held that written material may advocate or counsel sexual activity with children implicitly as well as explicitly under the governing interpretation of s. 163.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge erred in law by focusing on the absence of overt exhortation and by failing to assess whether the stories' combined messages — that children want and enjoy sex with adults, and that trusted adults routinely engage in it because it is good for children — implicitly conveyed that sex with children can and should be pursued.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.