James M. Flaherty

The plaintiff was involved in multiple motor vehicle accidents between 1989 and 1997, resulting in a chronic pain disorder and total disability.

Three separate actions were tried together.

The trial judge discharged the jury due to the complexity of the medical evidence, overlapping injuries, and different statutory regimes.

The trial judge assessed damages globally and apportioned liability among the defendants, holding the defendants from the 1989 accident solely responsible for past and future income loss and future care costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to discharge the jury, the apportionment of damages, or the quantum of damages awarded.

The insured's tractor-trailer was damaged in a rear-end collision.

The vehicle was covered by a collision policy from one insurer and a liability policy from another.

The collision insurer paid for the damage and brought a subrogated claim against the liability insurer.

The motion judge held the subrogated claim was barred by section 263(5) of the Insurance Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 263(5) only bars subrogated claims for payments made under a motor vehicle liability policy.

Because the collision policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy, the subrogated claim was permitted under section 278(1) of the Act.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision finding it liable to pay statutory accident benefits to the respondent, who was injured while driving a rented taxicab.

The respondent had a personal vehicle insured with the appellant but was not a named insured on the taxicab's fleet policy.

The appellant argued that its policy excluded coverage for vehicles used as taxicabs.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, holding that the broad definition of 'insured person' in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule prevailed over the exclusions in the standard owner's policy.

Furthermore, the respondent was not a named insured under the taxicab's policy for the purposes of the priority rules in section 268 of the Insurance Act.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitration decision finding it responsible for paying statutory accident benefits to the claimant.

The claimant was injured while a passenger in a vehicle insured by the respondent insurer.

The claimant applied for benefits from the appellant insurer on the basis that she was the spouse of its named insured.

The arbitrator found that the claimant and the named insured had cohabited in a relationship of some permanence and were therefore spouses under the Insurance Act.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's finding, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the determination of cohabitation despite the parties maintaining separate residences.

The appeal was dismissed, with a new issue regarding policy interpretation reserved for further submissions.

The respondent's husband died in a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent applied for a death benefit as a dependant under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator awarded the benefit, finding the respondent was principally dependent on her husband because the family's social assistance cheque was made payable to him.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate rescinded the order, holding that where both spouses are dependent on government assistance, neither can be said to be principally dependent for financial support on the other.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits until they were terminated.

He subsequently signed a release and received a settlement cheque, but later applied for arbitration seeking further benefits.

The arbitrator found that while the release document was deficient, the parties had reached a binding final settlement.

On appeal, the appellant argued the arbitrator exceeded her jurisdiction by deciding the broader issue of settlement rather than strictly the validity of the release as framed in the pre-hearing letter.

The Director of Arbitrations dismissed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator was not strictly bound by the pre-hearing letter and had jurisdiction to determine the real issue in dispute based on the evidence presented.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits until May 1992.

He sought further weekly benefits, rehabilitation expenses, and a special award.

The arbitrator found the applicant lacked credibility and that he was substantially able to perform his essential tasks after May 1992, dismissing the claim for ongoing weekly benefits.

Furthermore, the arbitrator found the applicant had attended school full-time between January and May 1992, precluding him from receiving benefits during that period, and ordered him to repay the benefits received.

The insurer was ordered to pay an outstanding rehabilitation account that had been pre-approved.

The insurer was also awarded $500 because the applicant's conduct unreasonably prolonged the proceedings and parts of the claim were without merit.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding the surviving children of a couple killed in a motor vehicle accident $10,000 each in respect of the death of their mother, in addition to the $10,000 each already paid in respect of their father.

The insurer argued that under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, a person can only be 'principally dependent for financial support' on one person at a time.

The Director of Arbitrations dismissed the appeal, finding that the wording of s. 3(2) allows a child to be a dependant of both parents, entitling them to death benefits for each.

The respondents' cross-appeal for a special award was also dismissed, as the insurer's position was based on a legitimate dispute over statutory interpretation.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's preliminary decision that the insured had not finally settled her weekly benefits claim at mediation and could proceed to arbitration.

The insurer argued that mediation is strictly confidential and the Report of Mediator confirming settlement should be conclusive.

The Director of Arbitrations held that while statements made to or by the mediator are privileged to protect the mediator's neutrality, evidence of the parties' own understanding and subsequent conduct is admissible to determine if a settlement was actually reached when the Report is ambiguous.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the arbitration for weekly benefits to proceed.

The applicants, two young children severely injured in a motor vehicle accident, applied for statutory accident benefits.

A priority dispute arose between the father's former insurer and the insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident.

The father's former insurer claimed it had cancelled his policy for non-payment of premiums prior to the accident by sending a notice via registered mail.

The vehicle's insurer argued the cancellation was invalid because the notice was never received.

The arbitrator found that the former insurer had validly terminated the policy in accordance with the statutory requirements, as the notice was received at the destination post office in time to provide the required 15 days' notice.

Consequently, the vehicle's insurer was held responsible for paying the statutory accident benefits.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision denying reimbursement for $200 in legal fees incurred to complete an application for no-fault accident benefits.

The Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's finding that legal fees do not qualify as 'other goods and services' under section 6(1)(f) of the No-Fault Benefits Schedule.

The Delegate agreed that the Schedule requires such expenses to be of a nature that a medical practitioner could validly opine on their necessity, which does not apply to legal fees.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a police officer, was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the appellant's negligence.

During his recovery, the respondent was unable to work but continued to receive his full salary pursuant to his collective agreement.

He sued the appellant for damages, including a claim for lost wages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent could not recover damages for loss of earnings because he had not suffered an actual financial loss, as his employer had continued to pay his salary.

The Court ruled that wage benefits paid while a plaintiff is unable to work must be deducted from a claim for lost earnings to avoid double recovery, unless the employer has a subrogated claim.

The appellant, a First Class Constable, appealed a decision of the Board of Commissioners of Police discharging him due to a purported mental disability.

The appellant had suffered a series of jaw injuries and experienced fear and anxiety about potential reinjury.

The Commission found that under Section 27(e) of Regulation 791, a discharge for mental disability must be supported by the evidence of two legally qualified medical practitioners.

The medical evidence presented did not support a finding of mental disability, as both doctors indicated his fear was a normal and justified reaction to his previous trauma.

The Commission quashed the discharge and ordered the appellant reinstated.

The Commission also noted that under the Human Rights Code, the employer bears the onus of establishing that the appellant's physical disability could not be accommodated without undue hardship.