John I. Laskin

The respondents brought a motion to quash several paragraphs of the appellant's notice of appeal.

The appellant argued that the time for appealing the judgment in the second proceedings did not begin to run until the constructive trust issue was disposed of.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the order terminating the constructive trust was a post-judgment order and the time for appealing the earlier orders had expired.

The court also declined to extend the time for appealing, noting the appellant's consistent prior position that he had no intention to appeal.

The motion to quash was allowed and the specified paragraphs of the notice of appeal were struck.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision confirming a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a mental disorder, including the use of neuroleptics.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board did not misapprehend the evidence, noting the appellant's denial of his schizophrenia diagnosis and lack of insight into the consequences of refusing treatment.

The Court held that the Board correctly applied the Health Care Consent Act and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order regarding her interest in a property located on Roncesvalles Avenue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any interest the appellant had was compromised in minutes of settlement in July 2002, which resulted in a court order transferring the property to the respondents.

As no appeal was taken from that prior order, the appellant had no claim to an accounting of the proceeds of the sale.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge regarding a settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion in concluding there was a reasonable inference that the respondent did not understand the offer remained open and that it had become obsolete.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The appellant, a woman of colour, sued her former employer for constructive dismissal, alleging racial discrimination.

The motions judge struck paragraphs of her statement of claim that alleged systemic discrimination against employees of colour, holding that only discriminatory acts directed specifically at the appellant could be pleaded.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no principled basis to distinguish between direct discrimination and systemic discrimination for the purpose of pleading discriminatory conduct to support a wrongful dismissal claim.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that a purported temporary lay-off was in fact a termination of the respondent employee's employment without notice or cause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting they were fully supported by the evidentiary record.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding an implied term of dismissal without notice, as it was not pleaded or supported by evidence, and affirmed the five-month notice period as reasonable.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal.

In the circumstances, the court declined to order costs on the appeal.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal and a motion for leave to appeal from an order granting interim relief in an oppression action under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory, meaning leave to appeal was required.

The Court further held that under s. 249 of the CBCA, appeals from interlocutory orders lie to the Court of Appeal, not the Divisional Court.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted, but the motion to quash the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that their solicitor was not negligent for failing to warn of the risks of proceeding as a minority shareholder without a unanimous shareholders agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the solicitor breached his duty, the appellants failed to prove causation and damages.

The appellant had already received the fair value of his shares and his shareholder's loan in separate oppression proceedings, and there was no evidence he would have obtained a better result had a warning been given.

The Ministry of the Attorney General appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding two orders by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The orders required the disclosure of the total amounts of legal fees paid by the Ministry to lawyers acting for intervenors and for Paul Bernardo on his criminal appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the disclosure of the total fee amounts would not reveal any privileged solicitor-client communications.

The Court also held that the disclosure did not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The conviction appeal was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the trial judge had accepted a guilty plea from a co-accused six weeks prior to the appellant's trial, during which facts implicating the appellant were read in.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, noting that trial judges routinely disabuse their minds of potentially prejudicial information from prior proceedings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in the sentence imposed and noted the appellant had almost completed the secure custody portion.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the capacity of the respondent.

The appellant argued that the experts erred in quantifying the needed capacity and that the fluctuating nature of the respondent's capacity should have shifted the onus of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the experts properly applied the criteria in s. 8 of the Act and that the legal onus remained on the appellant.

The trial judge was entitled to accept the expert evidence presented.

The appellant appealed a decision striking a separate claim for discrimination from their pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that discrimination claims do not give rise to a civil cause of action and must be addressed by the Human Rights Commission, though allegations of discrimination may still be pleaded as material facts supporting other causes of action.

The appellant appealed a finding of contempt for breaching a non-compete clause in a court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant had the requisite knowledge of the order or was wilfully blind to it.

Furthermore, the appellant admitted to breaching the clause after being personally served with the contempt motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The moving parties, two directors who were removed from the board of a company undergoing restructuring under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, sought an order expediting the hearing of their motion for leave to appeal the removal order.

The court granted the motion to expedite, finding that the fast-moving and unpredictable nature of CCAA proceedings required a generous view of urgency to provide the board with certainty regarding its composition during a critical phase of restructuring.

The Court of Appeal determined the costs of an appeal and cross-appeal.

Although success was divided, the respondent achieved much greater success by successfully defending against the main appeal on liability and succeeding on the cross-appeal.

The court fixed the respondent's costs at $40,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements, noting the complexity of the matter and the lengthy record.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Ministerial Surrender Order under s. 57 of the Extradition Act, ordering her extradition to Florida for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The applicant, a single mother of two teenage daughters, argued the Minister failed to properly consider whether surrender would be unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Act, and failed to consider alternatives such as delaying surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister fully considered the applicant's concerns and alternatives, and reasonably concluded that surrender was not unjust or oppressive.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of prohibited firearms, and was sentenced to two years less a day.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge made significant errors, including misapprehending the maximum penalty for the drug offence and relying on inaccurate facts.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentencing proceedings contained significant errors, warranting a non-deferential review.

However, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed was ultimately fit given the seriousness of the offences, particularly the possession of loaded handguns, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative potential.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The prosecutor appealed an order granting certiorari that had quashed a justice of the peace's refusal to permit cross-examination of a chief building inspector on a disclosure motion in a provincial offences prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that certiorari was not barred by the Provincial Offences Act because the impugned ruling was a pre-trial order not directly appealable under s. 116(1).

However, the refusal to permit cross-examination did not breach natural justice, as the justice of the peace was entitled to control the disclosure process and require the defence to show why cross-examination was necessary.

The defence failed to establish a basis for further disclosure or for compelling cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed, the certiorari order was set aside, the matter was remitted for trial, and no costs were ordered.

The appellants, a secured creditor and an interim receiver, appealed a decision granting priority to carriers over funds collected by a bankrupt freight broker.

The broker had failed to maintain a separate trust account for carriers' charges as required by provincial regulation, instead co-mingled the funds while tracking them in an accounting system.

The Court of Appeal held that provincial statutory deemed trusts do not exclude property from a bankrupt estate unless they satisfy general trust principles, which require strict segregation.

Consequently, the co-mingled funds collected before the receivership lost their trust character and were subject to the secured creditor's interest.

However, the interim receiver was obligated to hold funds collected after its appointment in trust for the carriers.