John I. Laskin

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $5,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

Following the release of reasons in which the Court of Appeal fixed costs, the court received written submissions from counsel regarding costs.

After reviewing the submissions, the court declined to vary its original costs disposition, noting that the respondent's obligation is to pay net child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had punched the victim, causing him to fall and hit his head, which resulted in fatal injuries.

The accused also kicked the victim shortly after.

The trial judge limited the Crown's cross-examination of the accused on his prior convictions for crimes of violence, and instructed the jury on self-defence and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary ruling on the criminal record.

Although the trial judge erred in her instructions regarding whether the punch and kick constituted a single transaction, the error did not affect the verdict, as the jury clearly found the punch was in self-defence and the medical evidence did not support the kick as a contributing cause of death.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision regarding costs and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's allegations in its defence and counterclaim did not amount to fraud or improper conduct seriously prejudicial to character or reputation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,000.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's decision finding that the parties had reached a settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge's conclusion was amply supported by the email and voicemail correspondence between the lawyers and that she committed no reviewable error.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund appealed a Superior Court decision that remitted an arbitration award back to the arbitrator.

The dispute arose after Kingsway cancelled an auto insurance policy for non-payment two days before an accident, leading the Fund to pay the injured party's accident benefits and seek reimbursement.

The arbitrator ordered Kingsway to pay the benefits permanently due to a breach of section 2 of O. Reg. 283/95, finding a 'significant nexus' between Kingsway and the insured.

The Superior Court held the arbitration was not under O. Reg. 283/95 because the Fund was not an 'insurer', and remitted the matter to determine if Kingsway was actually an insurer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the Fund is an insurer under the regulation, but upheld the decision to remit the matter to the arbitrator to determine if Kingsway was an insurer at the time of the accident.

The appellant appealed her sentence for her involvement in a marijuana grow operation, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to explain why a conditional sentence could not serve the goals of deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the appellant's temptation to reoffend and the prevalence of grow operations in the community.

The court held that the short jail term, which allowed the appellant to maintain employment, was fit and that this was not a rare case where a conditional sentence would be appropriate.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund paid death and funeral benefits to the family of an uninsured passenger killed in a motor vehicle accident.

The Fund sought reimbursement from the respondent insurer and initiated arbitration under O. Reg. 283/95.

The respondent objected, arguing the Fund was not an 'insurer' under the regulation.

The arbitrator dismissed the objection, but the appeal judge set aside the award based on previous case law.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Fund's appeal, overruling its previous decision and holding that the Fund is an insurer for the purpose of resolving disputes over the payment of accident benefits and is bound by the mandatory arbitration provisions of the regulation.

The appellant was briefly detained by a police officer for investigative purposes after an accomplice attempted to use a stolen gift certificate.

The officer asked exploratory questions before receiving additional information and arresting the appellant, at which point he was advised of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because he was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon the initial detention.

The Court of Appeal held that in the context of a brief investigative detention, the phrase 'without delay' allows for a brief exploratory interlude before the right to counsel must be provided.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against his former law firm, as well as the judgment allowing the firm's counterclaim for fees.

The dispute arose from a $650,000 personal injury settlement, which the appellant argued was supposed to be net of the fees of his four previous lawyers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant's testimony was not credible, that the authority to settle clearly meant net of the respondent's fees only, and that the appellant was fully aware he remained responsible for his prior lawyers' accounts.

The appeal was dismissed.

A police constable was acquitted of criminal charges and subsequently faced discipline proceedings under the Police Services Act for the same conduct.

The hearing officer, appointed by the Chief of Police, stayed the discipline proceedings as an abuse of process.

The Chief, who has no statutory right of appeal, sought judicial review of the decision.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Chief does not have standing to seek judicial review of a decision made by his own delegate, as the Chief and the hearing officer are synonymous under the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the hearing officer's decision was reinstated.

The appellants alleged they suffered harm due to mislabelled medication and sued the pharmacy.

After the expiry of the one-year limitation period under the Regulated Health Professions Act, they moved to add the dispensing pharmacist and the numbered company operating the pharmacy as defendants.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal regarding the pharmacist, finding no evidence of due diligence to discover her identity.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the numbered company, holding that it was not a 'health profession corporation' under the Act and was therefore subject to the general six-year limitation period.

The appellant pleaded guilty to indecent act, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6 to 9 months, but the trial judge imposed 18 months without providing reasons for substantially exceeding the Crown's position.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give reasons in these circumstances amounted to an error in principle.

The appellant had served seven months, and the sentence was varied to time served.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the Ontario Provincial Police appealed a motions judge's order refusing to dissolve an injunction against Aboriginal protestors occupying a residential development, and requiring the Attorney General to take carriage of criminal contempt proceedings while reporting back to the court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

It held that the motions judge erred in refusing to dissolve the injunction after the Ontario government purchased the property and consented to the occupation.

The Court maintained the referral of the contempt matters to the Attorney General, but imposed strict conditions, finding that the motions judge's previous contempt process was fundamentally flawed for denying procedural fairness and improperly interfering with police and prosecutorial discretion.

The appellant, Gold Financial Corp., appealed two orders of the Superior Court of Justice and sought an order that one-half of the proceeds of the sale of the Puslinch land be paid into court.

The motion judge had concluded that neither the Notice nor the Share Pledge Agreement was entitled to any weight and that the appellant's General Security Agreement did not support any claim to an interest in the land.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal with costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence to be illegal and varied it to a suspended sentence with two years of probation on the same terms imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding a dangerous driving conviction.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal court judge misapplied the curative proviso after the trial judge allegedly misstated the legal test for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err or depart from the correct legal test.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge misused information provided in the pre-sentence report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the absence of remorse was a relevant consideration in determining whether a conditional sentence was appropriate.

The sentence imposed was found to be fit.

The respondent was convicted of attempted murder after using his pick-up truck to run down the victim following a consensual fight.

The trial judge sentenced him to three years in the penitentiary.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing it was manifestly inadequate given the respondent's concerted effort to kill the victim and the devastating injuries caused.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the three-year sentence wholly inadequate despite mitigating factors such as the lack of planning and the respondent's work record.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was increased to six years.

The appellant appealed the 10-year length of a prohibition order and sought a variation to permit him to attend proscribed public places in the company of an adult.

The Crown consented to the variation but opposed reducing the length of the order.

The Court of Appeal granted the variation, adding the exception for being accompanied by an adult over 18, but deferred to the sentencing judge's discretion regarding the 10-year duration given the serious nature of the offence.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.