John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed the two-year driving prohibition imposed as part of his sentence for dangerous driving.

The appellant had no prior criminal or driving record and operated a self-employed business that required driving.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence on consent showing the prohibition would force the sale of his business.

Finding the two-year prohibition excessive and a particular hardship, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the driving prohibition to one year.

The appellant appealed a decision affirming the Minister of Finance's assessment of retail sales tax.

The appellant argued its boats were exempt under the Retail Sales Tax Act as they operated for 'commercial purposes' providing public transportation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the boats operated primarily for tourist purposes, such as glass-bottom shipwreck tours, rather than transportation.

The court also rejected the argument that refitting expenses were exempt capital costs, noting the tax applies to tangible personal property regardless of capital purpose.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the municipality for a motor vehicle accident on a snow-packed road.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment, as the municipality did not put causation in issue and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether it met its standard of care under the Municipal Act.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment was set aside, and the matter was directed to trial.

The appellants appealed a judgment finding that their dealings with the respondent bank did not result in a final arrangement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to find no final arrangement was reached.

Alternatively, the court found that the guarantee and chattel mortgage were continuing obligations that were not extinguished by the December 1999 financial agreement.

The appellants, land developers, retained the respondent engineering firm to prepare a geotechnical report on soil conditions for a townhouse development.

The report estimated pile foundations would need to be driven to an average depth of 20 feet, but ultimately they had to be driven to 60 feet, resulting in additional construction costs.

The appellants sued for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the failure to drill a sixth borehole was due to inaccessibility and that there was no evidence the respondent inaccurately interpreted the borehole data.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable on a promissory note.

He argued there was an absence of consideration and relied on the defence of non est factum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that consideration existed due to the family relationship and benefit to the appellant's son, and that the appellant could not rely on non est factum because he carelessly chose not to read the document.

The award of pre-judgment interest was also upheld.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the motion judge's conclusion that the parties never reached a meeting of the minds on an arbitration clause or a choice of laws provision.

The Court also agreed that the transfer motion was premature because the statement of defence had not yet been filed and the witnesses were unknown, making it impossible to determine the most convenient venue.

The appellant, a career criminal with a lengthy record, appealed his concurrent 21-month sentences for two counts of breach of recognizance.

The trial judge had treated the appellant as being at the 'worst end of the continuum' simply because he was subject to a section 810.2 recognizance.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error in principle, as it would inevitably result in maximum sentences regardless of the gravity of the breach or rehabilitative steps.

The appeal was allowed and the sentences for the breach of recognizance counts were reduced to 12 months concurrent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and his 21-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 11(b) Charter challenge regarding unreasonable delay.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's knowledge that the restricted weapon was loaded, setting aside that conviction and substituting it with possession of a restricted weapon, which was then stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The conviction for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR), arguing that the evidence on the record was insufficient to support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the expert opinion of Dr. Ramshaw, which concluded the appellant was psychotic and incapable of knowing his actions were morally or legally wrong, was tendered as part of a joint application and was not challenged at trial.

The court found the NCR finding was correct based on the record.

The appellant, the paternal grandmother of a six-year-old child, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her application for access in Ontario.

The child and her mother had moved to Nova Scotia, where the mother was granted joint custody.

The Court of Appeal held that while Ontario had concurrent jurisdiction because the child was habitually resident there when the application commenced, Nova Scotia was the more appropriate jurisdiction under section 25 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence relating to a prolonged period of domestic violence, including a stabbing incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge provided adequate reasons, properly applied the W.(D.) principle, and correctly assessed credibility based on objective evidence.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, upholding the five-year sentence as warranted for serious domestic violence.

The young person appealed a secure custody sentence imposed for a vicious, unprovoked attack on another youth.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the devastating consequences on the victim and the appellant's history of violent episodes at school.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and converted the sentence to open custody, emphasizing the appellant's rehabilitation, genuine remorse, and the need to avoid disrupting his schooling.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's pre-sentence house arrest and efforts to obtain professional counselling.

The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence was reduced to time served (just over six months), and the probation period was increased to three years.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that upheld his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by taking into account evidence that ought not to have been considered when making an adverse credibility finding.

Given that it was a close case, the conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The young person appealed a disposition imposed by the Youth Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave adequate reasons for his credibility findings, properly applied the principles in W.D., and found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give the jury a blended instruction on self-defence and accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's functional approach properly focused the jury on whether the stabbing was accidental.

The court noted that if the stabbing was purposeful, self-defence would have lacked an air of reality.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The young person appealed the custodial sentence imposed for a violent offence.

The Court of Appeal found that while a period of custody was justified, the trial judge erred in principle by failing to credit the young person for 8 days of pre-trial custody and time spent in pre-sentence house arrest.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 3 months of open custody and 1.5 months of supervision.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing an application for certiorari to quash an order committing the appellant to stand trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the Superior Court judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence imposed for his involvement in a large-scale marijuana operation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence by the sentencing judge, noting it was open to infer the appellant was a trusted member of the organization.

The court concluded the sentence was fit and within the acceptable range, dismissing the appeal.