John I. Laskin

The Superintendent of Financial Services appealed an order lifting a CCAA stay and permitting bankruptcy petitions to proceed against the insolvent Ivaco companies.

The Superintendent argued that unpaid pension contributions subject to a deemed trust under the Pension Benefits Act should have been paid or segregated before bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the CCAA and BIA create a comprehensive federal insolvency scheme that leaves no gap for provincial deemed trusts to operate outside of bankruptcy.

The court also upheld the motions judge's discretionary decision to lift the stay and his order transferring the companies' head offices to Toronto under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The appellant travel agency appealed a trial judge's finding of negligence and damages award in favour of the respondents.

The trial judge found the agency breached its duty of care by failing to warn the respondent about visa requirements, as the agency sent the invoice containing the warning to the wrong address.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility findings, liability conclusion, and damages assessment, dismissing the appeal with costs.

The plaintiff appealed the trial judge's decision denying her aggravated and punitive damages in a wrongful dismissal action, despite the trial judge extending the notice period by two months due to the manner of dismissal.

The defendant sought leave to appeal the trial judge's decision to award no costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion on damages.

The Court also refused the defendant's leave to appeal costs, finding no error in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion.

As success was divided, no costs were awarded for the appeal.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's reasons.

The court found there was nothing in writing to support the appellants' defence, and their affidavit material did not raise a viable issue concerning the bank's knowledge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the defence of intoxication and erred in admitting similar fact evidence of a prior sexual assault.

The Crown alleged the appellant murdered the victim during a sexual assault or attempted sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the jury instructions regarding intoxication, noting the charge as a whole correctly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

The Court also upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, concluding its probative value in establishing the occurrence of a sexual assault outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and arson after driving to the home of his estranged wife's lover, shooting the lover, assaulting his wife, and setting the house on fire.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on causation under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code by suggesting he could be liable if he actively participated in a struggle that accidentally caused the gun to discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the causation instruction was potentially confusing, it caused no prejudice because the jury's verdict demonstrated they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally shot the deceased.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay substantial spousal and child support, equalization, and costs.

He challenged the trial judge's orders that pierced the corporate veil of his solely-owned companies to secure the amounts owed, and that made the costs and pre-judgment interest enforceable as spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the piercing of the corporate veil, finding it appropriate in family law cases where a spouse completely dominates a corporation and uses it to shield assets from support obligations.

The Court also upheld the enforcement of costs as spousal support under the Family Responsibility and Support Enforcement Act, but allowed the appeal in part to remove pre-judgment interest on the equalization payment from being enforceable as support.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the order under appeal was interlocutory, despite a sanction providing that the claim may be dismissed for failure to comply.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants sought costs of the appeal and trial on a partial indemnity basis following their success.

The respondent argued for no costs, asserting the class proceeding raised a novel point of law and involved a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the litigation was a commercial dispute between sophisticated actors involving established principles.

The court awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $100,000 plus GST to both the individual and corporate appellants, along with disbursements, and ordered trial costs to be assessed on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence on appeal regarding the enforcement of a Singapore judgment in Ontario.

The fresh evidence consisted of affidavits from a Singapore litigant who faced criminal contempt proceedings after criticizing the Singapore judicial system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, applying the Palmer test.

The court found that the evidence could have been obtained earlier with due diligence and, given its political context, would not have affected the outcome of the commercial dispute.

The mother brought a motion to vary a child support order for two adult children attending post-secondary education.

The motion judge ordered the father to pay child support pursuant to s. 3(2)(b) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines but provided no reasons explaining how the quantum was determined.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's reasons were inadequate and failed to consider the necessary factors under s. 3(2)(b), such as the financial ability of each parent and the means and needs of the children.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The added parties appealed an order striking out their pleadings for willful failure to obey court orders.

They sought to adjourn their appeal to be heard with the husband's appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined the adjournment and dismissed the appeal on two grounds.

First, the appeal was moot because the respondent had proceeded to an uncontested trial and obtained a final judgment, and the appellants had not sought a stay of the order striking their pleadings.

Second, the appeal was dismissed due to the appellants' ongoing and deliberate refusal to comply with numerous court orders.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's findings constituted a finding that the appellant posed a significant risk to the public, primarily through violent suicidal conduct that could cause significant harm to others.

The appellant, a 26-year-old teacher, appealed her sentence of 15 months' imprisonment and two years' probation for the sexual exploitation of a 14-year-old former student.

She argued the trial judge erred by treating breach of trust as an aggravating factor, as it is an essential element of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that facts establishing the essential elements of an offence do not lose their relevance on sentencing and can be considered in the context of the entire circumstances.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Board's disposition but noted a legitimate concern regarding whether the appellant might be appropriately placed in a medium security facility other than Brockville.

The Court asked the Board to consider this question at the appellant's upcoming hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her sentence for conspiracy to rob her employer.

She argued the sentencing judge erred by considering evidence that she had previously provided information to her boyfriend enabling him to commit a serious robbery against the same victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the earlier events were part of the circumstances of the conspiracy under section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the sentence fell within the parameters of the joint submission put forward by counsel.

The court found the joint submission to be a fair reflection of the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's serious, related, and lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's interjection during argument resulted in unfairness and challenged the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the unfairness argument and held that the factual challenges revealed no error in law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's inferences regarding the speed and location of the appellant's vehicle were amply justified by the evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's decision to reject a conditional sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on identification evidence and improperly admitted evidence of his failure to attend work.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and holding that the work attendance evidence was relevant to opportunity.

The sentence was also upheld as fit given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the seriousness of the offences.