Eric Kay

The Plaintiff moved to remove the Defendants' solicitors of record, Dickinson Wright LLP, on grounds of conflict of interest.

The Plaintiff argued that one of the firm's partners, Douglas A. Hendler, was a defendant and a crucial witness whose credibility was likely to be an issue, compromising counsel's independence.

The Defendants contended the motion was tactical and that law firms can represent themselves in fee disputes.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the conflict did not raise a serious concern given the nature of the dispute being essentially over fees, and that it would not prejudice the Plaintiff.

Costs were awarded to the Defendants.

A long‑serving employee dismissed after 38 years sued several related corporations for wrongful dismissal, asserting they operated as a common employer and that a successor entity continued the same business.

The court applied the common employer doctrine and found the companies functioned as an integrated enterprise using the same business name, premises, and personnel.

The newly operating entity that continued the business could not avoid liability merely through corporate restructuring.

The court also upheld a decades‑old retirement compensation agreement, finding it remained valid because the employee’s duties and employment relationship had not fundamentally changed.

All defendants were held jointly and severally liable for wrongful dismissal damages and retirement compensation.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s administrative order dismissing the action for failure to set the matter down for trial within the required time.

Applying the factors outlined in Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that the delay resulted from inadvertence, that the plaintiff acted promptly after learning of the dismissal, and that the action had not been abandoned.

Although the defendants argued the claim was statute‑barred and that presumptive prejudice arose from the expiry of the limitation period, the court held the limitation issue could not be determined definitively at this stage and that no substantial prejudice would arise from allowing the action to proceed.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside.