Jonathon C. George

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The incident occurred on an access road behind businesses in London, Ontario.

The Crown alleged the accused drove at high speed, nearly struck a child, and then deliberately drove his vehicle towards an off-duty police officer.

The accused testified he drove at moderate speeds, did not intentionally drive at the officer, and that his vehicle may have swerved due to a pothole.

The court found credibility issues with the Crown witnesses and accepted that a reasonable doubt existed regarding the accused's intent and the manner of driving.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of attempting to commit an indictable offence while having his face masked.

The robberies occurred on January 1 and January 3, 2012, at a variety store and a Bank of Montreal branch respectively.

The accused had an extensive criminal history including six prior robbery convictions.

The court imposed a sentence of 48 months imprisonment, with enhanced credit for 184 days of pre-sentence custody at a 1.5:1 ratio (276 days credited), resulting in an effective sentence of 4 years and 9 months.

The court applied Gladue principles in sentencing an Aboriginal offender while balancing denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives.

The Crown sought leave to file a Notice of Cross-Appeal challenging a conviction under subsection 25(2)(h) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act, filed approximately 18 days beyond the limitation period.

The respondent had appealed the conviction within the allowable time.

The court applied the three-factor test from R. v. Menear to determine whether to grant the extension of time.

The Crown failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period and provided no reasonable explanation for the delay.

While the proposed appeal had some merit regarding the interpretation of regulatory terms, the court found that granting leave would not be in the interests of justice, particularly given that the Crown's decision to appeal appeared reactive to the respondent's appeal rather than based on independent concerns about the trial decision.