Jaan E. Lilles

The plaintiff underwent an incisional hernia repair surgery performed by the defendant general surgeon.

Following the surgery, the plaintiff developed a bowel leak requiring emergency repair and subsequent treatment for a fistula and wound infections.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action alleging the surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to order bowel preparation, failing to 'run the bowel', and improperly repairing the bowel perforation.

The court dismissed the action, preferring the evidence of the defendant's expert witness and finding that the surgeon's conduct met the standard of care in all respects.

The court also found that causation was not established.

In a delayed-diagnosis medical malpractice action, the defendant physician appealed findings on liability only.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s negligence and causation analysis and found no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed and the liability determination stood.

The respondent physicians brought motions to strike out an affidavit filed by the applicant in support of her applications for judicial review of decisions by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

The moving parties argued the affidavit contained impermissible evidence, argument, and matters outside the applicant's knowledge.

The court noted the general reluctance to determine evidentiary admissibility in advance of a judicial review hearing.

Given the mixed nature of the proposed evidence and uncertainty regarding its relevance to procedural fairness arguments, the court adjourned the motions to be decided by the panel hearing the applications.

The defendants successfully sought costs after obtaining summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice claim.

The court, while acknowledging the plaintiffs' difficult experience and self-representation, awarded discounted costs to the defendants, emphasizing the principle of indemnity for the successful party tempered by the expectation of the unsuccessful party.

The appellants (defendant doctors) appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for failing to obtain informed consent for a multi-step medical treatment plan that resulted in catastrophic brain injury to the plaintiff.

The appeal addressed the nature and extent of a physician's duty to obtain informed consent, on which physicians this duty rests, sufficiency of reasons, evidentiary issues (including expert witness exclusion), and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that all three appellant doctors failed to provide adequate disclosure regarding the cumulative risks of the treatment plan, and that the plaintiff would not have proceeded had he been properly informed.

Leave to appeal costs was refused.

The plaintiff moved to disqualify Norton Rose Fulbright LLP (NRF) from acting as lawyers of record for the K2 defendants.

The plaintiff argued that it was a current client of NRF for patent applications, and that NRF's representation of the K2 defendants in this litigation, which involved allegations that the plaintiff's core technology did not exist, created a disqualifying conflict of interest.

The court found that the two mandates were substantially related and that the bright line rule applied, rendering the advance waiver in NRF's engagement letter ineffective.

The motion to disqualify NRF was granted.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The appellant physician appealed a finding of professional misconduct and the resulting penalty (a reprimand and three-month suspension) imposed by the Discipline Committee.

The misconduct was based on criminal findings of guilt for domestic violence offences for which the appellant received an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued that the provincial legislation allowing discipline based on a criminal finding of guilt was unconstitutional on division of powers grounds because it conflicted with the federal Criminal Records Act provisions regarding discharges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no operational conflict or frustration of purpose between the statutes.

The Court also upheld the admission of the criminal records, the finding that domestic violence is relevant to a physician's suitability to practise, the penalty imposed, and the Committee's jurisdiction to award costs for preliminary motions.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

This decision concerns a request for reconsideration of a prior order granting leave to the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim.

The defendant argued that an inadvertent error in the draft amendments quoted in the previous reasons was material, suggesting an attempt to introduce a negligent misrepresentation claim after the limitation period.

The court clarified that the actual proposed amendments were less problematic than the version inadvertently quoted.

The court affirmed its previous decision to grant leave to amend, finding the actual proposed amendments were more benign and did not warrant a different outcome.

No costs were awarded for the reconsideration request.

The plaintiffs brought an action against several physicians involved in the treatment of their son, alleging a failure to diagnose Fragile X Syndrome, which led to the birth of a second child with the same genetic disorder.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to provide greater particularity, while the defendant physician moved to strike the claim, arguing he owed no duty of care to the parents of his patient.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion to amend, finding it did not introduce a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, holding that it was not plain and obvious that a novel duty of care could not be recognized between a physician and the parents of a patient in the context of genetic testing and family planning.

The plaintiff underwent a laparoscopic hysterectomy performed by the defendant gynaecologist, during which her colon was perforated, requiring subsequent reconstructive surgery.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action alleging the defendant failed to obtain informed consent, failed to review prior operative reports, lacked the skill to perform the surgery given her anatomy, and negligently caused the perforation.

The court dismissed the action, finding the defendant met the standard of care in his pre-operative advice and surgical technique, and that the bowel injury was a known complication likely caused by abnormal anatomy rather than negligence.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which revoked his certificate of registration for sexually abusing a patient.

The appellant argued that the Committee erred in finding a physician-patient relationship existed and in refusing to quash a summons issued to the reluctant patient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee's determination of a physician-patient relationship was reasonable based on medical records, OHIP billings, and medical notes provided to the patient.

The Court also upheld the Committee's decision not to quash the summons, concluding that the College's broad investigatory powers and the public interest in prosecuting sexual abuse allegations outweighed the patient's privacy interests.

The plaintiffs brought an action alleging the defendants infringed their copyright in various 'Anne of Green Gables' television productions.

The parties were unable to agree on a discovery plan under Rule 29.1.

The court was asked to establish a discovery plan, specifically addressing the scope of documentary production by both sides, the production of development agreements, and the time limits for oral examinations.

The Master ordered a limited, representative sample of productions from the plaintiffs regarding the alleged infringements, reciprocal financial production on an eyes-only basis, production of the defendants' development agreements subject to redaction, and equal time (14 hours) for oral discoveries for each side.

The moving party sought to review a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court who had declined to extend the time to perfect an appeal.

The moving party argued they were caught by surprise by the nature of the motion below.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to review, finding that this argument was not raised below, the record did not support it, no fresh evidence was adduced, and the single judge made no palpable or overriding error.

Furthermore, the motion to review was itself brought out of time.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' expert epidemiologist, Dr. Michael Freeman.

The court granted the motion, finding that Dr. Freeman lacked specialized knowledge in the specific medical areas (metabolics and neurology) relevant to the causation question.

His "comparative risk" methodology was deemed outside the mainstream study of epidemiology for specific causation, and his reports indicated a lack of objectivity by primarily critiquing other experts rather than offering independent analysis within his own expertise.

The court also noted that his proposed evidence was not necessary, as the plaintiffs' other expert covered the same points.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion at the outset of trial to strike the plaintiffs' jury notice.

The defendant argued that the complex scientific evidence relating to the minor plaintiff's rare metabolic disorder and the issue of causation made the case unsuitable for a jury.

Applying the principles from Kempf v. Nguyen, the court declined to strike the jury notice prior to trial, opting instead for the preferred 'wait and see' approach.

The motion was dismissed with leave to renew after the evidence is completed.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario imposing strict practice conditions pending a discipline hearing for alleged sexual abuse.

The allegations involved inappropriate comments and touching during an auscultation.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and set aside the interim order, finding that the Committee lacked evidence to conclude the physician was likely to expose patients to harm or injury.

The court held that the Committee improperly relied on its own clinical assumptions rather than evidence to reject the physician's explanation of his examination technique.

The defendant brought a motion to determine the admissibility of documents created during fitness to practice proceedings by the College of Nurses of Ontario concerning the plaintiff.

The defendant argued that s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act renders these documents inadmissible in civil actions.

The plaintiff contended this was re-litigation and that capacity investigations should be treated differently from discipline processes.

The court concluded that s. 36(3) applies broadly to fitness to practice proceedings, affirming the policy objective of separating college and civil proceedings to encourage expert participation without fear of civil action.

The motion was granted, and all documents created for the College's proceedings related to the plaintiff were declared inadmissible.