Jaan E. Lilles

The plaintiff underwent a nephrectomy performed by the defendant urologist after being diagnosed with suspected renal cell carcinoma.

Post-surgery pathology revealed the mass was a benign renal abscess.

The plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, alleging breach of the standard of care, lack of informed consent, and that the unnecessary removal of her kidney accelerated her end-stage renal failure.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the defendant met the standard of care as the clinical presentation and imaging strongly indicated malignancy and a biopsy was not the standard of care.

The court also found that informed consent was obtained and that the plaintiff failed to prove causation, as her pre-existing poorly controlled diabetes would have necessitated a kidney transplant regardless of the nephrectomy.

A lawyer appealed a professional misconduct finding based on in-court incivility during a securities prosecution.

The majority held that reasonableness review applied and accepted the disciplinary framework, but found its application unreasonable on the record.

The Court concluded the allegations were made in good faith with sufficient factual foundation in context.

The appeal was allowed and the complaints were dismissed.

An appeal from a trial judge's decision regarding the interpretation of an agreement.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's interpretation of key contractual language.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the trial judge correctly applied relevant legal principles, did not find the language ambiguous, and gave it its plain meaning with proper consideration of the surrounding provisions and circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

David W. Fickel sought leave to appeal from a motion judge's order that stayed the execution of a summary judgment for payment on a promissory note, pending the final resolution of the main action.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to Fickel on the promissory note but stayed its execution due to the interconnectedness of the claims arising from the same share purchase agreement.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant a stay under Rule 20.08, and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general or public importance beyond the immediate parties.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment claiming the defendant breached a non-solicitation covenant in a share purchase agreement by accepting former clients at his new firm.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on a counterclaim for payment of a $400,000 promissory note.

The court found the restrictive covenant did not prohibit the mere acceptance of former clients who transferred their accounts independently without encouragement.

The court also granted judgment on the promissory note, finding no legal or equitable set-off available, but stayed execution of the judgment pending the resolution of the main action.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a patient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Panel's decision was unreasonable because its credibility assessment of the complainant and the appellant was fundamentally flawed, incomplete, and lacked transparency.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

Following dismissal of a motion by a law firm seeking leave to withdraw from representation mid‑trial due to unpaid legal fees, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful clients sought full indemnity costs while the law firm argued that no costs should be awarded or that any award should be partial indemnity with a set‑off against outstanding legal accounts.

The court held that the circumstances did not justify elevated costs and fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

However, applying equitable principles of set‑off, the court allowed the law firm to deduct the costs award from its unpaid legal account.

The applicant, whose licence to practise law was revoked following discipline proceedings, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal to state a special case regarding the jurisdiction of the Law Society Hearing Panel.

She also sought directions for leave to appeal a 2009 Divisional Court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to agree to state a special case, which the Law Society did not.

The request for directions was also dismissed as there was no pending motion for leave to appeal and the underlying jurisdictional issue had already been rendered moot by subsequent proceedings.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the respondent College declaratory and injunctive relief for unauthorized practice and unauthorized use of protected titles.

The appellants argued that the language proficiency requirement in the Registration Regulation was discriminatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the appellants were barred from advancing the constitutional argument due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, as the same issue had been previously decided against them by the Divisional Court.

Following an earlier decision granting regulatory relief, the court addressed the appropriate costs award in a compliance application brought by a professional regulatory college against an individual practitioner.

The respondent argued for reduced costs based on partial success, the importance of legal issues under recently enacted legislation, and financial hardship.

The court held that the applicant had effectively obtained the relief sought and that the respondent’s circumstances did not justify reducing the presumptive costs award.

The court emphasized that inability to pay is rarely relevant absent clear evidence of permanent inability to satisfy costs.

Costs were fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis payable by the respondent.

The appellant, operator of Fort Henry, settled a personal injury claim with a plaintiff who fell into a moat after attending a banquet at a restaurant run by the third party.

The appellant sought indemnity from the third party, arguing it breached its contract or was negligent by failing to escort the plaintiff to her bus.

The trial judge dismissed the third party claim, finding no evidence connecting the plaintiff's fall to the departure of other guests.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proof.

The moving party law firm sought permission to withdraw as counsel of record for the plaintiffs mid-trial due to non-payment of legal fees and an alleged breakdown of the solicitor-client relationship.

The clients opposed the motion, arguing that withdrawal would cause significant prejudice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that despite a prior consent agreement, the court retained discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The court held that the clients would suffer serious prejudice as it was not feasible for them to self-represent in complex commercial litigation, they had already paid substantial fees, and the law firm held security on the clients' properties.

The regulatory college applied for injunctive relief under the Health Professions Procedural Code alleging that the respondent unlawfully practised traditional Chinese medicine and held herself out as a practitioner after the profession became regulated.

Evidence showed that the respondent, who was not registered with the college, examined an individual, communicated a traditional Chinese medicine diagnosis, used restricted titles, and represented herself through business materials as qualified to practise acupuncture.

The court found that the respondent communicated a diagnosis and held herself out as a practitioner contrary to the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 and the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.

The court concluded that providing health advice in these circumstances created a foreseeable risk of serious bodily harm and also breached statutory restrictions on the use of the title “Doctor.” The requested injunction was granted.

The respondent, having been successful on the appeal, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant argued that no costs should be awarded because the appeal involved an issue of public importance, or alternatively, that costs should be reduced to reflect divided success on the issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding the issue was not truly novel and declining to make a distributive costs award.

The respondent was awarded costs of $83,875.85.

The applicant college sought declarations and permanent injunctions against corporate and individual respondents alleged to have falsely held themselves out as statutory regulators, operated a competing registration and certification scheme, engaged in unauthorized traditional Chinese medicine practice, and used protected titles contrary to the governing health-professions legislation.

The respondents attempted to renew a constitutional challenge to the registration regime on discrimination grounds, but the court held that issue estoppel barred re-litigation of issues already decided by the Divisional Court.

On the evidentiary record, the court found breaches of the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006, the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, and the Code.

Declaratory relief and permanent injunctive relief were granted, with costs to be addressed separately.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for incivility during a criminal trial.

The Appeal Panel had reduced his penalty to a one-month suspension and $200,000 in costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Law Society has jurisdiction to discipline lawyers for in-court conduct without intruding on judicial independence.

The Court articulated the test for when incivility becomes professional misconduct, requiring that the conduct undermines or has the potential to undermine the proper administration of justice.

The Court found the Appeal Panel's application of the test and the resulting penalty and costs orders to be reasonable.

The Law Society's cross-appeal regarding the evidentiary use of prior judicial comments was also dismissed.

The appellant orthopedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for medical malpractice after the respondent developed compartment syndrome following the application of a full circumferential cast.

The trial judge had strongly criticized the appellant's counsel for reviewing and discussing draft reports with their expert witnesses, ruling that such practices were improper under the 2010 amendments to Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, confirming that consultation between counsel and expert witnesses is essential and protected by litigation privilege absent a factual foundation of improper influence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by using expert reports not in evidence to contradict viva voce testimony.

However, the Court concluded these errors did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the respondent's expert evidence was overwhelmingly stronger.

The appeal was dismissed.

The statutory regulator of traditional Chinese medicine in Ontario sought interim and interlocutory injunctions restraining several corporate and individual respondents from falsely holding themselves out as statutory regulators and from engaging in the unauthorized practice of traditional Chinese medicine and acupuncture.

The evidence demonstrated that the corporate respondents operated a registration and certification scheme that purported to authorize practitioners and used names and representations suggesting statutory authority.

The court found breaches of s. 34 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 and other provisions governing protected titles and controlled acts.

Applying the statutory injunction framework under s. 87 of the Health Professions Procedural Code, the court held that proof of continued statutory breach justified interim injunctive relief in the public interest.

The motion for interim and interlocutory injunctions was granted pending the hearing of the application.

The applicant sought remedies under Part VII.1 of the Competition Act after the respondents advertised that their wireless service had fewer dropped calls than competitors without conducting adequate and proper testing beforehand.

The court previously found the respondents engaged in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b) for making an untested performance claim, although the applicant failed to prove the claim was false or misleading under s. 74.01(1)(a).

In determining remedies, the court assessed proportionality and the factors in s. 74.1(5), including market reach, financial position, and the fact that later testing substantiated the claim.

The court held that post-claim substantiation does not excuse the statutory requirement for prior testing but is relevant to penalty quantum.

An administrative monetary penalty of $500,000 was imposed, while the request for a 10‑year prohibition order was denied.