Jaan E. Lilles

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a patient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Panel's decision was unreasonable because its credibility assessment of the complainant and the appellant was fundamentally flawed, incomplete, and lacked transparency.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

Following dismissal of a motion by a law firm seeking leave to withdraw from representation mid‑trial due to unpaid legal fees, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful clients sought full indemnity costs while the law firm argued that no costs should be awarded or that any award should be partial indemnity with a set‑off against outstanding legal accounts.

The court held that the circumstances did not justify elevated costs and fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

However, applying equitable principles of set‑off, the court allowed the law firm to deduct the costs award from its unpaid legal account.

The applicant, whose licence to practise law was revoked following discipline proceedings, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal to state a special case regarding the jurisdiction of the Law Society Hearing Panel.

She also sought directions for leave to appeal a 2009 Divisional Court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to agree to state a special case, which the Law Society did not.

The request for directions was also dismissed as there was no pending motion for leave to appeal and the underlying jurisdictional issue had already been rendered moot by subsequent proceedings.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the respondent College declaratory and injunctive relief for unauthorized practice and unauthorized use of protected titles.

The appellants argued that the language proficiency requirement in the Registration Regulation was discriminatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the appellants were barred from advancing the constitutional argument due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, as the same issue had been previously decided against them by the Divisional Court.

Following an earlier decision granting regulatory relief, the court addressed the appropriate costs award in a compliance application brought by a professional regulatory college against an individual practitioner.

The respondent argued for reduced costs based on partial success, the importance of legal issues under recently enacted legislation, and financial hardship.

The court held that the applicant had effectively obtained the relief sought and that the respondent’s circumstances did not justify reducing the presumptive costs award.

The court emphasized that inability to pay is rarely relevant absent clear evidence of permanent inability to satisfy costs.

Costs were fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis payable by the respondent.

The appellant, operator of Fort Henry, settled a personal injury claim with a plaintiff who fell into a moat after attending a banquet at a restaurant run by the third party.

The appellant sought indemnity from the third party, arguing it breached its contract or was negligent by failing to escort the plaintiff to her bus.

The trial judge dismissed the third party claim, finding no evidence connecting the plaintiff's fall to the departure of other guests.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proof.

The moving party law firm sought permission to withdraw as counsel of record for the plaintiffs mid-trial due to non-payment of legal fees and an alleged breakdown of the solicitor-client relationship.

The clients opposed the motion, arguing that withdrawal would cause significant prejudice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that despite a prior consent agreement, the court retained discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The court held that the clients would suffer serious prejudice as it was not feasible for them to self-represent in complex commercial litigation, they had already paid substantial fees, and the law firm held security on the clients' properties.

The regulatory college applied for injunctive relief under the Health Professions Procedural Code alleging that the respondent unlawfully practised traditional Chinese medicine and held herself out as a practitioner after the profession became regulated.

Evidence showed that the respondent, who was not registered with the college, examined an individual, communicated a traditional Chinese medicine diagnosis, used restricted titles, and represented herself through business materials as qualified to practise acupuncture.

The court found that the respondent communicated a diagnosis and held herself out as a practitioner contrary to the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 and the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.

The court concluded that providing health advice in these circumstances created a foreseeable risk of serious bodily harm and also breached statutory restrictions on the use of the title “Doctor.” The requested injunction was granted.

The respondent, having been successful on the appeal, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant argued that no costs should be awarded because the appeal involved an issue of public importance, or alternatively, that costs should be reduced to reflect divided success on the issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding the issue was not truly novel and declining to make a distributive costs award.

The respondent was awarded costs of $83,875.85.

The applicant college sought declarations and permanent injunctions against corporate and individual respondents alleged to have falsely held themselves out as statutory regulators, operated a competing registration and certification scheme, engaged in unauthorized traditional Chinese medicine practice, and used protected titles contrary to the governing health-professions legislation.

The respondents attempted to renew a constitutional challenge to the registration regime on discrimination grounds, but the court held that issue estoppel barred re-litigation of issues already decided by the Divisional Court.

On the evidentiary record, the court found breaches of the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006, the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, and the Code.

Declaratory relief and permanent injunctive relief were granted, with costs to be addressed separately.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for incivility during a criminal trial.

The Appeal Panel had reduced his penalty to a one-month suspension and $200,000 in costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Law Society has jurisdiction to discipline lawyers for in-court conduct without intruding on judicial independence.

The Court articulated the test for when incivility becomes professional misconduct, requiring that the conduct undermines or has the potential to undermine the proper administration of justice.

The Court found the Appeal Panel's application of the test and the resulting penalty and costs orders to be reasonable.

The Law Society's cross-appeal regarding the evidentiary use of prior judicial comments was also dismissed.

The appellant orthopedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for medical malpractice after the respondent developed compartment syndrome following the application of a full circumferential cast.

The trial judge had strongly criticized the appellant's counsel for reviewing and discussing draft reports with their expert witnesses, ruling that such practices were improper under the 2010 amendments to Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, confirming that consultation between counsel and expert witnesses is essential and protected by litigation privilege absent a factual foundation of improper influence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by using expert reports not in evidence to contradict viva voce testimony.

However, the Court concluded these errors did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the respondent's expert evidence was overwhelmingly stronger.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel that affirmed findings of professional misconduct and the revocation of her licence to practice law.

She argued that the Hearing Panel lacked jurisdiction due to improper transition from the old discipline regime to the new one, and that she was denied procedural fairness when refused access to an RCMP file.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the transition provisions were properly applied, the appellant suffered no prejudice, and she failed to demonstrate the relevance of the RCMP file or overcome the doctrine of abuse of process regarding her prior litigation.

The statutory regulator of traditional Chinese medicine in Ontario sought interim and interlocutory injunctions restraining several corporate and individual respondents from falsely holding themselves out as statutory regulators and from engaging in the unauthorized practice of traditional Chinese medicine and acupuncture.

The evidence demonstrated that the corporate respondents operated a registration and certification scheme that purported to authorize practitioners and used names and representations suggesting statutory authority.

The court found breaches of s. 34 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 and other provisions governing protected titles and controlled acts.

Applying the statutory injunction framework under s. 87 of the Health Professions Procedural Code, the court held that proof of continued statutory breach justified interim injunctive relief in the public interest.

The motion for interim and interlocutory injunctions was granted pending the hearing of the application.

The applicant sought remedies under Part VII.1 of the Competition Act after the respondents advertised that their wireless service had fewer dropped calls than competitors without conducting adequate and proper testing beforehand.

The court previously found the respondents engaged in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b) for making an untested performance claim, although the applicant failed to prove the claim was false or misleading under s. 74.01(1)(a).

In determining remedies, the court assessed proportionality and the factors in s. 74.1(5), including market reach, financial position, and the fact that later testing substantiated the claim.

The court held that post-claim substantiation does not excuse the statutory requirement for prior testing but is relevant to penalty quantum.

An administrative monetary penalty of $500,000 was imposed, while the request for a 10‑year prohibition order was denied.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the sudden death of Emilio Spirito at Trillium Health Centre.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' negligence, specifically the failure to insert a nasogastric tube, caused the deceased to aspirate fluids and die.

The court found that the defendant doctors and nurses met the standard of care in their treatment and monitoring of the deceased.

Furthermore, the court accepted expert pathology evidence that the deceased died from bilateral lobar pneumonia acquired from air-borne bacteria, meaning there was no causal connection between the alleged negligence and the death.

The action was dismissed.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under ss. 74.01(1)(a) and (b) of the Competition Act regarding claims of fewer dropped calls by a wireless provider, the court addressed discovery disputes involving communications between the Competition Bureau and industry participants.

The respondents sought disclosure of communications between the applicant and several wireless competitors, as well as internal investigative notes.

The court held that public interest privilege did not apply to communications with two competitors that had publicly promoted their role in the investigation, and ordered disclosure of communications occurring before litigation became the dominant purpose.

However, documents created after litigation was contemplated were protected by litigation privilege.

Communications involving another competitor and internal notes relating to discussions with a federal department remained protected by public interest privilege.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under s. 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act, the respondents sought leave to call eight expert witnesses despite the five‑expert limit imposed by s. 7 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing that some expert evidence was duplicative and that certain proposed opinions concerning the “general impression” of advertisements were inadmissible.

The court held that the proposed expert evidence was not unnecessarily duplicative and would not unduly prolong the hearing.

The court also determined that the admissibility of portions of the challenged expert evidence, including survey evidence and analysis of advertisements, could be addressed during trial if relied upon.

Leave was therefore granted to the respondents to call eight expert witnesses.

The Commissioner of Competition brought an application against Rogers and Chatr alleging that their advertising claims of 'fewer dropped calls than new wireless carriers' and 'no worries about dropped calls' were false, misleading, and made without adequate and proper testing, contrary to the Competition Act.

The court found that the applicant failed to prove the claims were false or misleading.

However, the court found that the respondents failed to conduct adequate and proper testing in certain cities prior to launching the advertising campaign, thereby engaging in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b).

The court also dismissed the respondents' constitutional challenges, finding that s. 74.01(1)(b) is a justified limit on freedom of expression and that the administrative monetary penalty does not engage s. 11 of the Charter.