Jaan E. Lilles

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the sudden death of Emilio Spirito at Trillium Health Centre.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' negligence, specifically the failure to insert a nasogastric tube, caused the deceased to aspirate fluids and die.

The court found that the defendant doctors and nurses met the standard of care in their treatment and monitoring of the deceased.

Furthermore, the court accepted expert pathology evidence that the deceased died from bilateral lobar pneumonia acquired from air-borne bacteria, meaning there was no causal connection between the alleged negligence and the death.

The action was dismissed.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under ss. 74.01(1)(a) and (b) of the Competition Act regarding claims of fewer dropped calls by a wireless provider, the court addressed discovery disputes involving communications between the Competition Bureau and industry participants.

The respondents sought disclosure of communications between the applicant and several wireless competitors, as well as internal investigative notes.

The court held that public interest privilege did not apply to communications with two competitors that had publicly promoted their role in the investigation, and ordered disclosure of communications occurring before litigation became the dominant purpose.

However, documents created after litigation was contemplated were protected by litigation privilege.

Communications involving another competitor and internal notes relating to discussions with a federal department remained protected by public interest privilege.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under s. 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act, the respondents sought leave to call eight expert witnesses despite the five‑expert limit imposed by s. 7 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing that some expert evidence was duplicative and that certain proposed opinions concerning the “general impression” of advertisements were inadmissible.

The court held that the proposed expert evidence was not unnecessarily duplicative and would not unduly prolong the hearing.

The court also determined that the admissibility of portions of the challenged expert evidence, including survey evidence and analysis of advertisements, could be addressed during trial if relied upon.

Leave was therefore granted to the respondents to call eight expert witnesses.

The Commissioner of Competition brought an application against Rogers and Chatr alleging that their advertising claims of 'fewer dropped calls than new wireless carriers' and 'no worries about dropped calls' were false, misleading, and made without adequate and proper testing, contrary to the Competition Act.

The court found that the applicant failed to prove the claims were false or misleading.

However, the court found that the respondents failed to conduct adequate and proper testing in certain cities prior to launching the advertising campaign, thereby engaging in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b).

The court also dismissed the respondents' constitutional challenges, finding that s. 74.01(1)(b) is a justified limit on freedom of expression and that the administrative monetary penalty does not engage s. 11 of the Charter.

The defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action for delay at a status hearing under Rule 48.14.

The action was commenced in 2007, but the plaintiffs failed to advance the litigation, missing deadlines for documentary discovery and examinations for discovery.

The court found a complete lack of communication between the plaintiffs and their counsel, and no acceptable explanation for the delay.

The court also found that the defendants would suffer prejudice due to the passage of time, as the events occurred in 2005.

The action was dismissed for delay.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee ordering a clinical caution and preceptorship.

The applicant argued the College lacked statutory authority and breached procedural fairness by initiating a broader investigation into his practice before resolving an initial patient complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the College had the authority to initiate the investigation based on reasonable and probable grounds, the request for OHIP records was relevant, and the disposition addressing both record-keeping and clinical concerns was reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that their medical malpractice action against the hospital defendants had been settled.

The motion judge had found that the appellants' offer to consent to a dismissal was contingent on the remaining defendants undertaking not to allege negligence against the hospital defendants, and that this undertaking had been fulfilled.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants had revoked their offer in writing before the remaining defendants purported to fulfill the undertaking.

As the offer was withdrawn before the condition precedent was met, no settlement was reached.

The appellant psychiatrist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding that he sexually abused a patient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Committee's structure of analysis effectively reversed the burden of proof by eliminating alternative scenarios based on an absence of evidence.

The Court also found the Committee compounded this error by relying on the absence of mental health evidence after denying the appellant's application for third-party records, and by improperly using prior consistent statements to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The plaintiff appealed an order of a Master dismissing her action for delay following a status hearing.

The action arose from the suspension of her nursing licence, allegedly due to a flawed report by the defendant physician.

The Master had applied a rigid two-part test, finding the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Master erred in principle by failing to apply a contextual approach and by ignoring the broader litigation history, including a companion case that resolved a key issue regarding document admissibility.

The order dismissing the action was set aside.

Following a prior decision striking the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim in its entirety without leave to amend, several successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the governing principles for costs awards, including the requirement that costs be fair and reasonable and the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although the defendants sought higher partial indemnity amounts, the court exercised discretion to reduce the awards.

The court ordered the self-represented plaintiff to pay fixed costs to multiple defendants reflecting their success on the motions while ensuring the amounts were reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff’s Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim alleging fraud, negligence, defamation, breach of contract, and numerous other causes of action arising from a physician assessment and subsequent complaints to the professional regulator and review board.

The court held that the pleading failed to set out material facts supporting the alleged causes of action and instead consisted largely of bald allegations and inflammatory assertions.

Claims relying on materials from professional discipline proceedings were barred by s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, and the regulatory bodies and their officials were protected by statutory immunity absent properly pleaded bad faith.

The court also found the claim constituted an improper collateral attack on the outcomes of the regulatory complaint and review process.

The entire claim was struck without leave to amend.

The appellant franchisor appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a franchise agreement and the statutory duty of good faith under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The trial judge found the franchisor deliberately withheld information from the franchisee regarding a new head lease and denied the franchisee's conditional right of renewal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's interpretation of the contract, her decision to treat the individual franchisee and his corporation as a single entity, and the damages awarded for breach of contract, breach of good faith, and mental distress.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel which had quashed her appeal from a Hearing Panel's dismissal of her motion challenging jurisdiction.

The Law Society argued the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction because the Appeal Panel's decision was not a final order under section 49.38 of the Law Society Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the right of appeal is statutory and limited to final dispositions of disciplinary proceedings.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action following the death of Emilio Spirito, naming several hospitals, doctors, and 'Doctors AB, CD, EF, GH'.

After the two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act expired, the plaintiffs sought to amend the claim to substitute the appellants for Doctors AB and CD.

The motion judge allowed the amendment, finding it was a case of misnomer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that correcting a misnomer does not constitute adding a party, and therefore s. 21 of the Limitations Act, 2002 does not bar the amendment.

The appellant obstetrician prescribed the fertility drug Clomid to the respondent mother, who subsequently gave birth prematurely to twin girls with severe disabilities.

The jury found the appellant negligent for failing to properly inform the mother of the risks of twinning and premature birth associated with Clomid, and that she would not have taken the drug if properly informed.

The trial judge held that the twins had a valid cause of action against the appellant and that the parents could recover future care costs for the twins beyond the age of 18.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the jury's verdict on causation and the parents' entitlement to future care costs.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the twins' claims, holding that the appellant owed no duty of care to the unborn children when prescribing a fertility drug to the mother, as his duty was solely to provide the mother with sufficient information to make an informed choice.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which had found a Complaints Committee decision to take no further action on a patient's complaint to be unreasonable.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Board failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard of review as set out in Zenner.

Instead of assessing whether the Committee's decision was supported by the evidence, the Board substituted its own view based on anecdotal theories.

The Court set aside the Board's decision and confirmed the Committee's decision.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to introduce fresh evidence and a motion to set aside an order of a single judge quashing her appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a Law Society Hearing Panel's decision to recuse itself and the Appeal Panel's decision to quash her appeal of that recusal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence as the proposed evidence was irrelevant to whether the appealed decision was interlocutory.

The Court also dismissed the motion to set aside the order, finding no error in the conclusion that the decision appealed from was interlocutory and therefore not subject to appeal under the Law Society Act.

The appellant brought a motion to consolidate the hearing of a motion to set aside a 2007 order with a motion to set aside a 2003 order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to consolidate, noting the appellant had ample time to bring the 2003 motion on for hearing and failed to do so, and that the 2007 order was a discrete matter.

The appellants brought a class action for prospectus misrepresentation under s. 130(1) of the Ontario Securities Act.

The respondent company made an initial public offering with a prospectus containing a sales forecast.

Before the offering closed, internal analysis showed sales lagging due to unseasonably warm weather, but this was not disclosed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the company had no obligation to disclose the intra-quarterly results because they did not amount to a 'material change' under the Act.

The Court also held that the Business Judgment Rule does not apply to statutory disclosure obligations.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Law Society brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision of an Appeal Panel that had quashed her appeal of a Hearing Panel's decision to recuse itself.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the decision appealed from was interlocutory and that the statutory right of appeal under the Law Society Act only applies to final decisions or orders.