Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed his sentence for firearms-related offences, arguing it was overly harsh and that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the onerous conditions of incarceration due to COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in principle or misapprehension of facts regarding the sentence's fitness, noting it was well within the available range.

Regarding the incarceration conditions, the court affirmed that the sentencing judge properly factored these as a mitigating circumstance and was not required to provide a mathematical credit.

Both grounds of appeal were dismissed.

The appellants, C.O. and N.P., appealed convictions for failure to provide necessaries of life and an order for a new trial on unlawful confinement, stemming from the unsanitary conditions in their apartment and the confinement of their four-year-old daughter, J. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, affirming that risk of harm is an element of the necessaries offence under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code and that the conditions of confinement are relevant to the "lawful authority" defence under s. 279(2).

The court found the trial judge erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the health risks posed by the cumulative unsanitary conditions.

The matter was remitted for sentencing on the necessaries charge.

The appellant, K.T., appealed his conviction for second-degree murder of his father, a judge-alone circumstantial case.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the movement of the deceased's body, the assessment of post-offence conduct (flight to Montreal with the deceased's belongings), and various factual inferences drawn from the evidence, including DNA, fingerprints, and the murder weapon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's careful and extensive reasons, which were well-rooted in the evidentiary record and properly rejected alternative theories.

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals concerning defamation actions dismissed under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The motion judge had dismissed the actions, finding no valid defence in one case and a potentially valid defence in the other, and in both cases, the public interest in protecting expression outweighed the harm to the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the dismissal of the defamation actions.

However, it allowed the cross-appeals on costs, finding that the motion judge erred in not awarding full indemnity costs to the successful defendants, as the actions bore the hallmarks of SLAPP lawsuits.

The appellant, Justin Longshaw, appealed his convictions for threatening, weapon possession, obstructing a peace officer, and probation breach, stemming from an incident at a bar where identification was the key issue.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence, particularly the continuous observation by one witness, and her conclusion that providing a false name constituted obstruction.

The sentence appeal was contingent and thus also dismissed.

The appellant, A.R., appealed a 20-year prison sentence for 30 offences of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse against five of their six children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence proportionate and fit, falling within the range for extensive child abuse cases with a sexual component.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's application of the totality principle, which involved imposing individual sentences that added up to a fit total, consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

Tallman Truck Centre Limited appealed an order staying its action against K.S.P. Holdings Inc. The stay was imposed because Tallman failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with the co-defendant, Secure Capital Advisors Inc., which fundamentally altered Secure's adversarial position to a cooperative one with Tallman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Tallman's appeal, affirming that such agreements, regardless of type (Mary Carter or Pierringer-type), require immediate disclosure as they change the litigation landscape.

The court reiterated that failure to immediately disclose constitutes an abuse of process, for which a stay of proceedings is the only appropriate remedy, regardless of intent or perceived prejudice.

The appellants (homeowners) appealed a trial decision that found them liable for breach of an oral renovation contract and dismissed their claims against the builder and the City of Hamilton.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding the oral contract, the standard of construction, the interpretation of allowances, the homeowners' breach of contract, and the builder's compliance.

The appellate court deferred to the trial judge's credibility findings, particularly concerning expert evidence, and his assessment of damages, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appellant was convicted of 10 sexual abuse offences against his former partner's daughter.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence related to pornography and his surveillance of the victim's grandmother's house, as well as the Crown's cross-examination of its own witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned evidence was relevant and properly used for material issues or credibility, and that the procedure for refreshing witness memories was appropriate given the lack of objection at trial and absence of prejudice.

The Crown appealed a dangerous offender sentence, arguing the sentencing judge applied the wrong legal standard ("reasonable possibility" instead of "reasonable expectation") when determining if a lesser measure than indeterminate detention would adequately protect the public.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in law by applying a less rigorous standard and by relying on speculative evidence of treatability and manageability.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of indeterminate detention was substituted.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his action against the City of Toronto, which was based on his failure to provide timely notice under s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors in her conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the three-year delay in providing notice, despite having sufficient information to investigate earlier.

The appellant appealed the granting of a charge against her property under s. 34(1) of the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the well-established three-step test for ordering a statutory charge was met, specifically that the appellant was unable or unwilling to pay the solicitor's fees.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's discretionary decision, which was amply supported by the record.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its motion for a charging order under the Solicitors Act and the amendment of trial and costs orders under the Family Law Rules.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the determination that the firm was not "instrumental" in preserving property for a charging order, and that the amendment to secure costs was appropriate under Rule 25(19)(c) to address an inadvertent omission.

The appellant, Barry James Gallant, appealed a motion judge's finding that the respondent, Miranda Bailey's, obligations as a guarantor on a mortgage loan ended on June 28, 2014, and that she was not bound by subsequent mortgage extensions made without her notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The motion judge had reasonably interpreted the mortgage documents, including standard terms, the mortgage agreement, and the mortgage schedule, to conclude that the guarantee's duration was limited to the 12-month period set out in the mortgage agreement, thereby modifying the standard terms.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision that the respondent was free to sell a property to a third party despite the appellant's right of first refusal under a lease.

The appellant had exercised its right of first refusal by matching a third-party offer, which included a 30-day financing condition.

The appellant failed to obtain financing, requested an extension which was refused, and the agreement expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's commercially reasonable interpretation that the right of first refusal was exercisable only once and was spent after the appellant failed to waive the financing condition.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding a published photo was not defamatory and in upholding the respondents' defence of responsible communication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the proper legal framework from Pointes Protection and Grant v. Torstar, and her conclusions were entitled to deference.

The appellant, Maxine Donna McLean, appealed the dismissal of her negligence action against Dr. Nikolaj Wolfson.

The action was dismissed by the motion judge due to Dr. McLean's repeated failure to produce medical records (a "recent X-ray" and related diagnoses) as requested and ordered, which were referenced in her Statement of Claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly exercised discretion in dismissing the action, given the ample time provided and lack of reasonable explanation for non-compliance.

The Court also declined to admit fresh evidence on appeal, as it did not correct the deficiencies and was not timely.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order transferring primary care of the parties' two children to the respondent father, which included an initial period of no contact for the mother and a staged increase in parenting time.

The trial judge's decision, made after a 39-day trial, found the mother had intentionally undermined parenting schedules and made false allegations of sexual abuse to terminate the children's relationship with the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's exercise of discretion and factual findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in parenting orders, especially when the decision has already been implemented.

The court found no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or her consideration of the Divorce Act regarding family violence, as the mother's allegations were not established.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his conviction appeal and set aside the abandonment of his sentence appeal, after his appeal had been dismissed on the merits.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding his statements voluntary, that the appellate court erred in its reasons, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no real concern of a miscarriage of justice to warrant re-opening the conviction appeal, and concluding that the proposed sentence appeal had no prospect of success.

This appeal concerned a motion judge's order requiring the appellants to pass their accounts as Attorneys for Property.

The appellants argued that the respondent failed to obtain proper leave under s. 42(4)-(6) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, that the test for leave was misapplied, that there was insufficient evidentiary foundation, and that the reasons for the decision were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge implicitly granted leave, applied the appropriate test, and provided sufficient reasons for appellate review.