David M. Paciocco

The appellant, Mostafa Alkhalil, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and sought leave to appeal his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the victim's testimony.

It affirmed that the trial judge correctly considered the appellant's creation of an expectation of trust and the victim's lack of consent as aggravating factors.

The sentence was deemed proportionate and consistent with sentencing principles for serious sexual offences involving vulnerable victims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, break and enter, and other offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing exculpatory eyewitness identification evidence, accepting the testimony of a witness to whom he confessed, and dismissing a lost evidence application regarding a glove and mitten.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the identification evidence, deferring to the credibility findings regarding the confession, and upholding the factual findings on the lost evidence application.

The appellant appealed 20 of his 53 convictions for internet-based child exploitation offences, arguing that the trial judge relied on statutory presumptions of belief in age that were subsequently declared unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal agreed, declaring the presumptions in ss. 171.1(3) and 172.2(3) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional and finding the trial judge relied on them to convict.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial on the 20 counts.

The global sentence of 11 years was maintained, though specific illegal concurrent sentences were varied.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation and uttering death threats following a judge-alone trial.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by relying on an ungrounded "common-sense" assumption to reject his evidence and by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were plausible and grounded in the evidence, and that the burden of proof was not reversed.

The court emphasized the high deference given to trial judges' credibility findings and clarified the application of the rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions.

The appellant, Thanh Nguyen, appealed his convictions for several possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, alleging that the trial judge erred by convicting him on circumstantial evidence that supported innocent inferences, engaged in illogical reasoning, and that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on a firearm charge.

He also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting unqualified opinion evidence from a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and any error in admitting opinion evidence harmless under the curative proviso.

Kevin Tran appealed his convictions for narcotics, proceeds of crime, and firearm offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge erred in not staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the s. 24(2) decision correct (despite an unconstitutional warrant, evidence was admissible due to good faith), and the s. 11(b) delay justified by exceptional circumstances related to a joint trial.

Lin Yang appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the sole defence witness, Ze Yi Xu, who offered exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two material errors in assessing Mr. Xu's credibility: a misapprehension of evidence regarding vehicle availability and an illogical reasoning error concerning Mr. Xu's delay in informing the police.

These errors were deemed essential to the trial judge's rejection of the witness's testimony.

The appeal was allowed, and a retrial was ordered.

This appeal addressed whether a Band Council Resolution (BCR) could be enforced as a by-law under the Indian Act.

Hiawatha First Nation sought a permanent injunction to stop three of its members from building a gas station on the reserve, relying on a BCR that imposed a moratorium on new businesses.

The application judge granted the injunction, treating the BCR as a by-law.

The Court of Appeal found that a BCR is distinct from a by-law and does not have the force of law to create rights and duties for band members or third parties under the Indian Act.

The court emphasized that law-making authority under the Indian Act, particularly when affecting proprietary rights, requires adherence to specific by-law formalities.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the injunction based on the BCR was set aside.

This appeal concerned a failed residential real estate transaction where the buyers' financing fell through, leading the sellers to terminate the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) and retain the deposit.

The sellers subsequently resold the property for a higher price.

The buyers sought specific performance, damages, or relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the sellers were entitled to terminate the APS as they were ready, willing, and able to close, and that relief from forfeiture was not warranted, despite the sellers realizing a profit on the resale.

The court also addressed the duty of honest performance and the effect of anticipatory repudiation.

The Limited Partners of YG Limited Partnership appealed a motion judge's order denying them standing to oppose a creditor's (CBRE Limited) appeal of a disallowed proof of claim under s. 135(4) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that limited partners do not possess a direct economic interest in the claim sufficient for common law standing, nor are they granted standing under s. 135(4) or s. 37 of the BIA.

The court emphasized that the BIA is a complete code designed for expeditious resolution of bankruptcy matters, and equity owners are generally excluded from direct participation in creditor claim appeals.

The appellants, Limited Partners of a debtor in a bankruptcy proposal, appealed an order for directions regarding the process for an appeal of a proof of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as premature, finding that the motion judge had not made any final orders regarding the appellants' standing in the anticipated claim appeal, but rather had made directions "subject to the discretion of the judge hearing the appeal." The court held that the possibility of influence or an incorrect underlying conclusion on discretionary standing was not a basis for appeal.

The appellant, Rolling Meadows Land Development Corporation, appealed judgments dismissing its motion to convert applications to an action, finding a purchase and sale agreement binding, and finding no breach of contract by the respondent, Pine Glen Thorold Inc. The appeal raised arguments concerning the refusal to convert applications, a claim of unilateral mistake in signing the contract, and the quantification of renovation costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decisions.

The court affirmed that the application judge was entitled to adjudicate the issues on the record, that no unilateral mistake was established given the appellant's sophistication and the contract's clarity, and that the renovation quantification was properly determined.

The appellants appealed an order directing funds paid into court to be released to the respondent, which were secured by a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding the order to be interlocutory rather than final.

The court reasoned that the order did not finally determine the substantive issues between the parties, such as claims of improvident realization or breach of duty, which remained subject to a separate, unscheduled application.

The appellant, Gary Austin, was convicted of fraud and theft based on circumstantial evidence, where he received over $165,000 from fraudulent cheques drafted by a general manager of a company.

Austin appealed, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles from R. v. Villaroman regarding circumstantial evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge, when read as a whole, correctly applied the Villaroman standard by concluding that guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The court also found the reasons sufficient for appellate review, noting that speculative inferences of innocence, contrary to human experience, do not constitute reasonable doubt.

The husband appealed two spousal support orders made after trial, challenging the quantification of ongoing, lump sum catch-up, and retroactive support, as well as the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding income imputation, retroactive support start date, occupation rent, and calculation methods.

The court found no reversible error of law or material error of fact, emphasizing the narrow scope of appellate review in family law matters.

The appellant, Devon Dinall, appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, conspiracy to traffic cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

His defence at trial was that he was involved in a marijuana trafficking conspiracy, not cocaine.

The primary ground of appeal argued that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on conspiracy and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, specifically by failing to instruct on the possibility of multiple overlapping conspiracies and misrepresenting his admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, viewed functionally and as a whole, clearly conveyed that conviction required proof of participation in a cocaine conspiracy, despite one misstatement.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction regarding expert evidence on drug slang.

This appeal concerned whether the appellants (vendors) were entitled to terminate an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a vacant lot under paragraph 10 (the "annulment clause") of the OREA standard form APS due to writs of execution against title.

The motion judge found the appellants breached the contract by not exercising the annulment power reasonably and ordered specific performance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that a vendor must make genuine efforts to satisfy title requisitions and cannot rely on the annulment clause if encumbrances, such as writs of execution, could be cleared from the sale proceeds.

Allison Dent appealed her conviction for publishing defamatory libel against Troy Lalonde, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to misapprehensions of evidence and erroneous "profile" analysis.

The Crown cross-appealed her sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's decision reasonable and solidly grounded in evidence, despite a conceded error regarding an adopted admission by silence which was deemed harmless.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding the trial judge erred by giving undue weight to the impact of incarceration on the appellant's child and failing to adequately consider denunciation and deterrence for a "worst-case example" of criminal defamation.

The Court substituted the conditional sentence with a two-year less a day term of incarceration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession, accessing, and making child pornography available.

The central issue at trial was the appellant's knowledge and control over illicit material found on computers seized from his father's residence.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including dates from a Digital Forensic Report that was not formally admitted into evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable based on admissible evidence, the trial judge's material reliance on the unadmitted report constituted a misapprehension of evidence, which was essential to the reasoning process and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court order declaring him a vexatious litigant and restricting his access to courts under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge lacked jurisdiction to make such an order on its own initiative, as s. 140 requires an application by an interested person, and there is no inherent common law authority for such orders.

While acknowledging the appellant's history of frivolous litigation, the court reluctantly allowed the appeal and quashed the vexatious litigant order, affirming that underlying dismissals of actions under Rule 2.1.01 remained undisturbed.