David M. Brown

The appellants appealed an order striking out their action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellants had previously failed to set aside a default judgment obtained against them and subsequently brought a new action claiming damages and alleging fraud regarding the service of the original claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the new action was an attempt to relitigate issues already decided and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in persons and theft, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the definition of exploitation, prior inconsistent statements, and psychological safety, and erred by amending the indictment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the amendment caused no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was allowed on consent to credit the appellant for 14 days of pre-trial custody, reducing his sentence to 29 months and 7 days.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault involving his stepchild.

The prosecution relied heavily on the complainant’s testimony along with evidence that the complainant had previously disclosed the allegations to friends, family members, and a boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly admitted the prior consistent statements to rebut defence suggestions of recent fabrication and motive to lie.

However, the trial judge erred by relying on those statements as proof that the offences occurred, effectively treating them as corroborative evidence during the W.(D.) credibility analysis.

Because this constituted an impermissible use of prior consistent statements, the convictions could not stand.

A new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a statement he made after police violated his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The arresting officer had twice asked if the appellant wanted to make a statement after he requested counsel.

However, the appellant later spontaneously asked if his wife would be arrested, and upon receiving a truthful answer, confessed to owning drugs in a safe.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was a Charter breach, the statement was spontaneous and not causally connected to the breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision dismissing appeals from Superior Court orders affirming a decision of the Chief Building Official.

The respondent argued no appeal to the Court of Appeal was available.

The Court of Appeal clarified that leave to appeal remains available under s. 6(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act for decisions made under s. 26 of the Building Code Act, 1992.

However, the motion for leave was dismissed on the alternative ground applying the Sault Dock test.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision that a single notice letter satisfied the 60-day notice requirement under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act for 15 separate class actions.

The actions alleged the Crown failed to enforce HST guidelines against automobile insurers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the notice letter communicated a broad complaint on behalf of a defined class and fulfilled the legislative purpose of allowing the Crown to investigate and prepare for litigation, even though 15 separate actions with different representative plaintiffs were ultimately commenced.

The appellant, K.R., appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual interference against his step-daughter.

The grounds of appeal included impermissible speculative reasoning by the trial judge, undue weight on the complainant's demeanor, and an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility and reliability, and concluding that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence, with proper application of the burden of proof.

The applicant sought a review of a single judge's decision refusing a stay of an order setting a settlement conference date and refusing an extension of time to perfect his appeal.

The applicant argued the motion judge erred in considering the court's lack of jurisdiction, asserting such a decision required a full panel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motion judge's consideration of jurisdiction as a factor in exercising discretion to refuse the stay and extension of time.

The plaintiff, Ms. Clarke, sought long-term disability benefits from Sun Life.

Sun Life initially approved 'own occupation' benefits but closed the file in February 2014, stating medical information did not support 'any occupation' benefits.

After a three-year delay, Ms. Clarke provided further medical information in March 2017, leading to another rejection in June 2017.

Ms. Clarke then filed a statement of claim in August 2018.

Sun Life moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred, which was denied by the motion judge.

Sun Life appealed.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in determining the limitation period's commencement and in failing to conduct a proper discoverability analysis under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the motion judge's order and directing the matter to proceed to trial to determine the limitation period issues.

The appellant was stopped for a traffic violation, which escalated into an arrest for marijuana possession.

Police committed multiple serious Charter breaches, including an unlawful public strip search, a 20-minute delay in providing the right to counsel, and a warrantless cellphone search.

The trial judge admitted the seized firearm and drugs, but the Crown conceded on appeal that the s. 24(2) analysis was flawed.

The Court of Appeal found the breaches to be egregious and highly impactful on the appellant's protected interests, outweighing the public interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded, the appeal allowed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant solicitors represented the plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident trial.

Although the jury awarded damages, the trial judge's costs award resulted in a net judgment requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendants.

The solicitors sought a charging order under s. 34(1) of the Solicitors Act on the damages awarded before set-off.

The motion judge dismissed the request, finding no property was recovered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that mutual debt obligations in a judgment are set-off, and since the plaintiff emerged as a net debtor, no property was recovered through the solicitors' instrumentality.

The appellant applied for relief to enforce a promissory note assigned to him by a corporation.

The application judge dismissed the application on a without-prejudice basis, finding the appellant had not proven the validity of the assignment, but stated she would remain seized if further proceedings were brought.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the application judge erred in principle by putting the parties to the expense of a new proceeding.

To avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, the judge should have directed the trial of an issue under Rule 38.10(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Prior to the hearing of his appeal, the appellant died.

His counsel filed a notice of abatement.

The Court of Appeal applied the established principles regarding mootness and abatement, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify proceeding with the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant, Bruce Wilson, appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault, kidnapping, and uttering death threats, and his subsequent dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's corrective instruction to the jury regarding defence counsel's closing arguments about untested DNA samples.

The sentence appeal argued that "Lord Coke's principle" which generally prohibits relying on subsequent convictions to aggravate a prior offence's sentence, should apply to dangerous offender proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the corrective instruction and holding that Lord Coke's principle does not apply to dangerous offender determinations, as these proceedings are forward-looking and focus on future public safety and patterns of behaviour.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of a prohibited firearm, careless use of a firearm, and possession of marijuana following a self-inflicted gunshot wound at an industrial unit.

The appellant challenged the lawfulness of two searches: a warrantless entry and a subsequent search conducted pursuant to a warrant.

The trial judge found the warrantless search justified by exigent circumstances and the warrant valid despite exclusion of evidence obtained in breach of Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of either search.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of use of an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, two counts of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of threatening to cause death, arising from violent robberies of two victims behind the Yorkdale Subway Station in Toronto.

The appellant received a global sentence of four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of an expert forensic report authenticating Voxer App voicemail messages that would establish his absence from the scene of the robberies.

The Crown consented to the admission of the fresh evidence and conceded that the convictions amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants sought to appeal a judgment from the Superior Court of Justice.

The matter proceeded to a consent dismissal of the actions against Douglas LaFramboise.

The court approved the partial settlement by consent order, while preserving the crossclaim by Pomer & Boccia Professional Corporation and David Michael Pomer against LaFramboise.

An inmate serving a life sentence for first-degree murder appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application challenging his emergency transfer from a medium-security to a maximum-security institution and the increase in his security classification.

The inmate alleged procedural unfairness based on inadequate disclosure of information under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) and argued the Warden's reclassification decision was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the Institution complied with statutory disclosure requirements, adequately justified information withheld under CCRA s. 27(3), and that the Warden's decisions were reasonable and procedurally fair.

The appellant, a corporation operating a Canadian Tire store, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge found that a Facebook post and media article by the respondents describing poor customer service at the store related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding factual error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction on nine offences arising from an armed robbery of a salon, including use of a firearm, robbery, wounding, and assault.

The trial judge had upheld the validity of two search warrants (residential and digital video recorder) despite Charter challenges.

The Court of Appeal found that both warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds due to material non-disclosure in the Information to Obtain affidavits.

The affiant officer failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of licence plate evidence, vehicle colour discrepancies, and other material facts.

The digital video recorder evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Without this evidence, the Crown's case was gutted, and acquittals were ordered.