David H. Doherty

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his conviction.

The appellant argued that the unusual fact situation required the court to grant leave regarding the law of entrapment.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the law of entrapment well settled and its application to the facts uncontroversial.

The appellant appealed her convictions and sentence for fraud and uttering a forged document.

She had pled guilty but later moved to strike her pleas, which the trial judge refused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the pleas were voluntary and informed.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the 22-month conditional sentence imposed for frauds totalling approximately $40,000 and the use of forged documents for a passport application.

The Court of Appeal issued supplementary reasons to allocate a previously imposed total sentence of six years among the appellant's various convictions.

The court allocated three years for trafficking in Oxycodone, five years concurrent for trafficking in Fentanyl, and one year consecutive for forgery charges, resulting in a net sentence of seven and a half months on the forgery charges after pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after strangling the victim.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding intent and the partial defence of provocation, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the cross-examination but held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the appellant's after-the-fact conduct (hiding the body and lying) could be used to infer the requisite intent for murder without proper qualification.

The trial judge also erred in the provocation instruction by attributing the appellant's size and athletic ability to the 'ordinary person' test.

The curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a unit owner and former director of the respondent condominium corporation, appealed a costs order made against him.

The application judge had ordered the appellant to pay $45,000 in costs but failed to clearly determine whether the appellant had acted in bad faith or was merely negligent, which was critical to determining his entitlement to indemnification under the condominium's by-laws.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the costs order, and remitted the matter to the application judge to clarify the findings and reassess the costs.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility after shooting the victim outside a bar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on self-defence, failed to leave the defence of provocation, and misstated witness evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly tailored the self-defence instruction to the key factual issue of whether the victim drew a gun first, correctly concluded there was no air of reality to provocation, and made no material errors regarding witness testimony.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the aggravating factors, including the use of an illegal handgun in a public place.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, arguing that the search warrant for his residence was unconstitutional.

The warrant was based largely on information from a confidential informant.

The appellant contended that the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) did not provide reasonable grounds for the warrant and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of the ITO affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the redacted ITO provided sufficient grounds when read as a whole and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing cross-examination to protect the informant's identity.

The appellant Superintendent of Financial Services appealed a CCAA judge's order lifting a stay of proceedings and ordering the debtor companies into bankruptcy.

The appellant argued that a deemed trust arose under the Pension Benefits Act upon the wind up of two pension plans during the CCAA proceedings, and that this trust should have priority over secured creditors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the CCAA judge reasonably exercised his discretion to transition the proceedings to bankruptcy under the BIA, where provincial deemed trusts are rendered inoperative by the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepsister and sentenced to two years less a day.

He appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility, evaluating the reliability of the complainant's evidence, and treating the evidence of the complainant's mother.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that despite the conduct being at the lower end of the range, the blatant breach of trust and multiple assaults justified the sentence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that directed a conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred by focusing on whether the arresting officer actually knew a test result was reliable, rather than whether the officer's belief was reasonable.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the appropriate remedy was a new trial, not a directed conviction, because a trial judge could conclude the officer's belief was unreasonable given his reliance on a rookie officer whose training was unknown.

The appeal was allowed in part, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that a specific incident occurred later than the trial judge had found.

Because the trial judge had relied on the erroneous chronology to distinguish the count on which he convicted from those on which he acquitted, the distinction disappeared.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her convictions and nine-year sentence for drug trafficking and forgery arising from a prescription fraud scheme.

The Crown conceded she should be acquitted of two trafficking counts, and the court stayed two forgery counts under the Kienapple principle.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the jointly submitted nine-year sentence manifestly unfit despite the seriousness of the offence, citing the appellant's youth, lack of record, cooperation with police, and the fact that a more culpable co-accused received the same sentence.

The sentence was reduced to six years.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury, arguing that the Crown made an inappropriate comment during closing submissions and that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that there is a presumption in law that a witness comes to court to tell their honest recollections.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Crown's comment was inappropriate, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court also held that the erroneous jury instruction did not prejudice the appellant, as both the appellant and the complainant testified, and the jury was properly instructed on the factors for assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his failure to negotiate a curve and the testimony of witnesses in a trailing vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interpretation of the expert data was open to him and that he provided detailed, accurate reasons for rejecting the witness testimony as unreliable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the lack of a Vetrovec caution.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence on one count, quashing that conviction and ordering a new trial.

Another conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The remaining convictions and the total five-year sentence were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own motion to quash and that there was no prejudice to the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for firearm offences.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made one factual error, it was not material to the conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the Court agreed that the sentence for unauthorized possession should be concurrent, not consecutive, to the sentence for possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The Court upheld the trial judge's calculation of presentence custody credit, noting the appellant's poor conduct in custody negated the quantitative rationale for enhanced credit.

The total sentence was reduced from six to five years.

The appellant was convicted in Jordan of murdering his ex-wife in the United States and served six and a half years of a 15-year sentence before being released under a general amnesty.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition from Canada to stand trial for the same murder.

The extradition judge committed the appellant, finding he lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant's double jeopardy claim, and the Minister of Justice ordered his surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review application, holding that the committal judge correctly identified the limits of his jurisdiction and that the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable, as the United States did not participate in the Jordanian prosecution and the potential sentence of life without parole did not shock the conscience.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for arrears owing under three vehicle leases that had been assigned to the respondent.

The appellants argued that because they did not receive written notice of the lease assignments, the respondent was required to join the assignor as a party to the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the assignor perhaps should have been joined, the appellants had actual notice of the assignment and suffered no prejudice.

The Court also rejected arguments that the trial judge violated the collateral fact rule during cross-examination and erred in her credibility assessments.

The appellant appealed her convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and applied unbalanced scrutiny to her testimony compared to the Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while there was at least one factual error in the reasons, it did not amount to a material misapprehension of the evidence.

The sentence appeal on the obstruct police charge was deemed moot.