David H. Doherty

The appellant appealed her convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and applied unbalanced scrutiny to her testimony compared to the Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while there was at least one factual error in the reasons, it did not amount to a material misapprehension of the evidence.

The sentence appeal on the obstruct police charge was deemed moot.

The Crown appealed an 18-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting his wife and assaulting his wife and children over a period of years.

The sentencing judge had considered the cultural impact of the family's move from Iran to Canada as a factor in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that cultural practices that are criminal in Canada do not mitigate criminal conduct, particularly in domestic violence cases.

Finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit and noting the respondent's lack of remorse, the Court increased the global sentence to four years and ordered the respondent's reincarceration.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction over their claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract against the respondent banks.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the contract was entered into in St. Kitts and the tort was completed there, meaning Ontario lacked presumptive connecting factors.

The Court also agreed with the motion judge's forum non conveniens analysis that St. Kitts was the appropriate forum, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from an order refusing to strike fraud allegations in the Statement of Defence.

The appellant conceded that the order appealed from was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant mother appealed a Hague Convention return order requiring the parties' child to be returned to Australia following a finding of wrongful retention in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge made no reviewable error in rejecting the claim that the respondent father consented or acquiesced through a custody agreement, in declining to entertain an unargued grave-risk defence under Article 13(b), and in finding the Article 12 settled-environment defence unavailable because the Hague application was commenced within one year of wrongful retention.

The appeal was dismissed, subject only to a variation extending the expiry date in one paragraph of the order.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal after a sexual assault conviction, relying on fresh expert evidence that he was in a parasomnic state and should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court applied the fresh evidence framework under s. 683(1) of the Criminal Code and held that, although the proposed defence was raised only after trial and first appeal, the evidence was legally admissible, sufficiently cogent, and not barred by any tactical failure at trial.

Competing expert opinions created a live evidentiary issue that a reasonable trier of fact could resolve in favour of the appellant on a balance of probabilities.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The new trial was limited to determining whether the appellant was NCR-MD or guilty.

Following the release of the court's decision on the appeal, the parties filed written submissions regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs in favour of the successful respondent in the amount of $20,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable on a guarantee for unpaid rent under a commercial lease.

The appellant argued that documents were tampered with, the trial judge was biased, and a breach of the lease's exclusivity provision relieved him of his obligation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of tampering or bias, and agreeing with the trial judge that any breach of the exclusivity provision was independent of the obligation to pay rent and the guarantee.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned without costs.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict finding it liable for injuries sustained by the respondent child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's verdict was reasonable as the appellant's failure to train staff in child supervision provided a basis for finding a breach of the duty of care.

The court also found no ambiguity in the jury's answers regarding causation when given a full and liberal reading.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action on a summary judgment motion, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing to further adjourn the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the refusal to adjourn was a reasonable exercise of discretion given the history of the claim and a previous adjournment granted at the appellants' request.

The action was properly dismissed under Rule 20.

The appellant church operated a homeless shelter in its basement.

The respondent municipality sought an injunction to stop the shelter, arguing it violated the local zoning by-law which permitted 'church' uses but prohibited soup kitchens and food banks.

The application judge granted the injunction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in his interpretation of the by-law.

The Court found that the homeless shelter fell within the by-law's definition of 'church-sponsored community activities and projects'.

The appeal was allowed and the injunction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a restricted firearm, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to set aside his guilty pleas prior to sentencing.

He claimed he lacked the cognitive capacity to understand the pleas due to medical issues and that he received ineffective assistance from both his original trial counsel and the counsel who brought the application to set aside the pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the 'limited cognitive capacity' test and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant was convicted of a multi-million dollar fraud arising from an investment scheme.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that a forensic accountant employed by the OSC should have been disqualified from testifying due to bias, and that his pre-trial Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was improperly dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's evidence was primarily factual tracing and his prior involvement did not automatically disqualify him.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the Rowbotham application, as the appellant had failed to be transparent about his financial resources.

The appellant was convicted of a large-scale, complex fraud and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with a $100,000 restitution order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning, noting that denunciation and deterrence are dominant for such offences.

However, based on sealed material regarding post-sentence events, the parties consented to a sentence reduction.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to three years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in characterizing his relationship with the complainant as exploitative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was fully justified given the appellant was 11 years older, acted as the complainant's drug supplier and street protector, and took advantage of the resulting power imbalance.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the death of his domestic partner, whose body was never found.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the appellant's sister, to whom he confessed and who helped him dispose of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the jury instructions were flawed regarding post-offence conduct, his confession, the lack of a Vetrovec warning, and the manslaughter charge, and that a mistrial should have been ordered due to prejudicial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's instructions and mid-trial cautions adequate to ensure a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his step-daughter while she was sleeping.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his testimony due to its lack of clarity and in drawing an unreasonable inference that his admitted 'thoughts' about the complainant were sexual in nature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment and inferences were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to touch for a sexual purpose against his five-year-old great-niece, as well as possession of child pornography.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior consistent statements and the use of the child pornography evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the prior statements but held the trial judge erred by failing to expressly instruct the jury that the child pornography evidence could not be used to determine guilt on the sexual abuse charges.

The convictions for the sexual offences were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for possession of child pornography was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to time served after applying the correct pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action to set aside three inter vivos monetary transfers and a testamentary bequest of Canada Savings Bonds made by his late father to the respondent, his sister.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding sufficient corroborating evidence to rebut the presumptions of resulting trust and undue influence, and that the testamentary gift adeemed when the bonds were placed in a joint account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the father had donative capacity, was not subject to undue influence, and intended the transfers as gifts.

The Court also found the bonds did not adeem as they were never endorsed by the father and remained registered in his name.