David H. Doherty

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which mandates lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence.

The appellant argued the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate.

The court held that conviction of multiple sexual offences is a reasonable proxy for enhanced risk of re-offending, and that the modest impact on liberty is proportionate to the important objective of public safety.

Appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellant's action for misuse of confidential information and spoliation.

The appellant alleged that the respondent West Face Capital Inc. improperly obtained and used confidential information about the appellant's bid to acquire WIND Mobile Inc., allegedly obtained from a former employee who moved to West Face.

The trial judge dismissed all claims, finding that the appellant failed to prove that confidential information was provided to West Face or that any such information was used in West Face's successful competing bid.

The trial judge also found that the appellant's choice to terminate negotiations due to a break fee demand, rather than West Face's competing bid, caused the failure of the appellant's acquisition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment and dismissed the appeal, as well as the application for leave to appeal the costs orders.

The appellant displayed a sign reading "Trump is right.

Fuck China.

Fuck Mexico" in Grand View Plaza within Niagara Parks.

The Niagara Parks Police issued a summons for violations of section 2(9)(a) of Ontario Regulation 829 under the Niagara Parks Act, which prohibits abusive or insulting language that interferes with the use and enjoyment of the parks.

The appellant was also issued an oral trespass notice.

The application judge dismissed the constitutional challenge.

On appeal, the court held that while section 2(9)(a) does limit freedom of expression under the Charter, the limitation is justified under section 1.

However, the court found that the trespass notice was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's political expression.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants were successful in overturning orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondents had been successful on the main issue regarding whether a possible third party claim constituted a chose in action that vested in the Trustee in Bankruptcy.

However, the appellants were successful in obtaining the right to have the issue of whether they should be allowed to advance third party claims heard and determined within the section 37 application.

The court found divided success on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's finding that the purchaser (241 Ontario) had actual notice of a defect in the power of sale process.

The trial judge had conflated actual knowledge with constructive knowledge, finding that receipt of information suggesting the need for inquiry constituted actual notice.

The appellate court clarified that actual notice requires actual knowledge of the defect itself, not merely knowledge of facts that might prompt inquiry.

The court held that 241 Ontario was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and could rely on the protections of the Land Titles Act.

The court also found that sections 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act do not limit the right to rely on registration under the Land Titles Act, and that these provisions provide complementary methods of protecting bona fide purchasers.

The post-sale mortgagees' interests were upheld, and Ginkgo's mortgage was found to be valid.

The respondent brought an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration in writing.

The court awarded costs to the responding parties, rejecting the moving party's argument that costs should be modest because the motion was made in writing.

The court found that the 18.6 hours spent by counsel responding to the motion was reasonable, as the motion required a review of materials filed on the appeal and arguments made at the hearing.

Costs were fixed at $8,249, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

A condominium corporation issued a clean status certificate to the respondent when he purchased a unit in 2013.

When the respondent requested a new status certificate in 2016 to market the unit for sale, the corporation noted that the unit layout had been altered without Board consent, contrary to the declaration.

The respondent sought a declaration that the corporation was estopped from noting such matters in the subsequent certificate.

The application judge granted the relief sought, finding the corporation bound by its earlier clean certificate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while the corporation is bound by its earlier certificate as against the original purchaser, it is not estopped from disclosing newly discovered matters in subsequent certificates.

The corporation's obligation to disclose material information to prospective purchasers overrides any estoppel argument.

The respondent brought a motion to quash an appeal on the ground that the order under appeal was interlocutory and not final, placing it outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.

The order arose from ongoing family law proceedings and required the appellant to make monthly spousal and child support payments, with a provision allowing the respondent to strike the appellant's pleadings on financial issues if payments were not made.

The appellant argued he could not pay and that the consequence clause created a "catch 22" preventing his participation in ongoing proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory and quashed the appeal, finding the jurisdictional issue was plain and obvious.

The appellant, a commercial condominium unit owner, sought to amend the condominium declaration to allow its employees access to recreational common elements (swimming pool, gymnasium, library, squash court) that were restricted to dwelling unit holders and their guests.

The application judge dismissed the application, holding that restrictions on the use of common elements need not be listed in Schedule F of the declaration under the Condominium Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the statutory provisions or his use of the zoning by-law to explain the declaration's proper interpretation.

The appellant, Solstice Two Limited, appealed a decision granting relief from forfeiture to the respondent, Valeria Scicluna, who had advanced $293,685 toward the purchase of a condominium but failed to close due to job loss.

The application judge awarded the recovered funds to the bankruptcy trustee rather than to Scicluna.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the relief from forfeiture as appropriate given the grossly disproportionate nature of the forfeiture and confirming that the funds properly vest in the bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding their right of access to waterfront property through membership in Cedar Ridge Waterfront Park Corporation (CRRC).

The motion judge found a common intention that lot purchasers would have water access through CRRC membership.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the right of access was contractual in nature, not an easement or easement by estoppel.

The court found that the documentation and circumstances were inconsistent with the creation of an easement, including the requirement to assign membership to subsequent purchasers and the absence of typical easement indicia such as metes and bounds descriptions.

Two consolidated appeals concerning whether a claim for contribution and indemnity represents property of a bankrupt that vests in the Trustee under section 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and whether a bankrupt can advance such a claim when the Trustee refuses to do so and a creditor has obtained a lifting of the stay of proceedings.

The appellants sought to issue third party claims for contribution and indemnity against a co-defendant.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the claim constituted property vested in the Trustee and that the undischarged bankrupt lacked capacity to deal with it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a claim for contribution and indemnity is property under the BIA and that the motion judge erred in failing to consider relief under section 37 of the BIA.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation.

The central issue was whether police lawfully detained the appellant and his luggage for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes pending the arrival of a drug-sniffer dog, based on a confidential informant's tip.

The trial judge found the detention reasonable; the Court of Appeal found it violated the appellant's Charter rights under section 9 but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant also appealed his 12-month sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating him as a repeat offender and failing to apply sentencing principles for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made an error but upheld the sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offence charges on the basis that the trial judge erred in denying two s. 11(b) Charter applications regarding unreasonable delay.

The first application was decided under the Morin test, and the second under the Jordan test.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in calculating the delay period and in assessing the relevant factors.

The trial judge incorrectly attributed delay to the defence when much of it was attributable to Crown disclosure practices and procedural issues.

The properly calculated delay of over 17 months substantially exceeded the Morin guideline of 8-10 months for provincial trials.

The case was not complex, and the prejudice to the accused was not modest as the trial judge had found.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and the proceedings were stayed.

The Ontario Provincial Police and the Crown appealed an order by Nordheimer J. determining that certain materials seized under a search warrant were subject to litigation privilege and therefore not potentially evidence in any criminal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that the order affected the enforcement or implementation of the search warrant, which is a judicial order made in a criminal investigation.

The court determined that judicial orders directed at the enforcement or implementation of a criminal order are themselves criminal in nature.

Consequently, no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal in a criminal proceeding under the Courts of Justice Act, and the appeal was quashed.

The respondent sought leave to appeal a bankruptcy proposal order.

The court found the appeal moot because the debt to the moving party had been paid in full, eliminating the subject matter of the bankruptcy proceeding.

The court also determined there was no right of appeal under the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent's argument regarding prospective effect of the order was rejected, as counsel for the moving party acknowledged that the relevant provision was spent and could not be relied upon for future indebtedness.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was transferred back to medium security prior to the extension of time being granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the current habeas corpus proceeding was the preferable forum to address the lawfulness of the appellant's present detention.

The appellant, a cocaine dealer, was arrested in possession of a loaded semi-automatic Ruger pistol, cocaine, and cash.

He was convicted of firearm and drug-related offences after a trial by judge alone.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on Charter grounds, arguing that police violated his rights to be free from arbitrary detention and unreasonable search when they entered a private backyard without permission.

The majority (Doherty and Brown JJ.A.) upheld the convictions, finding the police entry lawful under the implied licence doctrine and the detention justified by reasonable suspicion.

Lauwers J.A. dissented, finding the police entry unlawful and the detention arbitrary, and would have excluded the evidence and acquitted the appellant.

The appellant was convicted at trial of being an accessory after the fact to murder, obstructing police, and public mischief.

She appealed only the accessory conviction.

The trial judge found that the Crown had failed to prove that Joshua Barreira, the alleged principal, was guilty of murder.

However, rather than acquitting the appellant, the trial judge convicted her on the basis that she had assisted Chad Davidson (the actual shooter) by serving as a witness to his wedding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the conviction was based on a theory of liability that fell outside the scope of the indictment, which was limited to the appellant's conduct in relation to Joshua Barreira.

The court entered an acquittal.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was reclassified back to medium security and subsequently released on parole while the appeal was pending.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issues sought to be raised were not properly raised before the application judge and that attempting to expand upon the legal principles established in Mission Institution v. Khela without a proper factual foundation would provide limited assistance.