Charles William Hourigan

The appellants attempted to appeal an interlocutory order of the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, noting that it lacked jurisdiction because there is no right of appeal from an interlocutory order of the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal, with or without leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a full indemnity basis due to the contractual terms of the loan and the appellants having prior notice of the jurisdictional issue.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, arguing the trial judge failed to scrutinize the complainant's evidence with the same rigour as his own.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not unfairly reject the appellant's evidence and was entitled to accept the complainant's explanation for her incremental disclosure.

The court concluded the trial judge's reasons were adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appellant, who was 16 at the time of the offence, appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence that he suffered from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), arguing it affected his ability to foresee the consequences of stabbing the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence lacked the cogency to affect the verdict, as the expert could not conclude the FASD impacted the appellant's state of mind at the time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the fresh evidence did not alter the appellant's moral blameworthiness or the appropriateness of the adult sentence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety.

The Court also found the Board's decision to detain the appellant on a secure unit rather than a general unit or via a hybrid order was reasonable given concerns about her risk of going AWOL and assaultive behaviour.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the appellant's efforts to improve his condition but dismissed the appeal as moot because the Board had since issued a later disposition.

The appellant sued a police officer, alleging he suffered damages due to the officer's false testimony in a criminal trial where the appellant was ultimately acquitted.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis and noting there was no basis to conclude the appellant suffered damages from testimony on a collateral issue.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for malicious prosecution against the respondents.

The trial judge had found that the appellant failed to establish the elements of malicious prosecution, specifically that the respondents, rather than the Crown, made the decision to prosecute.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the law or apprehension of the evidence, noting that her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not meet either branch of the test for leave to appeal under R. v. R.(R.).

The publication ban on the complainant's identity was continued.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on an icy, sloped municipal boulevard connecting to a private driveway.

She argued the municipality owed a higher standard of maintenance because pedestrians occasionally cross there, and that the adjacent property owner was an occupier of the boulevard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the municipality's maintenance standard was for vehicles, not pedestrians, and the adjacent owner did not exercise control over the boulevard to qualify as an occupier.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action regarding the stigma of a haunted property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate given the lack of direct evidence of economic loss or strange occurrences at the property.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment on a mortgage and a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mortgage enforcement but referred a $5,000 default fee to a Master.

The court set aside the default judgment on the promissory note, directing that it be pursued in Small Claims Court.

The appellant was granted a one-month stay of enforcement to allow for refinancing.

The appellant, a former senior officer and director of a publicly held waste management firm, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and his sentence of eight years' imprisonment, a US $17.9 million restitution order, and a US $15.5 million fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from his undisclosed involvement in copper trading transactions that diverted millions of dollars from his employer to companies he controlled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on the duty to disclose, responses to jury questions, or the overall balance of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court affirming the fitness of the sentence and the appropriateness of the restitution and fine orders, subject only to a clarification that restitution payments would be credited against the fine to prevent double recovery.

The appellant appealed a discretionary order of the motion judge who denied an adjournment after allowing counsel to be removed from the record and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the claim was clearly statute-barred and there was no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his s. 15 Charter violation and racial profiling allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant had not sought a specific Charter remedy at trial.

Furthermore, the trial judge's rejection of the racial profiling claim was based on credibility findings that were open to her on the evidence.

The appellants appealed an interim order that allowed condominium owners with outstanding parking assessments to vote at an upcoming Annual General Meeting.

The motion judge made the order to facilitate the meeting after finding the appellants in breach of a previous production order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the interim order suspended the determination of the underlying liability issue and fell within the motion judge's broad discretion under section 134(3)(c) of the Condominium Act.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's debt would be released by his discharge from bankruptcy.

The respondent had acted as a 'straw borrower' and co-signed a mortgage application, unaware that the primary borrower had made fraudulent misrepresentations.

The appellant argued the debt should survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act due to false pretences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 178(1)(e) requires a causal connection between the bankrupt's false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation and the obtaining of the property.

The trial judge correctly found the mortgage funds were advanced based on the primary borrower's misrepresentations, not the respondent's.

The Children's Lawyer and other appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to appoint an independent trustee for an inter vivos spousal trust.

The appellants alleged that the respondents, who were directors of the corporation wholly owned by the trust, committed a breach of trust by declaring dividends in excess of net income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents' actions as directors were governed by the Business Corporations Act, not the trust agreement, and did not constitute a breach of trust.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence and upheld the application judge's order that costs be paid out of the estate.

The Crown brought a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal of the respondent's acquittals.

The proposed appeal was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a post-judgment conversation between the trial judge and the investigating officer.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that although the Crown initially pursued the wrong remedy, there was an arguable appeal on the merits and no undue prejudice to the respondent.

The interests of justice favoured allowing the appeal to proceed.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting the developer's application for declarations that the appellants were bound by agreements of purchase and sale for two hotel investment condominium units, and dismissing the appellants' application for a refund of deposits.

The appellants argued that changes to the building, including a reduction from 70 to 60 stories and changes to PATH access, constituted material changes under the Condominium Act, entitling them to rescission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the May 2012 disclosure statement was a revised statement under s. 74(3) of the Act and that the changes were not material changes under the objective standard in s. 74(2), as they did not reasonably affect the value of the units for investment purposes.

In a criminal appeal motion, the applicant sought an order compelling a trial witness to attend and provide a voice sample for use by a defence expert in support of an anticipated fresh evidence application.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code authorizes production of existing material connected with the proceedings, not the creation of new material.

It further held that s. 683(1)(b) permits compelling a compellable witness to attend and be examined as a witness, but not to assist in creating material for expert analysis.

The motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.