Charles William Hourigan

The appellants, indigenous Ecuadorian villagers, obtained a multi-billion dollar judgment in Ecuador against the respondent corporation for environmental pollution.

They brought an action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the judgment against the corporation and its Canadian subsidiary.

The motion judge found that Ontario had jurisdiction but stayed the action on his own initiative, finding the corporation had no assets in Ontario and the corporate veil of the subsidiary could not be pierced.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the motion judge erred in granting an unrequested discretionary stay and prematurely deciding the merits of the enforcement action.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, confirming that a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of the litigation and Ontario is not required to establish jurisdiction for an action to enforce a foreign judgment.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision denying her claim against her group disability insurer for benefits.

She argued the insurer had a common law duty to inform her directly of a potential claim, and that the limitation period should not run until they did so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no such common law duty exists for group disability insurers in these circumstances, and noting the insurer had complied with the statutory notification obligations under the Insurance Act.

The respondent, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a declaration that he could apply for a ministerial review of his conviction under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code without first seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding that the Minister of Justice is not precluded from determining that an applicant has exhausted their rights of appeal despite not applying for leave to the SCC.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed, and the respondent cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, agreeing with the application judge's analysis.

The appellant appealed a jury award of $114,216.44 arising from a motor vehicle collision, arguing the trial judge made several errors including admitting a WSIB statement of claim, failing to strike the jury due to improper cross-examination, and providing an inadequate jury charge.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's costs award regarding disbursements incurred after a Rule 49 settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice in the trial's conduct and insufficient evidence on the record to prove an error in the costs award.

The appellant homeowner made a claim against his insurer for flood damage, submitting a proof of loss without supporting documentation.

The insurer invoked the statutory appraisal process and successfully moved for an order compelling the appellant to submit to an examination under oath and produce documentation.

The appellant appealed, arguing the appraisal process extinguished the insurer's right to examine him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appraisal process does not oust the insurer's contractual right to examine the insured, and the court has inherent jurisdiction to make procedural orders to give effect to the statutory scheme.

The appellants appealed from a judgment dismissing their action and declaring the appellant a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons and conclusions of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants, two former doctoral students, appealed an order striking their 187-page Statement of Claim as an abuse of process without leave to amend.

They conceded the original claim was properly struck but argued they should have been granted leave to file a narrower amended claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision, as the proposed claims were an indirect attempt to appeal internal academic decisions that should be addressed through judicial review.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

EllisDon applied for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision that admitted a photocopy of a 1958 working agreement and found the unions were estopped from enforcing it for only two years.

The Divisional Court held that the OLRB erred in law by admitting the document as a business record or ancient document without assessing its reliability.

Furthermore, the Court found that the OLRB's decision to limit the estoppel to two years was unreasonable, as EllisDon had permanently lost the opportunity to seek a legislative solution.

The Court quashed the OLRB's decision and dismissed the unions' grievances, ruling the estoppel must be permanent.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous operation causing death following a fatal motor vehicle collision involving a tractor‑trailer.

He brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of several categories of evidence, including statements made at the collision scene, driving logs and related trucking documents seized from the vehicle, a videotaped police interview, and derivative evidence.

The court held that statements made to the first officer at the scene were compelled accident‑report statements under the Highway Traffic Act and therefore protected by use immunity pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter.

However, although police breached s. 8 by unlawfully searching the truck cab and seizing driving logs, the evidence was admitted after applying the Grant factors because the privacy interest was minimal and the evidence was reliable and important.

The court also rejected arguments that the logs engaged s. 7 self‑incrimination protections or that the later interview breached s. 10(b).

The Crown appealed a sentence for impaired driving where the sentencing judge refused to allow the Crown to file a Notice of Increased Penalty for a repeat offender.

The sentencing judge had unilaterally gathered transcripts from other cases to conclude the Crown's practice was inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by reviewing the reasonableness of the prosecutorial discretion and by impermissibly gathering evidence.

Applying the appellate framework, the court found no abuse of process or Charter violation in the Crown's decision to file the notice, and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 30 days' incarceration.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault against a young man whom he had groomed.

The Crown sought 15 to 18 months' incarceration, while the defence sought 8 months.

The court sentenced the offender to 9 months' incarceration to be served concurrently, followed by 3 years of probation, along with a lifetime SOIRA order, a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The landlords appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing their claims for property damage, including a mould problem.

The Board found that the landlords failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the tenants caused the problems.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's conclusion was a finding of fact and that appeals from the Board are restricted to questions of law under section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing an action as abandoned, extend time for service of the statement of claim, and amend the claim to include a claim for accident benefits.

The court applied the contextual approach outlined by the Court of Appeal regarding Rule 37.14 motions and considered factors such as explanation for delay, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the delay in serving the claim was minimal and attributable to the plaintiff being unrepresented while attempting to retain counsel.

The plaintiff did not receive the dismissal notice due to a court addressing error and moved promptly once aware of the dismissal.

As no actual prejudice to the defendants was demonstrated, the registrar’s dismissal order was set aside and the amendment permitted.

The Crown appealed acquittals on two assault counts arising from incidents involving the accused and his mother.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant’s credibility and found the assaults technically made out but declined to convict, applying the principle of de minimis non curat lex and considering the accused’s prior custody and the complainant’s pursuit of mental health interventions.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred in law by treating the assaults as trivial, misapplying the de minimis principle, and by considering irrelevant factors such as pre-trial custody and the complainant’s earlier attempts to address the situation through the mental health system.

The court set aside the acquittals and entered convictions on the remaining assault counts.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to sexual assault and breach of probation.

The offender restrained the complainant with handcuffs, filmed part of the assault, and forced sexual intercourse while already bound by a probation order for a prior sexual assault conviction.

The court considered aggravating factors including the videotaping of the offence, the physical restraint of the complainant, the prior sexual assault conviction, and the breach of probation.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court held that these circumstances warranted a sentence above the typical range.

A penitentiary sentence of 54 months for sexual assault and 6 months concurrent for breach of probation was imposed, along with ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA registration, forfeiture of offence-related property, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff bank.

The court considered whether the motion was brought promptly, whether the default had a plausible explanation, and whether the defendant demonstrated an arguable defence on the merits.

The defendant admitted service but explained her failure to respond by reference to involvement in other litigation, which the court held did not constitute a reasonable explanation.

The court further found that the proposed defences relating to alleged loan agreement defaults, account transfers, and excessive costs did not raise arguable issues.

Concluding that the interests of justice did not favour relief, the court dismissed the motion.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault against a 14-year-old complainant.

The court found that the accused groomed the complainant by providing him with marihuana, cigarettes, and a place to stay, thereby establishing a position of trust.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as incredible and internally inconsistent, applying the W.(D.) test.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence for narcotics offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He argued that the Information to Obtain relied on a confidential informant whose information was not compelling, credible, or sufficiently corroborated and contained misleading or prejudicial material.

The court held that the informant’s information was detailed, first‑hand, and supported by prior reliability and police corroboration through surveillance and database checks.

The issuing justice had reasonable and probable grounds to authorize the warrant and no breach of s. 8 of the Charter was established.

In any event, applying the Grant framework, the evidence would not be excluded because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and central to the prosecution.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his wife during a period of marital breakdown.

The complainant alleged that the accused forced himself upon her, while the accused testified that the sexual encounter was consensual and initiated by the complainant.

Applying the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, the trial judge found inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding her 9-1-1 call and initial statements to police.

The court concluded it could not resolve the conflicting evidence, leaving a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interim interlocutory injunction seeking to preserve rights under a motor fuel supply agreement with the defendants.

The agreement permitted termination without notice where the plaintiff failed to make required payments.

The court applied the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.) and found that the plaintiff failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, given repeated breaches of the agreement including numerous NSF payments and failure to meet contractual obligations.

The court further held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured relief, particularly where alternative fuel suppliers could be obtained and evidence of business collapse was speculative.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendants.