Charles William Hourigan

The appellants, a law firm and its partners, were sued for damages arising from the allegedly improper appointment of a lawyer as a committee of a client's person and estate, and from the allegedly negligent administration of the client's estate.

The appellants' professional liability insurer argued that the allegations constituted a single claim under the policy because they arose from 'related' errors, omissions, or negligent acts.

The application judge agreed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding that the two claims arose from errors, omissions, or negligent acts that were sufficiently different in nature and kind, and therefore were not 'related' within the meaning of the policy.

The appellants (Daimler Chrysler) appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed their motion to have the actions against them declared statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had relied on a police accident report that incorrectly identified the driver as the owner of the vehicle.

The true owner, Daimler Chrysler, was discovered during examinations for discovery, more than two years after the accident.

The motion judge found that the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence and the discoverability principle applied for the Limitations Act claims.

For the Trustee Act claims, the motion judge found special circumstances and no prejudice to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her application of the discoverability principle or the special circumstances test.

Following the dismissal of appeals and motions for leave to appeal regarding the appointment of a trustee for an inter vivos trust, the successful parties sought their costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the normal loser-pays regime applied to the appeals, rather than costs being paid out of the estate, as the uncertainty regarding the trust's administration had been resolved by the application judge.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful beneficiaries and full indemnity costs to the trustee, payable jointly and severally by the appellants.

The parties settled their matrimonial litigation in 2008 with a consent order providing for $3,000 monthly spousal support with no termination date.

In 2010, the respondent sought to terminate support and obtain child support, citing a decrease in his income and the appellant's unexplained accumulation of wealth.

The trial judge found a material change in circumstances, terminated spousal support, and ordered the appellant to pay child support.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a material change but found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the circumstances at the time of the original consent order, effectively rescinding rather than varying it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent purchased a residential property from the appellant and later discovered it had previously been used as a marijuana grow-op and contained mould.

The respondent successfully obtained partial summary judgment on liability.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment, finding that the motion judge's brief endorsement failed to provide any legal analysis or findings of fact regarding the existence of mould at the time of closing, thereby preventing meaningful appellate review.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order requiring them to pay an additional $528,113 pursuant to a settlement agreement.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in accepting the evidence of the respondents' expert accountant regarding management fees, professional fees, and benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings or his decision to prefer the expert's evidence over that of an interested party, especially since the appellants did not object to the report's admissibility or file their own expert report.

The appellants purchased a commercial property that was later discovered to be contaminated.

They sued the vendor for failing to disclose the contamination and their real estate lawyer for negligence.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, finding that the purchaser actually knew about the contamination before waiving the environmental condition and closing the transaction, and had instructed the lawyer not to order further reports.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and findings of fact.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment awarding a 20-year employee 22 months' pay in lieu of notice.

The employer argued the motion judge was bound by stare decisis to follow a similar Superior Court decision that awarded 13 months.

The Court of Appeal rejected the stare decisis argument, noting Superior Court decisions are persuasive but not binding on other Superior Court judges.

However, the Court found the 22-month notice period excessive and reduced it to 18 months, less 11 weeks of working notice.

The motion judge's award of substantial indemnity costs was upheld due to the employer's unreasonable conduct on the motion.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring him to repay $195,538.98 to a joint line of credit and $10,000 to a corporate respondent, arising from funds withdrawn during matrimonial proceedings.

The appellant argued the repayment obligations had not matured and were tied to other outstanding financial issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the repayment obligations had matured based on the clear terms of the signed documents and the availability of funds, and that no triable issue was established.

The appellants appealed an order recognizing and enforcing in Ontario a German arbitral verdict.

They argued for the first time on appeal that a certified copy of the arbitral record was not before the application judge and that the enforcement order should not have been made.

The court held that the supporting affidavit attached a true copy of the duly certified translation of the arbitral verdict, together with the original verdict and translator’s affidavit, and that it was open to the application judge to accept that evidence as meeting article 35(2) of the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondent.

The appellant operated a property management business and appeared before the Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of property owners without a paralegal license.

The Law Society obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting him from providing legal services.

On appeal, the appellant argued he was a 'landlord' under the Residential Tenancies Act and thus entitled to self-represent.

The Court of Appeal held that even if he met the definition of a landlord, he was providing legal services to third parties and had no right to self-represent under the Law Society Act.

The appeal was dismissed, but the injunction was narrowed to allow him to appear before the board only when he is the actual owner of the property.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that found a cohabitation agreement invalid but upheld the validity of subsequent Minutes of Settlement regarding spousal support.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Minutes were negotiated with independent legal advice and were not unconscionable.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also refused, as the trial judge properly exercised her discretion considering divided success and the parties' financial circumstances.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his claims against the respondent university.

The appellant conceded his original statement of claim could not stand but argued he should have been granted leave to amend it to plead breach of contract for the university's failure to graduate him in 2004.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the proposed amendment would entirely recast the claim, which originally focused on academic marks and unfair treatment.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal resolved the matter on consent, directing it to proceed as per the signed order, noting that no other agreements had been reached regarding the property.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claims against former directors, officers, and consultants of a corporation in which he invested.

The motion judge found the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the appellant knew the material facts more than two years before asserting the claims and that the proposed amendments advanced new causes of action unconnected to the original pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention on a secure forensic unit.

He argued the Board erred by rejecting a hybrid disposition that would have allowed discretion to transfer him to a general forensic unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that a hybrid disposition was premature to be reasonable given the early stages of the appellant's treatment.

Although the Board improperly relied on the appellant's request for an absolute discharge to buttress its findings, the error was of no consequence.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2002 but did not commence an action until 2011.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred, finding that a reasonable person would have investigated the ongoing back pain and discovered the serious and permanent nature of the injury well before 2009.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusion on discoverability and noting the appellant adduced no evidence of individual characteristics that would have prevented her from discovering the claim earlier.

The self-represented appellant failed to appear for his appeal, which had been adjourned multiple times and made peremptory to him.

He requested a further adjournment by email on the morning of the hearing, claiming he thought it was scheduled for the following day.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment, finding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

After reviewing the filed materials, the Court dismissed the appeal on its merits and awarded $1,000 in costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to extend the time to appeal a Crown wardship order regarding her 14-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no explanation for the lengthy delay, no merit to the appeal, and that it was not in the best interests of the child, who had been placed for adoption, to upset her current arrangements.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred by not permitting him to address the court before sentencing and by finding a conditional sentence inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to allow the appellant to speak was an inadvertent procedural error that would not have changed the outcome, as the judge was already aware of his remorse.

The court further found the sentence was fit given the monetary amount, breach of trust, and lengthy duration of the fraud.