Charles William Hourigan

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim against a family physician for alleged negligence in prenatal care that resulted in the infant appellant being born with cerebral palsy.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in rejecting their theories that the mother suffered from pre-eclampsia or elevated blood pressure, and that the physician was negligent in failing to induce labour or refer her to an obstetrician.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings that the physician met the standard of care and that the appellants failed to prove causation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Crown conceded that if the fresh evidence was accepted, the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal found that the fresh evidence met the Palmer criteria, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a jury inquiry or declare a mistrial after the jury reported feeling uncomfortable because the appellant parked in the same area as them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that the presumption of juror impartiality was not displaced and that an inquiry or mistrial was unnecessary.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim following the death of a mother from post-partum haemorrhaging hours after a caesarean section.

The trial judge found that while one anaesthetist breached the standard of care by failing to promptly notify an obstetrician of the patient's deteriorating condition, this breach did not cause her death, which the judge attributed to an untreatable blockage in her lung caused by disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the cause of death and lack of causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding errors.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's cause of death theory was unsupported by the evidence and not advanced by either party.

The respondent, a former equity partner of the appellant accounting firm, withdrew from the partnership to join a competitor.

The partnership agreement required a withdrawing partner to pay liquidated damages equal to two times their 'Permanent Capital'.

The appellants argued the permanent capital should be based on the partner's 'Anchor Capital' which included shareholder loans, while the respondent argued it was limited to the $10,000 fixed in his capital account following a capital conversion.

The trial judge agreed with the respondent, fixing liquidated damages at $20,000 and ordering the appellants to repay the respondent's shareholder loan and other entitlements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the partnership agreement, finding no palpable and overriding error, but allowed the appeal in part to set aside a small award for management fees that lacked evidentiary support.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual and related offences arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's utterances during a later seizure-like episode as independent corroboration, because they were not admissible for the truth of their contents under the hearsay and prior consistent statement rules.

The court further held that the Crown expert's opinion linking the episode to the alleged assault was inadmissible because it exceeded the expert's qualifications and depended on unproven foundational facts.

As the impugned evidence was central to the credibility assessment, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged Canada's assent to changes to the royal succession rules, arguing that the continued exclusion of Roman Catholics from the throne violated s. 15 of the Charter and seeking declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the application, holding that the succession rules form part of the constitution of Canada and cannot be amended or overridden by the Charter.

The court further held that the appellant lacked both private standing and public interest standing, and rejected the argument that standing had been admitted through a failure to respond to a notice to admit.

The appeal, including the appeal on costs, was dismissed, with appeal costs fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

The appellant mother appealed an order dismissing her appeal from a child protection disposition making the child a Crown ward without access.

She alleged numerous palpable and overriding errors relating to the child’s behavioural problems, her parenting abilities, mental health, judgment, and the child’s dietary needs, and argued material evidence had been ignored.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge gave extensive and considered reasons, that any misstatements did not amount to palpable and overriding error, and that the evidence of the infant mental health counsellor had been considered.

Applying a deferential standard of review in child welfare matters, the court found no basis to interfere.

The appellants appealed an order striking their negligence claim against former criminal defence counsel as an abuse of process.

The court held the civil action was plainly a collateral attack on criminal convictions that had remained undisturbed on appeal.

To succeed, the appellants would have had to prove that, but for counsel's negligence, the accused would have been acquitted, thereby re-litigating the criminal charges and undermining the integrity of the adjudicative process.

The court held that allegations of ineffective assistance generally should be pursued by direct attack within the criminal proceeding, not through a separate civil action.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In an extradition appeal, the court issued a brief endorsement addressing whether a publication ban imposed by the extradition judge during the hearing extended to the court's previously released decision.

The court held that, whether explicitly or implicitly, the ban was subject to further order of the court.

It declined to apply the ban to the appeal decision and confirmed that the decision could be published.

This was a costs endorsement arising from an appeal concerning costs at first instance on a motion for summary judgment.

After receiving written submissions from counsel, the court ordered that those costs be costs in the cause.

The amount was not fixed by the appellate court and was left to the summary judgment judge or trial judge, as the case may be.

The appellant, a young person convicted of manslaughter, challenged the constitutionality of s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied legal aid and state-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 684 is an ameliorative, case-specific mechanism that does not infringe the equality guarantee in s. 15 and does not violate ss. 7, 10(b), or 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that where liberty interests are engaged, state-funded appeal counsel may be constitutionally required only when necessary to make the right of appeal meaningful and effective.

Requiring an indigent appellant to demonstrate an arguable appeal for appointment of counsel to present the appeal is not unfair.

The appellant challenged reassessments imposing Ontario corporate income tax and corporate minimum tax on interest received under specialty debt instruments created through an inter-corporate refinancing designed to reduce provincial tax.

The court held the interest was income from property, not income from business, because the appellant's activity was minimal and the debt instruments were not employed or risked in any separate business.

Applying GAAR principles, the court found that even if the transactions generated a tax benefit or constituted avoidance transactions, they were not abusive because the statutory scheme deliberately distinguished between business income and property income for foreign-incorporated corporations with an Ontario permanent establishment.

The court also held the specialty debt instruments were not property situated in Canada because, under the settled common law situs rule, specialty debts are located where the instruments are physically found, here the British Virgin Islands.

The appeal was allowed and the reassessments were to be vacated.

The respondent, a former CEO and director of the appellant corporation, was removed from his position by shareholders.

He filed a claim for enhanced severance, a bonus, and a share appreciation rights (SAR) cancellation award under his management services agreement.

The trial judge found that the respondent breached his fiduciary duties by establishing the bonus and SAR cancellation awards for his own benefit, but still awarded him the enhanced severance, finding the breach did not constitute a default under the agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the corporation's appeal, holding that the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement ignored s. 134(3) of the Business Corporations Act and led to a commercially absurd result.

The respondent's breach of fiduciary duty constituted a default disentitling him to the enhanced severance.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal given the history of the proceedings and the absence of any merit in the appellant's claim.

Costs were awarded to each respondent.

The appellants loaned a valuable sculpture to the respondent art centre.

Years later, the sculpture was discovered to be severely damaged.

The appellants sued for negligence, breach of contract, and bailment.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and also obtained judgment on a counterclaim for storage costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in his factual findings regarding when the appellants first learned of the damage.

The Court set aside the summary judgment and the counterclaim judgment, allowing the action to proceed to trial.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment regarding a 1994 promissory note, arguing the trial judge failed to consider a 1983 agreement, a cancellation clause, the appropriate interest rate, and the principle of proportionality in costs.

The plaintiff cross-appealed on interest and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the note was clear on its face, the cancellation clause was inapplicable due to prior default, and the trial judge made no reversible error in exercising discretion over interest and costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault.

The trial judge had relied on what he characterized as admissions by the appellant to reinforce the complainant's credibility.

The Crown conceded on appeal that the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence, as the appellant had not made those admissions.

The Court of Appeal held that this error vitiated the findings of guilt, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant died prior to the appeal and no order to continue was obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without prejudice to the estate's right to take appropriate steps to revive it.

The parties, a same-sex couple, entered into a civil partnership in the United Kingdom when same-sex marriage was not permitted there.

After moving to Ontario and separating, the respondent sought a divorce and equalization under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act.

The appellant argued they were not spouses.

The motion judge declared the civil partnership a marriage under the Civil Marriage Act and the parties spouses under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation consistent with the modern approach to statutory interpretation and Charter values.