Charles William Hourigan

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent approximately $995,000 in damages plus $921,508 in costs for injuries sustained while riding a bicycle on a recreational path.

The respondent's bicycle struck an exposed metal bracket from a removed bollard, causing her to fall and sustain a brain injury.

The trial judge found the municipality solely liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act and awarded damages for lost income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, rejecting arguments regarding misinterpretation of the Act, failure to apply the but-for test, lack of jurisdiction regarding lost income damages, and failure to find contributory negligence.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs award.

The mother appealed a trial judge's decision awarding sole custody of two children to their father.

The children had resided with the father since 2010 when the Children's Aid Society placed them with him, and the mother had previously agreed to this arrangement in 2012.

At trial, the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported continued residence with the father.

The mother sought to introduce hearsay evidence of statements made by the children and a surreptitious recording, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding this evidence and in awarding sole custody based on the father's alleged inattention to medical needs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the exclusion of the hearsay evidence or the recording, and finding the trial judge's custody determination was thorough, sensitive, and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal costs was refused.

The appellants were found liable for condominium arrears following a trial.

Their appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful, as was their subsequent motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellants then brought a motion in the Superior Court under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside the judgment and obtain judgment in their favour.

The motion judge dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.02(1), fixing costs at $500.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the Rule 59.06(2) motion to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants sought relief that exceeded what was permissible on such a motion, and the set-off issue argument they raised had already been made at trial.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that permitted it to file a third amended statement of claim but precluded it from referring to five prior shipments or claiming damages in respect of those shipments.

The motion judge found that the limitation period had expired for the five prior shipments and that this constituted uncompensable prejudice, thus barring the amendment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, rejecting the appellant's arguments that the limitation period applies only to unrelated statute-barred claims and that new claims cannot be added to a claim already commenced.

The law firm sought reconsideration of the court's decision on its motion for a charging order or solicitor's lien.

The court denied the request for reconsideration, noting that the law firm had already addressed the merits of obtaining a charging order in its written submissions and that the test for a charging order and solicitor's lien is the same.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court decision upholding an Ontario Court of Justice decision dismissing his motion to appoint private counsel for his two children.

The appellant sought to have private counsel appointed to conduct an investigation into the children's wishes regarding access arrangements, similar to what the Office of the Children's Lawyer would do.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the children had been consulted by OCL counsel two years prior and had indicated no desire for change, that they were well-functioning and not exhibiting behavioral or academic issues, and that appointing counsel would not be in their best interests.

The Superior Court upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appointment of counsel for children is discretionary under the Family Law Rules and must focus on the best interests of the children, to which deference is owed to the motion judge's assessment.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including sexual assault and sexual exploitation against his former common law wife and her three daughters.

He appealed on five grounds: refusal to sever the sexual assault charge involving the adult complainant; refusal to allow him to sit at counsel table; improper application of the collateral fact rule; jury instructions on similar fact evidence; and failure to correct alleged impropriety in Crown's closing address.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some errors occurred, they were not material and did not result in an unfair trial.

The appellant sought to bring a class action against BP for secondary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act.

The motion judge found that eleven of fourteen alleged misrepresentations were statute-barred under the three-year limitation period in section 138.14 of the Act.

The appellant argued that section 138.3(6), which permits the court to treat multiple misrepresentations as a single misrepresentation, should extend the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 138.3(6) does not modify the event-triggered limitation period and was enacted to limit, not expand, liability.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to defend the respondents in an action arising from an ATV accident.

The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the ATV was not required to be insured as it was being operated on private property and did not fall under the definition of "automobile" in the OAP 1.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the pleadings alleged facts permitting a finding that the respondents were not occupiers of the property at the time of the accident, which was sufficient to trigger the insurer's duty to defend under the policy.

An appeal concerning the interpretation of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The respondent was convicted in the United States of conspiracy and fraud, sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, and ordered to pay a $26 million USD forfeiture money judgment.

American authorities discovered $9.2 million CAD in a Canadian bank account believed to belong to the respondent and obtained a restraint order.

The respondent appealed the motion judge's decision upholding the restraint order, arguing the funds were not proceeds of crime or offence-related property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that "proceeds of crime" should be interpreted broadly in the context of mutual legal assistance to respect differences in foreign legal systems and to fulfill Canada's international treaty obligations.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition finding that an NCR accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety and ordering a conditional discharge rather than an absolute discharge.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2002 for serious violent offences including aggravated assault, kidnapping, and assault with a weapon, argued the Board's finding was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the appellant poses a significant threat within the meaning of the Criminal Code, based on his serious index offences, ongoing psychiatric symptoms including paranoid delusions, lack of insight into his mental illness, substance abuse, and stated intention to discontinue medication if absolutely discharged.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which mandates lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence.

The appellant argued the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate.

The court held that conviction of multiple sexual offences is a reasonable proxy for enhanced risk of re-offending, and that the modest impact on liberty is proportionate to the important objective of public safety.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant appealed the decision of Justice James F. Diamond dated August 22, 2016, and the associated costs order dated September 27, 2016.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the costs submissions of both parties and determined that the respondent was entitled to costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $80,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court found no basis for awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

A law firm sought a charging order or solicitor's lien on funds awarded to its client in a successful civil action.

The client had recovered $390,000 in damages and $550,000 in costs at trial, with an additional $50,000 in costs awarded on appeal.

The law firm claimed $360,836.88 in unpaid fees and sought to secure this amount through either a charging order under the Solicitors Act or a lien under the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The client contested the amount owed and initiated an assessment process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while it had jurisdiction to grant such relief, the law firm failed to establish that the client was unable or unwilling to pay.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The trial judge found that the constable's demand for a breath sample violated section 8 of the Charter because the constable had not followed three procedures in the OPP manual for the Drager Alcotest 6810 device, and therefore could not have reasonably believed the device was functioning properly.

The trial judge excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no objective basis for the constable's belief that the device was functioning properly, and that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence under section 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault following a jury trial.

The offences involved two separate incidents with the appellant's stepdaughter when she was 13 years old and approximately 18 months later.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that evidence concerning one incident could not be used to support a finding of guilt on charges relating to the other incident.

The jury charge was deficient and confusing, creating a risk of propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered, and an acquittal was entered on the sexual exploitation count as the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's finding that the purchaser (241 Ontario) had actual notice of a defect in the power of sale process.

The trial judge had conflated actual knowledge with constructive knowledge, finding that receipt of information suggesting the need for inquiry constituted actual notice.

The appellate court clarified that actual notice requires actual knowledge of the defect itself, not merely knowledge of facts that might prompt inquiry.

The court held that 241 Ontario was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and could rely on the protections of the Land Titles Act.

The court also found that sections 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act do not limit the right to rely on registration under the Land Titles Act, and that these provisions provide complementary methods of protecting bona fide purchasers.

The post-sale mortgagees' interests were upheld, and Ginkgo's mortgage was found to be valid.

Appeal from a summary judgment decision enforcing settlement agreements between Mars Canada Inc. and the appellants regarding the sale of grey market Mars products in Canada.

The appellants challenged the enforceability of the settlement agreements as being in restraint of trade, the motion judge's jurisdiction to order a reference on damages, and the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the settlement agreements reasonable under the Tank Lining test, confirming the court's jurisdiction to order a reference under Rule 20.04(3) on summary judgment, and affirming the substantial indemnity costs award based on the appellants' reprehensible conduct.

An insurer (State Farm) sought to pursue a subrogated claim against fuel oil suppliers for contamination losses.

The central issue was whether the insurer could commence the action in the name of its bankrupt insured or whether it was required to proceed in the name of the trustee in bankruptcy.

The majority held that the insurer's subrogation rights do not create a proprietary interest in the cause of action itself, and that upon the insured's bankruptcy, the cause of action vested in the trustee.

Consequently, the insurer could not commence the action in the name of the undischarged bankrupt but should have proceeded in the trustee's name.

The majority dismissed the action.

A dissent would have remitted the matter to permit the insurer to regularize the action by substituting the trustee as plaintiff.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant fell asleep at the wheel while driving under the influence of alcohol, cannabis, and cocaine, causing a serious collision that injured two victims.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's arguments that the sentence was unfit, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered the relevant principles, the serious nature of the offence, the appellant's status as a novice driver, and the catastrophic consequences of the accident.

The appeal was dismissed.