Mark Repath

The plaintiff purchased a new Kia Sorento and subsequently claimed it had several defects, including a malfunctioning passenger seat warmer and adaptive cruise control.

He brought an action against the manufacturer and dealership for breach of contract and breach of the Sale of Goods Act, seeking rescission and damages.

The court dismissed the action, finding no breach of contract as the warranty covered the defects and the manufacturer eventually repaired them.

The court also found no breach of the Sale of Goods Act, as the vehicle was of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for its purpose, evidenced by the plaintiff driving it for over 170,000 kilometres.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion by the defendants to transfer an action from Perth to Oshawa.

The court found the defendants' requested costs of over $12,000 to be excessive for a straightforward, in-writing motion within a Simplified Procedure action.

The court awarded all-inclusive costs of $2,500, payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The defendants moved for an order transferring this action from Perth to Oshawa, arguing Oshawa was a significantly better venue due to the contract being entered there, vehicle servicing in Durham Region, and witness locations.

The plaintiff opposed, citing inconvenience for his family witnesses in the East Region.

The court applied Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure holistically, finding Oshawa significantly better given the transaction's nexus, service locations, and defendant witness locations, despite the plaintiff's current residence.

The motion was granted, transferring the action to Oshawa.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff's interpretation of the termination clause was without merit, that she caused unnecessary delays, and that she made unwarranted personal attacks on defense counsel.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's legal arguments plausible and her conduct as a self-represented litigant not reprehensible.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $54,313.45.

The plaintiff, a law clerk, was terminated without cause after 13 years of employment.

The employer provided her with her minimum entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, relying on a termination clause in her employment contract.

The plaintiff sued for wrongful dismissal, arguing the termination clause was invalid for failing to explicitly provide for the continuation of benefit plan contributions during the statutory notice period, or alternatively, that it was unconscionable.

The court held that the termination clause was legally enforceable as it incorporated the minimum statutory requirements by reference and did not attempt to contract out of the Act.

The action was dismissed.

In the alternative, the court found that had the clause been invalid, the plaintiff would have been entitled to nine months' common law notice and compensation for a lost bonus opportunity.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that permitted it to file a third amended statement of claim but precluded it from referring to five prior shipments or claiming damages in respect of those shipments.

The motion judge found that the limitation period had expired for the five prior shipments and that this constituted uncompensable prejudice, thus barring the amendment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, rejecting the appellant's arguments that the limitation period applies only to unrelated statute-barred claims and that new claims cannot be added to a claim already commenced.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to reintroduce damages related to five shipping containers, which had been struck by a consent order five years earlier.

The defendant opposed the amendment, arguing the limitation period had expired, constituting non-compensable prejudice, and that the amendment was an abuse of process and barred by issue estoppel.

The court found that while the amendment was not an abuse of process or barred by issue estoppel, the expiration of the limitation period created non-compensable prejudice.

The motion for leave to amend was dismissed.