Alexandra Hoy

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and breach of trust by a public officer.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence, finding a key witness credible, and applying the elements of fraud.

The appellant had submitted false travel expense claims to the government, claiming $217 per trip while only paying $50 and pocketing the difference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility.

The court also held that the element of deprivation for fraud was met, as the government would not have paid the claims had it known the truth.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing that evidence seized pursuant to a telewarrant should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was insufficient and contained a false statement regarding the unavailability of a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal conducted a Grant analysis and concluded that the officer's conduct was not a serious Charter breach, as the statement, though sworn without personal knowledge, was factually true.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing detention subject to conditions.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to address two Charter applications, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in refusing a conditional discharge.

The court held that the Charter applications were unsupported by particulars or sought remedies beyond the Board's jurisdiction or irrelevant to the annual review, found no material misapprehension of evidence, and concluded that continued detention was adequately supported by the Board's reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing detention subject to conditions permitting community living.

The appellant argued that the Board’s finding of significant risk to the safety of the community was unsupported by the evidence and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the case was close, the evidence of the treating psychiatrist concerning the risk of a return to fire-setting and threatening behaviour supported the Board’s conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement reflected in minutes of settlement.

They argued that a term requiring execution of a release satisfactory to all parties made the settlement conditional, ambiguous, and unenforceable.

The court rejected those submissions, holding that the motion judge found the parties had agreed to the form of release and that finding was not challenged.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing his motion to set aside a registrar's dismissal for delay.

The motion judge applied the Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. test and found that while the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in moving to set aside the order, he failed to adequately explain the litigation delay, his failure to set the action down was deliberate, and he failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the expiry of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants, creditors of a bankrupt corporation, sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence a negligence action against the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the proposed action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellants argued that subsequent appeals of a Registrar's decision regarding the trustee's misconduct tolled the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that all material facts were known to the appellants by June 23, 2008, and the subsequent appeals did not affect the limitation period.

The appellant, a non-citizen, pleaded guilty to obstruction of a peace officer after repeatedly lying to police about her involvement in a fatal hit-and-run committed by her boyfriend.

She received a suspended sentence.

Upon learning that the conviction rendered her inadmissible to Canada, she appealed her sentence, seeking a conditional discharge to avoid deportation.

The summary conviction appeal judge conducted a de novo hearing but dismissed the appeal, finding a discharge contrary to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge properly applied the Supreme Court's framework in Pham regarding collateral immigration consequences and correctly concluded that a discharge would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction for uttering a threat to cause death against a Crown Attorney.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the legal test for a threat.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no error of law of general significance and no merit to the appeal, as the determination that the words constituted a threat was a factual finding fully open to the trial judge.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-car accident.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 839 of the Criminal Code, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge failed to properly review the evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were largely factual, raised no question of law, and did not involve issues of significance to the general administration of criminal justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and put to bed by friends, who shortly after discovered the appellant having sexual intercourse with her.

The trial judge found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent and rejected the appellant's claim of consensual sex.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed two orders: one striking his pleadings for non-compliance with court orders, and another imputing income for support purposes and vesting his half-interest in the matrimonial home in the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The court found no error in the motion judge's decision to strike the pleadings given the appellant's history of non-disclosure and default.

Furthermore, the trial judge's imputation of income and the vesting order were well-supported by the evidence and established jurisprudence.

The appellant, a 20-year-old at the time of the offence, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding a question of law regarding whether the sentencing judge considered if a conditional discharge would serve the public interest.

Noting the appellant's positive post-offence conduct, including compensating the victim, complying with probation, and successfully completing two years of medical school, the Court allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to a conditional discharge.

The appellant purchased a property at a tax sale and claimed a prescriptive right or easement to use a well located on the respondent's neighbouring property.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the appellant's use of the well was governed by a time-limited well-sharing agreement registered on the respondent's title, which expired in 2010.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that the non-registration of the agreement on the appellant's title did not render it ineffective and that the express permission in the agreement precluded any prescriptive rights.

The client appealed a motion judge's decision that set aside an assessment officer's award regarding her solicitors' bill of costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the assessment officer erred by ignoring the retainer agreement, improperly discounting docketed time, and mischaracterizing the complexity of the matrimonial litigation.

The court also rejected the client's allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias against the motion judge.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their proposed class action claims against a food distributor.

The appellants alleged the distributor was a 'franchisor's associate' under the Arthur Wishart Act in relation to a vending machine program run by a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the distributor did not control the third party and was therefore not a franchisor's associate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter and appealed sentence, seeking to rely on fresh Gladue evidence.

The court held there was no reviewable error in the trial judge’s application of the credibility principles in W.D. and dismissed the conviction appeal.

Although the Crown consented to admission of the fresh Gladue report, the court found the appellant’s claim to Gladue consideration weak, the report speculative on causation, and the offences so serious that Aboriginal background did not materially affect sentence fitness.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and his 50-month sentence.

He argued the police used the Highway Traffic Act as a pretext to stop and search his vehicle, violating his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the stop had a valid dual purpose and that the smell of marijuana provided reasonable grounds for arrest.

The court also upheld the admission of evidence under s. 24(2) despite a minor s. 10(b) breach.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the appellant was not entitled to enhanced pre-sentence custody credit because he was on bail and bound by a weapons prohibition at the time of his arrest.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a loaded firearm and assaulting police, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated during a traffic stop.

The trial judge found that while the appellant was arbitrarily detained, he initiated an unjustified assault against the police using excessive force, making the subsequent search that revealed a handgun reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, her conclusion that there was no opportunity to provide right to counsel, or her refusal to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge excluded evidence obtained during a warrantless search of a driver and his vehicle following a traffic stop.

The trial judge found the stop became an unjustified investigative detention and rejected the officers' safety concerns, concluding they were on a 'fishing trip'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's arguments that the trial judge made an unsupported finding of fact regarding a rolling stop and that his questioning of police witnesses created a reasonable apprehension of bias.