Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The applicant, Donald Riggs, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained via search warrants, arguing a violation of his Section 8 Charter rights due to an initial warrantless search of his mobile phone.

The Crown contended that the warrants were valid even if information gleaned from the initial search was excised.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the information provided by the reporting party alone was sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant, and that the 'three Cs' test from R. v. Debot was not applicable to this type of information.

The court also noted the conflicting jurisprudence regarding police actions when private citizens report criminal activity on electronic devices but did not need to resolve it for this decision.

The media applicants sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court judge's decision regarding access to youth court records in a high-profile murder case, arguing the judge erred in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estates test and requiring a formal application.

They also sought to bring a constitutional challenge to the Youth Criminal Justice Act's access provisions.

The court dismissed the certiorari application, finding the Youth Court judge correctly applied the test by balancing the open court principle with the YCJA's privacy protections for young persons, and that a formal application is required for media access under s. 119(1)(s)(ii).

The court also declined to hear the constitutional challenge, stating it should first be heard in Youth Court where a full record is available and which has exclusive jurisdiction over YCJA access issues.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The accused, Shane Codrington, was charged with multiple offences including robbery, sexual assault with an imitation firearm, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault with a weapon, stemming from an incident on July 10, 2019.

The Crown presented evidence including the complainant's testimony, video surveillance, and forensic DNA evidence linking a co-accused.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming an alibi and that evidence was planted.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by video and medical evidence.

The court rejected the accused's alibi and claims of planted evidence, finding his testimony untruthful.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except one related to the co-accused's participation in the elevator assault.

Jevor Brown, co-accused in a sexual assault case, brought a motion under s.11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 46 months and 29 days, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling for indictment cases.

Brown argued that only a four-month period was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the Crown should have severed his case from his co-accused, Shane Codrington, whose actions caused significant delay.

The Crown contended that a longer period of delay was due to the pandemic's "ripple effect" on court capacity, resulting in a net delay below the Jordan ceiling, and that severance was not in the interests of justice given the nature of the charges and potential for a cut-throat defence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the majority of the delay was attributable to the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and its systemic impact, and that the Crown's decision not to sever the trials was justified by the interests of justice.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a police interview conducted with the accused, Donald Riggs, who was charged with voyeurism and other offences.

The accused opposed admission, arguing he lacked an operating mind due to his mental state.

The court, after a voir dire, found the statement to be made voluntarily, noting the absence of police impropriety, the accused's awareness of his rights, and his ability to selectively answer questions, despite his emotional distress.

The statement was deemed admissible.

Michael Roberts sought certiorari to quash his committal for first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge erred by finding evidence of planning and deliberation where none existed, and requested committal for second-degree murder instead.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision for jurisdictional error, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's actions before and after the shooting, was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation, even if other inferences were possible.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, upholding the committal for first-degree murder.

The court sentenced the offender after jury convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his stepdaughter over a lengthy period beginning when she was a child.

Applying the post-Friesen sentencing approach for sexual violence against children, the court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, the offender's breach of trust, the victim's young age, the escalating and intrusive nature of the abuse, the prolonged duration of the offences, and the serious ongoing harm to the victim.

The defence authorities were found distinguishable because they involved fewer incidents, less serious conduct, or meaningful remorse.

A global sentence of seven years' imprisonment was imposed, one count was stayed under Kienapple, and ancillary prohibition, DNA, and lifetime registration orders were made.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges.

The trial judge had excluded all evidence, including pre-arrest observations by a civilian and police, under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) breaches.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the pre-arrest observations were 'obtained in a manner' that violated the Charter, as they were temporally and contextually distinct from the subsequent breaches.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay criminal proceedings against the respondent, Herbert Meawasige, due to an alleged violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application judge had found the total delay of 18 months and 22 days to be unreasonable.

The Superior Court found that the application judge erred in her analysis of defence-attributable delay and failed to adequately consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court re-evaluated the timeline, attributing significant periods of delay to the defence's marked inefficiency and indifference, including failure to diligently obtain disclosure and schedule pre-trials.

After deducting defence-attributable delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicants sought certiorari and mandamus to overturn the Public Prosecution Service of Canada's (PPSC) decision to terminate a private prosecution against Sar-El Canada under the Foreign Enlistment Act.

The applicants alleged the termination was influenced by partisan interests and constituted an abuse of process, arguing there was a reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants lacked standing to challenge the Crown's exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

The court affirmed that prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to withdraw charges based on no reasonable prospect of conviction, is reviewable only for egregious abuse of process, which was not demonstrated in this case.

Brian Luckman was convicted by a jury of trafficking in methamphetamine.

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of 2 years less one day.

The court found Luckman to be a principal offender in a high-level commercial drug trafficking operation involving 4 kilograms of methamphetamine intended for export to Australia.

Considering aggravating factors like the gravity of the offence and mitigating factors such as his lack of a criminal record and prospects for rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment, rejecting the conditional sentence.

The applicants sought judicial review of the respondent's alleged decision to allow coyote hunting contests to proceed without written authorization, contrary to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent did not authorize the contests.

Instead, the contests proceeded without authorization, and the respondent's Enforcement Branch exercised its prosecutorial discretion not to lay charges.

The court held that this discretionary decision is immune from judicial review absent bad faith or abuse of process, which were not alleged.

This ruling addresses a Section 276 Criminal Code application in a sexual assault case, where the accused, Habtamu Kebede, sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity and communications.

The court dismissed the application for certain utterances (race-based sexual preferences and sexual inactivity) due to lack of relevance and high prejudicial effect.

However, it granted the admission of video evidence showing flirtatious behaviour at a bar and evidence of a goodbye kiss at the complainant's Airbnb, finding these relevant to the complainant's credibility and the surrounding circumstances of the alleged offence, with their probative value outweighing any prejudice.

The applicant, Anh Chiem, charged with first-degree murder, sought to quash a production order compelling the Law Society of Ontario (LSO) to disclose her complaints against the deceased lawyer.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked standing under s. 487.0193 of the Criminal Code, as only the party ordered to produce (the LSO) could initiate such a challenge.

The court also held that the Criminal Code provisions for production orders operate independently of the Law Society Act's disclosure criteria, and that issues of privilege or incrimination are addressed within the Code's framework or at the admissibility stage.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal killing of a vulnerable 75-year-old woman in her apartment.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 18-20 years, while the defence argued for 12-15 years.

The court considered the horrific nature of the attack, the vulnerability of the victim, the offender's lack of prior record, and his mental health issues.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial.

The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and preferred the line of cases holding that the dock is the customary position for an accused.

The court found that seating the accused in the dock does not infringe the presumption of innocence, avoids the prejudice of having multiple security officers surrounding the accused at counsel table, and ensures the accused remains visible to the jury.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter application to exclude his police interview, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The arresting officer initially informed the accused he was arrested for unrelated offences, delaying mention of the homicide investigation for seven minutes to avoid upsetting the accused's family.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach as the accused was subsequently informed of his true jeopardy and provided his right to counsel multiple times, constituting a 'fresh start'.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, and would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision upholding the constitutionality of Bill 66, which amended the Labour Relations Act to deem municipalities as non-construction employers.

The union argued this violated section 2(d) of the Charter by nullifying their collective agreements and subcontracting protections.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board correctly applied binding precedent and that the amendments did not substantially interfere with the right to a meaningful process of collective bargaining.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying him statutory accident benefits after he fell from the roof of his camper trailer while cleaning it.

The Adjudicator had found the incident did not meet the causation test for an 'accident' because there was no evidence the appellant tripped on the trailer or that the trailer directly caused the fall.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Adjudicator erred in law by requiring direct physical contact with the vehicle to establish causation.

The court found that falling from the trailer while inspecting it was a normal incident of the risk created by its use, satisfying the definition of an accident under the Schedule.